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Abstract: 
In this thesis, the South African legal system's attempt to address sexual violence is explored through 
the lens of the work of the French feminist philosopher, Luce Irigaray. It will be argued that the South 
African equality jurisprudence lays the foundation for a strongly Irigarayan approach to the 
transformation of sex and gender relations in so far as our right to equality can be interpreted as being 
underpinned by an acknowledgment of embodiment, sexual particularity and difference. Our 
Constitution envisions equality as a value informed by difference rather than sameness and, in 
accordance with Irigaray’s work, it can be said that the implication of this is that the pursuit of the 
transformation of sex and gender relations on the one hand, and an acknowledgment of sexual 
difference on the other, are not mutually exclusive, but that sex equality instead calls for a 
fundamental recognition of sexual difference and an authentic response to the demands thereof. 
However, it will be argued that our newly reformed sexual violence legislation undermines the 
progress made on a constitutional level by entrenching a problematic approach to sexual difference in 
the definition of the crime of rape. This is done through firstly, defining the crime of rape in gender-
neutral terms and secondly, retaining the concept of consent as the distinguishing characteristic 
between sex and rape. I will argue that through these features, our sexual violence legislation reflects 
the most basic mistakes that Irigaray identifies with the law. It will be argued that the legislation, on 
the one hand, denies sexual difference in a way that is prejudicial to women through its gender-neutral 
language, while at the same time, through the concept of consent, (re-)introducing a hierarchical 
construction of masculine and feminine sexuality into the Act in terms of which femininity is 
construed as derivative of, and inferior to, masculinity. Furthermore, the combination of the gender 
neutrality of the definition and the concept of consent exacerbates the situation, in so far as the gender 
neutrality masks the harmful construal of sexual difference that is incorporated in the definition 
through the concept of consent. Accordingly, judged from an Irigarayan perspective, the South 
African sexual violence legislation is deeply problematic. In addition, the legislation undercuts 
important constitutional developments, in so far as it ignores the constitutional insights that, firstly, 
sexual violence is a problem of sex inequality, and that secondly, the pursuit of the transformation of 
sex and gender relations is served, rather than undercut by a concern with particularities.  On this 
basis, it is argued that the South African sexual violence legislation should be amended so that the 
concept of consent is removed and the crime of rape is defined in sex-specific language (while still 
allowing for male victims and female perpetrators) that facilitates judicial understanding of the 
complexities of the crime of rape. 
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Abstrak: 
In hierdie tesis sal die Suid-Afrikaanse regsisteem se poging om seksuele geweld aan te spreek, deur 
die lens van die werk van Luce Irigaray, ‘n Franse feministiese filosoof, ondersoek word. Daar sal 
geargumenteer word dat die Suid-Afrikaanse gelykheidsjurisprudensie ‘n grondslag vir ‘n sterk 
Irigarayiese benadering tot die transformasie van geslagsverhoudinge lê, in soverre ons reg op 
gelykheid geïnterpreteer kan word om in ‘n erkenning van beliggaming, seksuele spesifiekheid en 
verskil (“difference”) begrond te wees. Ons Grondwet stel gelykheid as ‘n waarde wat deur verskil 
eerder as eenvormigheid geïnformeer is, voor oë, en in lyn met die werk van Irigaray, kan daar gesê 
word dat die implikasie hiervan is dat die nastrewing van die transformasie van geslagsverhoudinge 
aan die een kant, en die erkenning van geslagsonderskeid (“sexual difference”) aan die ander, nie 
wedersyds uitsluitlik is nie, maar dat geslagsgelykheid eerder juis ‘n fundamentele erkenning van 
geslagsonderskeid en ‘n outentieke reaksie op die eise daarvan, noop.  Daar sal egter geargumenteer 
word dat ons nuuthervormde wetgewing oor seksuele geweld die vordering wat op ‘n grondwetlike 
vlak gemaak is, ondermyn deur ‘n problematiese benadering tot geslagsonderskeid in die definisie van 
die misdaad van verkragting te verskans. Dit word bewerkstellig deur eerstens, die misdaad van 
verkragting in geslagsneutrale taal te formuleer, en tweedens, om die begrip van toestemming as 
onderskeidende kenmerk tussen seks en verkragting, te behou. Ek sal argumenteer dat dit deur hierdie 
eienskappe is, wat ons wetgewing oor seksuele geweld die mees basiese probleme wat Irigaray in die 
reg identifiseer, weerspieël. Daar sal voorgehou word dat die wetgewing, aan die een kant, deur die 
geslagsneutrale taal, geslagsonderskeid ontken op ‘n manier wat vrouens benadeel, terwyl dit 
terselfdertyd, deur die begrip van toestemming, ‘n hiërargiese verhouding tussen die manlike en die 
vroulike in die wetgewing daarstel, in terme waarvan die vroulike as derivatief en minderwaardig tot 
die manlike verstaan word. Verder, die situasie word deur die kombinasie van die geslagsneutraliteit 
van die definisie en die begrip van toetsemming, vererger deurdat die geslagsneutraliteit van die taal 
die skadelike vertolking van geslagonderskeid wat deur die begrip van toestemming in die definisie 
ingesluit word, verberg. Dus, vanuit ‘n Irigarayiese perspektief is die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing oor 
seksuele geweld diep problematies. Verder, die wetgewing ondermyn belangrike grondwetlike 
ontwikkelinge in soverre dit die volgende grondwetlike insigte ignoreer: eerstens, dat seksuele geweld 
‘n probleem van geslagsongelykheid is en tweedens, dat die strewe na transformasie van 
geslagsverhoudinge gedien, eerder as ondermyn word deur ‘n besorgdheid met die partikuliere. Op 
hierdie gronde word daar geargumenteer dat die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing oor seksuele geweld 
gewysig behoort te word, deur die begrip van toestemming te verwyder en die misdaad te definieer in 
geslagspesifieke taal (op ‘n manier waardeur manlike slagoffers en vroulike oortreders steeds 
ingesluit word) wat geregtiglike begrip van die kompleksiteite van die misdaad van verkragting 
bemiddel. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I   Scope and outline 
The South African rape statistics are widely publicised, well known and rarely fail to shock.  
The South African Police Service (SAPS) crime statistics of 2010/2011 report that 56,272 
cases of rape were reported during that year. Furthermore, this figure is estimated to reflect 
merely a fraction of the rapes that actually occurred, in so far as studies have found that only 
one in nine rapes are reported (Jewkes & Abrahams 2002:1233). Less than half of reported 
rape cases result in the initial arrest of the alleged perpetrator in order to start the prosecution 
process, and a trial commences in only 14.7 percent of cases (Vetten et al 2008:7). A 2012 
study by Interpol estimates that a woman is raped every 17 seconds, and that one in four 
women in South Africa suffers domestic violence (Odhiambo 2011). The SAPS rape statistics 
of 2007 – 2011 report that twenty-six percent of reported rape cases in South Africa are 
retracted before they get to court, fifty-three percent of reported cases are thrown out of court, 
and in only eleven percent of reported cases are there successful convictions (Gouws 2012:8). 
In addition, statistics reveal that the incidence of rape in South Africa is not decreasing but 
increasing (SAPS Crime Report 2011:10). 
Rape is not the only violent threat that South African women face. According to a study by 
the Medical Research Council (the MRC), South Africa has a female homicide rate six times 
higher than the global average, and half the women that are murdered are killed by an 
intimate partner (Jewkes et al 2009:1). In 2004, the MRC found in another study that a 
woman is killed by her intimate partner every six hours (Mathews et al 2004:2). At the 
beginning of 2012, the ‘miniskirt incident’ focused attention on the way in which some South 
African men deem it their right to sexually violate women if they dress in a certain way. 
Harassment at taxi ranks of women wearing miniskirts has been reported since 2008. The 
Mail & Guardian reported that “[w]omen in miniskirts are stripped naked, assaulted and left 
to the mercy of bystanders” at taxi ranks in Johannesburg (Williams 2008)1. A member of the 
Gauteng community safety portfolio committee explained that “these thugs want to say what 
women should wear” (Williams 2008). In 2012, attention was again focused on this problem 
when fifty to sixty men were caught on camera chasing, punching and groping a girl wearing 
                                                          
1 Because this is a newspaper article that I accessed electronically, there is no page number to refer to. The 
same goes for the article titled Premier condemns sexual harassment at Noord taxi rank.  
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a miniskirt at a Johannesburg taxi rank (Premier condemns sexual harassment at Noord taxi 
rank, 2012). NUMSA commented as follows: “[t]he action of these lumpens that women 
should not wear miniskirts in public, including taxi ranks, borders on societal patriarchy and 
relegation of women into cheap sexual commodities as fostered and entrenched by [the] 
capitalist system” (sic.) (Premier condemns sexual harassment at Noord taxi rank, 2012). 
South Africa is therefore a society where the freedom, dignity and physical well-being of 
women are under constant attack from personal and public sources through sexual violence 
and the threat thereof. This is despite the fact that the Constitutional Court has emphasised on 
several occasions the constitutional duty of the state to protect women from sexual violence. 
For example, in the case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 
(10) BCLR 995 (CC), the Constitutional Court confirmed that the state has a constitutional 
obligation to respect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Constitution, and more specifically, 
to protect women’s right to safety and security. The Court also declared that South Africa has 
a duty under international law to prohibit all gender-based discrimination which results in, or 
is intended to limit, the enjoyment by women of their fundamental human rights and 
freedoms (par 62). Furthermore, the right to freedom and security of the person, which 
includes the right to be free from violence from public and private sources, is explicitly 
guaranteed in section 12 of the Constitution. In this regard, Catherine Albertyn, a prominent 
South African legal scholar and feminist, notes that the explicit and specific inclusion of this 
right, as well as the fact that it also finds horizontal application (which means that it can be 
applied in the context of private agents), is unusual in a national constitution (Albertyn et al 
2007:297). Accordingly, it is clear that the South African Constitution goes out of its way to 
condemn violence against women. The fact that sexual violence remains so rife in South 
Africa is thus also deeply problematic from a constitutional perspective. A further concern is 
that there is no clear indication that the legislation dealing with sexual violence, despite the 
fact that it recently underwent a process of reform, has thus far improved the low rate of 
successful convictions in rape cases, or even changed the way in which rape is handled by the 
courts. 
In this thesis, I will use the work of Luce Irigaray, a French feminist philosopher, to critically 
evaluate the South African legal system’s attempt to address sexual violence against women. 
Irigaray traces the problem of the oppression of women to its symbolic origins, and argues 
that an overhaul of the existing symbolic order is necessary in order to emancipate and 
empower women. She also offers a strategy for such transformation. This strategy entails, 
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firstly, a rethinking of the subject of the western (and currently globally dominant) symbolic, 
social and legal order. In this regard, Irigaray argues that the disembodied, universal subject 
of the western symbolic order represents an exaggerated form of masculinity, and that it is 
established and maintained through the exclusion of the feminine - a category representing 
the embodied and the particular. Irigaray then calls for an acknowledgment of the sexed 
embodiment and particularity of all human beings as the first step toward sex equality 
(Irigaray 1993b:12). If the subject is reconceptualised in this way, the ideal of equality is not 
brought about through identical treatment of all people, but through the recognition of the 
equal value of all persons in all their difference, and through allowing everyone an equal 
opportunity to flourish as sexed beings. Irigaray also ascribes a very specific role to the law 
in this symbolic transformation, by arguing that the law should carve out a space for feminine 
subjectivity and identity in civil society by acknowledging sexual difference and providing 
both women and men with sex-specific rights that are aimed at their particular needs and 
vulnerabilities. Irigaray’s work thus provides a convincing account of the pervasiveness and 
resilience of patriarchy, in so far as she understands the patriarchal system to be rooted at the 
fundamental level of the understanding of subjectivity in the western social and symbolic 
order. In this thesis, I will explore the extent to which the Constitution and the South African 
legal system make possible the kind of symbolic transformation that Irigaray deems to be 
necessary for the successful empowerment of women and the fight against sexual violence.  
The first chapter of the thesis will be dedicated to an exposition of the main tenets of 
Irigaray’s work. I will elaborate on, enhance and supplement Irigaray’s theory with reference 
to other feminist thinkers who develop her ideas in ways that render them specifically 
applicable to equality and the law. This exposition will constitute the theoretical framework 
which will form the basis for the arguments in the rest of the thesis. The second chapter will 
be dedicated to an exploration of the right to sex equality as formulated and developed in our 
constitutional order, in order to determine the extent to which it allows for an interpretation of 
equality that is in line with Irigaray’s emphasis on sexual particularity and difference. This is 
relevant in so far as it will be argued that sexual violence is a matter of sex inequality and 
that, accordingly, sexual violence cannot be addressed successfully if the structural 
inequalities between the sexes remain intact. In the third chapter an evaluation of South 
Africa’s sexual offences legislation, in light of the discussions in the first two chapters, will 
follow. 
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The main argument, that will crystallise in the course of the abovementioned discussions, is 
that the South African equality jurisprudence lays the foundation for a strongly Irigarayan 
approach to the transformation of sex and gender relations in so far as our right to equality 
can be interpreted as being underpinned by an acknowledgment of embodiment, sexual 
particularity and difference. Our Constitution envisions equality as a value informed by 
difference rather than sameness and, in accordance with Irigaray’s work, it can be said that 
the implication of this is that the pursuit of the transformation of sex and gender relations on 
the one hand, and an acknowledgment of sexual difference on the other, are not mutually 
exclusive, but that sex equality instead calls for a fundamental recognition of sexual 
difference and an authentic response to the demands thereof. However, it will be argued that 
our newly reformed sexual violence legislation undermines the progress made on a 
constitutional level by entrenching a problematic approach to sexual difference in the 
definition of the crime of rape. This approach is entrenched, firstly, by defining the crime of 
rape in gender-neutral terms, and secondly, by retaining the concept of consent as the 
distinguishing characteristic between sex and rape. I will argue that, through these features, 
our sexual violence legislation reflects the most basic mistakes that thinkers like Irigaray 
identify with the law. It will be argued that the legislation, on the one hand, denies sexual 
difference in a way that is prejudicial to women, while on the other hand simultaneously (re-) 
introducing a hierarchical construction of masculine and feminine sexuality into the Act, in 
terms of which femininity is construed as derivative of, and inferior to, masculinity. It will 
thus be argued that the legislation undercuts important constitutional developments and 
cannot guarantee justice to women in the context of rape. 
The next section of this Introduction will be dedicated to establishing rape as an act of both 
sex and violence, which therefore implies that it cannot be reduced to either of these 
components. In the subsequent section, I will explain the reciprocal relationship between rape 
and sex inequality which forms the point of departure for the second chapter of this thesis. 
Thereafter, I will comment on the use of certain terminology. Lastly, a brief discussion 
regarding the role of the law in the transformation of sex and gender relations and the fight 
against sexual violence will follow.  
II   Rape, sex and violence 
The arguments in this thesis flow from the standpoint that rape is not simply an instance of 
private, criminal violence like physical assault, but that it fulfils a very specific political 
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function which entails the large scale subordination of women and, accordingly, the 
maintenance of patriarchal rule after the advent of democracy in South Africa. It will be 
shown that this implies that rape is a gendered and gendering phenomenon which cannot be 
understood independently of its sexual meanings, to the extent that it is an act perpetrated as a 
masculine form of dominance over the feminine through sexual means.  
In her book, Rethinking Rape, Ann Cahill (an American feminist whose work will form the 
basis of my discussion of South Africa’s sexual violence legislation) highlights the problems 
underlying the line of thinking which defines rape as a purely violent crime. Cahill identifies 
Susan Brownmiller, a feminist who wrote in the 1970s in America and whose views were 
largely adopted by the second wave feminists, as one of the main proponents of this view. 
Brownmiller advocated for an understanding of rape as a violent crime rather than a sexual 
one, in so far as it is argued that rape does not result from lust, but from an urge to exercise 
power over the victim (Cahill 2001:1). Rape is then “a deliberate, hostile, violent act of 
degradation and possession on the part of a would-be conqueror, designed to intimidate and 
inspire fear” (Brownmiller 1975:391). Brownmiller writes: 
[T]he rapist performs a myrmidon function for all men by keeping all women in a 
thrall of anxiety and fear. Rape is to women as lynching was to blacks: the ultimate 
physical threat by which all men keep all women in a state of psychological 
intimidation. Women have been raped by men, most often by gangs of men […] as 
group punishment for being uppity, for getting out of line, for failing to recognize 
‘one’s place,’ for assuming sexual freedoms, or for behaviour no more provocative 
than walking down the wrong road at night in the wrong part of town and presenting a 
convenient, isolated target for group hatred and rage (1975:245 -255). 
For Brownmiller and the second wave feminists, separating rape from sexuality was an 
important political move in so far as it allowed for the focus to shift from the victim to the 
perpetrator in rape trials (Cahill 2001:20). If rape is understood as sexually inspired, the 
victim’s sexuality can easily be regarded to be the primary cause of the rape, and it is this 
kind of thinking that justifies the Court’s interrogation of the victim as to what she wore the 
night she was raped, how she acted toward the alleged perpetrator, and what her sexual 
history is (Cahill 2001: 20). Accordingly, Cahill argues that Brownmiller’s reformulation of 
rape as a crime of violence and not sex did serve an important function at the time in so far as 
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it contributed to countering the default or widespread assumption of female complicity in 
rape (Cahill 2001:119).  
However, the main problem that Cahill identifies with this approach is that defining rape 
purely in terms of violence results in the setting up of a false dichotomy between power or 
politics on the one hand, and sexuality on the other, and that this misses the complex 
interplay between these two domains (Cahill 2001:26). Cahill points out that rape is distinct 
from other political violence in that group domination is exercised through sexual means, 
invoking the sexuality of the perpetrator as well as the victim (Cahill 2001:26). Interestingly, 
although Brownmiller tries to rid rape of its sexual elements by conceiving of it as purely a 
violent phenomenon, an interplay between sex and violence is strikingly evident in her 
theory, in that she conceives of rape as sexual violence that is directed towards women 
because of their sex. Accordingly, even though Brownmiller wants to deny the sexual aspects 
of rape, she does not succeed in escaping it. Cahill (2001:27) explains this powerfully: 
Simply put, it matters that sexuality is the medium of the power and violence that are 
imposed on the victim. It matters that the act of rape constructs male sexuality in a 
particular way such that it constitutes a way of imposing harm, pain and 
powerlessness. It matters that the act of rape constructs female sexuality in terms of 
passivity, victimhood, and lack of agency. It matters too that in the context of the 
assault, the rapist is sexually aroused. [...] The rapist’s sexuality is engaged: he 
experiences an erection and, frequently, orgasm. That these sexual experiences may 
be the result of the violence and the asymmetric power relations inherent in the assault 
makes them no less sexual in nature. 
Cahill’s point is thus that the crime of rape is significantly and importantly different from 
other violent attacks in so far as it achieves its goal of domination through sexual means. This 
is central to the argument that I want to make. Rape strikes at the most intimate sphere of 
interaction between the sexes, and the attack is aimed at cruelly displaying one type of sexual 
being’s dominance over the other. Catherine MacKinnon, a radical feminist and lawyer 
whose work will form the basis of many arguments made in the last chapter of this thesis, 
writes: 
Sexual violence symbolizes and actualizes women’s subordinate social status to men. 
It is both an indication and a practice of inequality between the sexes, specifically of 
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the low status of women relative to men. Availability for aggressive intimate intrusion 
and use at will for pleasure by another defines who one is socially taken to be and 
constitutes an index of social worth. To be a means to the end of the sexual pleasure 
of one more powerful is, empirically, a degraded status and the female position 
(2005:129). 
Rape is therefore not merely a passing incident between one man and one woman, but shapes 
both masculine and feminine sexuality in general in a very specific way by, firstly, 
constructing the penis as a weapon and the vagina as a potential target (thus undercutting the 
idea that male and female sexuality function on a complementary and mutually dependent 
basis for sexual pleasure and procreation), and secondly, constantly reminding women that 
their sexuality renders them vulnerable and inferior. Debra Bergoffen, an American feminist 
philosopher, writes in this regard: 
Within patriarchy, the sexual disymmetry of the human body is marked as crucial. 
Thus the question of trust is translated into the question of the sexual relationship. It 
then gets perverted. Instead of recognizing a mutual vulnerability between men and 
women that throws them both before each other in the passion and heteronomy of a 
trust that can neither be determined nor measured, it establishes the law of patriarchal 
disymmetry. [...] The sexual difference, instead of revealing our shared human 
vulnerability; instead of throwing us all before each other in our embodied finitude; 
instead of opening us to the passions, uncertainties, and necessities of trust; becomes 
the structure through which only one sex lives the humanity of vulnerability 
(2003:131).  
In this regard, Cahill argues that the threat of rape even becomes part of feminine bodily 
comportment, in so far as it affects how women live their bodies (Cahill 2001:159).  
It is difficult to deny this allegedly gendered nature of rape if one considers the fact that men 
and boys world-wide make up, at most, about seven percent of all rape victims, and that less 
than one percent of perpetrators are women (Stemple 2009:606-607). Furthermore, statistics 
regarding instances of rape where the victims are male indicate certain trends that show that 
these arguments about the gendered nature of rape are also applicable to male rape. Men who 
become the victims of rape are often perceived to be more ‘feminine’ by the rapist and in the 
process of the rape are also actively ‘feminised’ by the rapist; homosexual men have a higher 
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chance of being raped and men who rape men mostly identify as heterosexual (Du Toit 
2012a:52). In addition, male rape occurs mainly within “strongly hierarchised, 
institutionalised all-male settings such as prisons or prisoner-of-war camps” (Du Toit 
2012a:52). Moreover, Lara Stemple writes that rape is used in prison to maintain a prison 
hierarchy analogous to the gender hierarchy in which the victims who are humiliated and 
dominated are also feminised (Stemple 2009: 610). Stemple explains that in South African 
prisons, the notorious ‘28s’ gang determines the rules for sex and rape through maintaining a 
strict gender hierarchy which consists of the so-called masculine ‘blood line’ and the 
feminine ‘private line’. Members of the masculine blood line choose ‘wyfies’ (the Afrikaans 
term for female animals) from the feminine private line who are forced to perform duties that 
are traditionally those of a wife – namely domestic chores and sexual services (Stemple 
2009:611). In Ross Kemp’s documentary (Ross Kemp on Gangs, 2007) about the South 
African numbers gangs, he interviews John Mongrel, the leader of the 28s, who is currently 
incarcerated in Pollsmoor. In reaction to Mongrel’s description of ‘having sex’ with men in 
Pollsmoor Prison, Kemp asks Mongrel whether he is gay. Mongrel emphatically exclaims 
that he is not, after which Kemp asks why he has ‘sex’ with men then. Mongrel replies that he 
does not have sex with men, that they are women, or ‘wyfies’, that they do his domestic 
chores and that he has sex with them in the missionary position. In this sense, feminist 
philosopher Louise du Toit holds that male rape (rape of men) is “parasitical” on female rape 
for its meaning in so far as the male victim is feminised and humiliated for his perceived or 
imposed femininity (Du Toit 2012a:57) and that women and girls mostly constitute the target 
of rape because they are female / feminine (Du Toit 2012a:52). Similarly, Judge Langa writes 
in the case of Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions (Pretoria) and Others 2007 (8) 
BCLR 827 (CC): 
[T]he groups of men who are most often the survivors of rape, young boys, prisoners 
and homosexuals, are, like women, also vulnerable groups in our society. Moreover, 
they, and most other male victims, are raped precisely because of the gendered nature 
of the crime. They are dominated in the same manner and for the same reason that 
women are dominated; because of a need for male gender-supremacy. That they lack 
a vagina does not make the crime of male rape any less gender-based (par 86). 
In the same vein, Shafer and Frye (1977:334) famously write: 
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Rape is a man’s act, whether it is a male or a female man and whether it is a man 
relatively permanently or relatively temporarily; and being raped is a woman’s 
experience, whether it is a female or a male woman and whether it is woman 
relatively permanently or relatively temporarily. 
It is thus clear on what grounds thinkers like Cahill argue that rape is a distinctly sexual and 
gendered kind of violence, in that it serves the system of patriarchal oppression of the female 
or feminine. However, Cahill is careful not to reduce the effects of rape to its broader 
political function, but highlights that rape is also sexual on a personal or individual level, in 
so far as the sexual specifics of the bodies of both victim and assailant have an effect on their 
experience of the sexual attack (Cahill 2001:163). Accordingly, Cahill identifies rape as a 
sexual act on both a social and personal level (Cahill 2001:121) in so far as it constructs 
sexuality in a hierarchical manner through a violent attack through sexual means on the sexed 
body of an individual. Furthermore, the political function of rape influences the personal 
experience thereof, and each individual experience of rape is implicated in the social function 
(Cahill 2001:126). What this means is that the personal and individual experience of the 
sexual attack is aggravated by the political function thereof, in that the victim is not only 
objectified and sexually used by the man attacking her, but that through the rape a message is 
also conveyed to her about her lack of agency and worth – on the basis of her sexual 
embodiment – in the context of a broader patriarchal society. Feminine sexuality is thus 
constructed as instrumental; as a function for man. The personal experience of rape is thus 
informed by (yet irreducible to) its place in the greater political narrative of society. 
Similarly, the political function that rape fulfils, namely keeping women/the feminine ‘in 
their/its place’ in the sexual hierarchy, is enabled through the sexual humiliation and 
degradation that the individual victim experiences. This point can also be made with 
reference to Kellard’s distinction between direct and indirect harms of rape. Kellard uses the 
term “direct harm” to refer to the harms done to the victim of rape, for example the violation 
of her sexual bodily integrity (Kellard 2012:91). On the other hand, “indirect harm” refers to 
the social effects of the act of rape, in its maintenance of patriarchal rule through a “systemic 
sexualised control of women” (Kellard 2012:101). Rape thus harms its individual victims 
directly, but also causes indirect harm to women and feminised men as a collective (Kellard 
2012:103). Furthermore, as explained above with reference to the personal and political 
functions of rape, the direct and indirect harms of rape inform each other in a reciprocal way.  
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Rape is thus a gendered and gendering crime, and it will be argued throughout this thesis that 
it can therefore not be understood or successfully addressed without reference to its sexual 
meanings and the sexed bodies of both perpetrator and victim.   
III   Rape and inequality 
The arguments regarding the sexual and gendered nature of the crime of rape directly explain 
its connection with sex inequality. In this regard Naylor (2008:23), a South African legal 
theorist, writes: 
The intention of gender-based violence is to perpetuate and promote hierarchical 
gender relations. No matter how the violence is manifested it ultimately serves the 
same end: the preservation of male control and power. [...] Sexual violence is thus 
seen and contextualised as a form of social control. 
Albertyn et al (2007:300) note that “[i]n the case of South Africa, sexual assault can therefore 
be said to reflect the substantial gender power inequalities that pervade our society”. With 
reference to the quote by Naylor above, it can be added that apart from reflecting sexual 
inequalities of our society, sexual violence also maintains these inequalities.  
Furthermore, Du Toit (2012b:10) writes: 
[A] political analysis helps us to see those who rape, those who threaten rape, and 
those who tolerate rape (all of us), as political actors who informally but with large-
scale social support impose a system of oppression on women as a group in order to 
violently re-subject them to male power. This is a campaign of defiance against the 
Constitution and the spirit of freedom for all in which the new political dispensation 
was born. 
On this basis Du Toit (2012b:14) argues that rape functions as a strategy to establish the 
patriarchal foundations of the South African society of the future. Du Toit (2012b:14) 
explains that this does not mean that every individual rapist is consciously motivated by the 
overarching political aim of rape to maintain patriarchy. However, the fact that, firstly, rape is 
meted out by men against women for reasons such as punishment, warning, or as a display of 
ownership; secondly, that there exists a kind of social consensus that rape is a medium to 
punish women or to portray certain messages; and thirdly that it is tolerated to such a large 
extent in our society, indicate that rape is never merely a random and isolated event in the 
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personal life of the rapist, but also has a specific place in the machinery of patriarchy (Du 
Toit 2012b:14).  MacKinnon also writes: 
Surely the legal tolerance of sexual assault is not a fact of nature. It is a fact of sex 
inequality in human societies, supported by ideologies that explain and exonerate 
systemic abuses of women by appeals to biological fact (2005:242). 
These remarks from Du Toit, Albertyn, Naylor and MacKinnon bring the reciprocal 
relationship between sex inequality and sexual violence to the fore. This entails that, on the 
one hand, it is the existing inequality between men and women that results in the occurrence 
of rape on such a large scale, while, on the other hand, sexual violence is one of the primary 
ways of maintaining these same patriarchal power structures.  
In support of the first point - namely, that rape of women by men is made possible by sex 
inequality - it can be argued that women can also rape men. A powerful example of this from 
popular culture can be found in Stieg Larsson’s novel The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo 
(2005) where the main character takes revenge on her rapist by returning to her rapist’s home, 
tying him up and raping him in return by repeatedly penetrating his anus forcefully and 
violently with a dildo which causes him immense humiliation and pain. However, such 
vindication by women very rarely happens, not because it is physically impossible, but 
because in our patriarchal society femininity is not conceived of or imagined as a position of 
sexual agency, and much less as a position of aggression and dominance, and this is also, 
importantly, the case for women themselves. Women who access positions of dominance or 
aggression are seen as unnatural, and this is therefore not something that society (including 
women) recognises as an option for women. Linda Sjoberg explains the problem as follows 
with reference to female perpetrators in genocidal violence: 
In addition to distinctions between women’s commission of genocide and genocidal 
rape and men’s commission of similar war crimes, women who commit genocide are 
distinguished from other, “real,” women. “Real” or “normal” women are seen as 
incapable of committing genocide generally and the sexual violation of women 
specifically. “Real” women are peaceful, conservative, virtuous, and restrained; 
violent women ignore those boundaries of womanhood. [...] Because their stories do 
not resonate with these inherited images of femininity, violent women are 
marginalized in political discourse. Their choices are rarely seen as choices, and, 
when they are, they are characterized as apolitical (2011:27). 
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The point is not that women should start raping or killing men. Rather, the fact that society 
understands rape as a mechanism available to men for use against women and some men and 
boys, while not even conceiving of it as an option for women against men, constitutes an 
indication of the strongly hierarchical construction or imaginary of sexuality that underlies 
our social order. Moreover, this imaginary is also reflected in the way in which rape of 
women by men is so often justified and excused by society and the state, and tolerated to such 
a large extent by the law. 
However, as explained above, sexual violence is not only the result of the existing structures 
of sex or gender inequality, but also plays a central part in the maintenance and perpetuation 
of these unequal power structures, in so far as rape “forcibly re-sexualises women, turns them 
symbolically into objects and possessions of men, renders them as natural objects for the use 
of men, and thus de-politicises their status” (Du Toit 2012b:13).    
Accordingly, the eradication of sexual violence would be central to the achievement of 
equality, while equality between the sexes would mean that rape would not be tolerated.  
In a constitutional context, this relationship between sexual violence and inequality between 
women and men has been acknowledged on numerous occasions. For example, in the Masiya 
case (2007) Judge Nkabinde writes: 
It is now widely accepted that sexual violence and rape not only offends the privacy 
and dignity of women but also reflects the unequal power relations between men and 
women in our society (par 28). 
Furthermore, sexual violence is listed in the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act, 4 of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as PEPUDA) as an instance of unfair 
discrimination on the grounds of gender. PEPUDA was promulgated to give effect to section 
9 of the Constitution by developing section 9 in such a way so as to promote equality and 
eliminate unfair discrimination. The fact that sexual violence is thus listed in PEPUDA as an 
instance of unfair discrimination on the ground of gender therefore implies constitutional 
recognition of the fact that sexual violence is both an equality issue and a sex/gender issue.  
Accordingly, it is submitted, on the basis of these arguments, that an exploration and 
evaluation of the legal system’s response to sexual violence should also include an 
examination of its approach to sex inequality.  
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IV   Terminology 
For purposes of the clarification of the terminology that will be used in this thesis, it is 
necessary to pause for a moment at the sex/gender distinction. In terms of this distinction, sex 
is regarded as referring to the biological traits that distinguish men from women, and gender 
is understood as the social, cultural and sexual attitude or identity that accompanies the 
biologically sexed body. Cahill explains that this distinction became prominent in liberal 
feminism in the 1970s, because the concept of gender allowed feminists to contest the values 
ascribed to femininity as cultural constructions rather than biological necessities (Cahill 
2001:5). Gender was thus seen as the site for the feminist revolution in so far as, while the 
biological facts of being a woman couldn’t be changed, feminine attitudes and identity could 
(Cahill 2001:5). Cahill explains that the political goal of liberal feminism could then be 
understood as a denial of the relevance of (biological) sex (Cahill 2001:5).  
The problematic nature of a simplistic sex/gender distinction is highlighted by many 
feminists. Among them is Elizabeth Grosz, an Australian feminist, who aims to counter the 
dualist logic of western Cartesian metaphysics in terms of which the body has “generally 
remained mired in presumptions regarding its naturalness, its fundamentally biological and 
pre-cultural status, its immunity to cultural, social and historical factors, its brute status as 
given, unchangeable, inert and passive, manipulable under scientifically regulated 
conditions” (Grosz 1994:x). The most obvious problem with the distinction between sex and 
gender is, then, that in terms of the distinction, the body is regarded as completely natural, 
pre-cultural and a-historical, thus ignoring the fact that bodies are “not only inscribed, 
marked, engraved, by social pressures external to them but are the products, direct effects, of 
the very social constitution of nature itself” (Grosz 1994:x). Grosz evokes the logic of the 
model of the Möbius Strip, a three dimensional, inverted figure eight, the surface of which 
defies a clear distinction between inside and outside, in order to reconceptualise the 
distinction between body and mind. In this regard she explains that “bodies and minds are not 
two distinct substances or two kinds or attributes of a single substance, but [...] through 
twisting [...] one side becomes another” (Grosz 1994:xii).  The argument is thus that the body 
is always shaped by and interpreted in terms of social and cultural contexts, while these 
constructs are, in turn, influenced by the body, so that the nature/culture dichotomy is 
rendered superficial. The sex/gender distinction then becomes dangerous in so far as 
regarding the body as completely natural implies a naturalisation of certain cultural attitudes 
and constructs. As a result, the use of the term ‘sex’ – understood as an intersection of the 
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corporeal, cultural and symbolic – is much preferred to the term ‘gender’ in contemporary 
feminist theory (Cahill 2001:5).   
Because the South African Constitution still upholds the traditional liberal distinction 
between sex and gender and refers, for example, specifically to discrimination on the ground 
of gender, I will also often refer to the term in my discussion of the South African 
constitutional position. However, in so far as I have argued above that it is widely held in 
feminist circles that the distinction is superficial, my use of the term ‘gender’ will not refer to 
anything different to my use of the word ‘sex’.   
In this regard, I also want to draw a distinction between my use of the words ‘masculine’ and 
feminine’ on the one hand, and ‘male’ and ‘female’ on the other. With ‘masculine’ and 
‘feminine’ I refer to the symbolic categories of being that are associated with different sets of 
sexed values and characteristics. Where ‘femininity’ is associated with values like 
vulnerability, motherhood, dependence, plurality, and is regarded as corresponding to an 
ethics of care, masculinity is set up as invulnerable, independent, singular and corresponding 
to an ethics of justice. In a patriarchal symbolic order, masculinity and femininity are set up 
in a hierarchical dichotomy, where masculinity is the dominant position and its characteristics 
and corresponding values are deemed more important than those of the feminine. Even 
though femininity is seen as the appropriate category of being for women and masculinity as 
the appropriate category of being for men, masculinity and femininity are positions that can 
both be taken up by either male or female persons. Often, women need to become masculine 
and embrace masculine values in order to be recognised by society on political or 
professional levels. On the other hand, men who are more feminine are regarded to have 
taken up an inferior position and will often be marginalised. It will be argued throughout this 
thesis that rape serves the domination of the masculine over the feminine. This is why rape 
remains a deeply gendered issue even when the victim is male.     
I also want to comment on my references to the western symbolic order or western 
metaphysics. My use of the term ‘western’ also includes ‘South African’ in so far as the 
South African symbolic and legal order have largely absorbed the trends and founding 
principles of western thought (perhaps especially in so far as we have opted for a liberal 
democratic constitutional dispensation). 
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V   The role of the law in the fight against sexual violence 
The aim and meaning of looking to legal reform as a strategy to improve the lives of South 
African women is an important issue that needs to be raised from the outset. The usual 
response to a project like this is that the flaws in the legal system are only the tip of the 
proverbial iceberg, and that if an issue like rape is to be successfully addressed, it needs to be 
done at the much deeper level of societal attitudes and relations. However, there are at least 
two important reasons for involving the law in the fight against sexual violence and the 
oppression of women. The first reason is that deeper societal change may be almost 
impossible to achieve as long as the law, as the official reflection of society’s conception of 
justice and the official channel for condemnation of certain behaviour, is complicit in 
maintaining the hierarchy between the sexes and implicitly tolerating the oppression of 
women. The second reason, which is closely linked to the first, is that legal reform has 
symbolic value which contributes in the long term to the changing of societal attitudes. I will 
explain both of these points in what follows.  
In the context of the first abovementioned reason for looking to legal reform as a strategy in 
the feminist quest for justice, it is argued that, although legal reform does not guarantee social 
change, social change is unlikely to happen if the law does not reflect, pre-empt or at least 
allow for such change. Here it is argued (and it will be shown in this thesis) that the law 
remains riddled with masculine bias and that the patriarchal foundations of our society cannot 
be dislodged if it remains firmly entrenched in the legal system, which arguably reflects an 
ideal normative framework toward which society aspires. Artz and Smythe (2008:14), two 
leading South African feminist legal scholars, note that although women’s suffering is often 
outside the scope of legal redress, and that the law is therefore not the ideal instrument for 
feminist social change, the continued participation in feminist law reform can at least unmask 
the masculinist interpretations of justice that find expression and gain power through the 
criminal legal system. Accordingly, feminist legal reform might not be able to effect all the 
levels of social change that are necessary for the liberation of women, but it can at least 
expose the legal system’s complicity in the maintenance and perpetuation of patriarchal 
oppression.  
Furthermore, MacKinnon highlights the usefulness of the law in attempts to achieve social 
change:  
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A form of force, law is also an avenue for demand, a vector of access, an arena for 
contention other than the physical, a forum for voice, a mechanism for accountability, 
a vehicle of authority, and an expression of norms [...] Women who work with the law 
have learned that while legal change may not always make social change, sometimes 
it helps, and law unchanged can make social change impossible (2005:103).  
MacKinnon thus explains that although the law is not a magical instrument that can guarantee 
results, it functions in a way that can provide useful possibilities and opportunities for 
feminist change in that it is a public forum through which women can, among other things, 
access authority, voice their demands and express their norms. Furthermore, if feminism has 
no access to the channels and forums of the law, it might be impossible to effect social 
change. 
From the previous paragraphs, the symbolic value of law reform should be obvious. Artz and 
Smythe  note that in post-apartheid South Africa the law has gained considerable symbolic 
importance (Artz & Smythe 2008:19), and accordingly, even though the full equality of 
women cannot be achieved through the law alone, the law has an important part to play in the 
process of shifting, or at least acknowledging, inequalities (Artz & Smythe 2008:15).   
The work of Drucilla Cornell, a prominent American feminist legal philosopher, also reflects 
an understanding of the value of symbolic change in our culture. She justifies her decision to 
ground her work in the realm of legal struggle as follows:  
Why enter the preservational economy of law at all? My answer is that we have 
inevitably already been entered into it. Our demand is to enter it differently, on the 
basis of the equivalent evaluation of our sexual difference. Thus, I agree with Irigaray 
when she argues that without changing “the general grammar of our culture, the 
feminine will never take place in history” (Irigaray 1985a:155). Law is undoubtedly, 
and particularly in the modern western democracies, a powerful part of our general 
culture, and that may be reason enough to challenge it from within, as well as from 
without (1995:235).  
Accordingly, even if amended legal provisions do not always directly and immediately bring 
about change on a social level, legal reform plays a role in the general transformation of our 
culture, by slowly altering our attitudes toward certain behaviour or our belief in certain 
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principles and concepts. On the other hand, however, Cornell warns that it is important to 
recognise the law as a “field of coercion” and that any attempt of feminism to further its 
cause through legal projects is thus inherently limited (Cornell 1995:26 – 27). Accordingly, 
“[f]eminism must not entrench itself in the realm of legal struggle as the primary arena of its 
political and personal aspirations to change the social world and our form of life” (Cornell 
1995:26).  
I am therefore not arguing in this thesis that phallogocentrism2 can be overcome through the 
correct constitutional doctrines, or that rape will cease to occur as soon as the criminal law 
definition thereof more closely reflects the relevant issues, but rather that if we are to work 
towards a society where women enjoy equal freedom and rights to men, the law cannot 
remain as it is, but should be transformed so that it can set the tone for such broader societal 
transformation on a practical and symbolic level.  
  
                                                          
2 The Derridaen term for the privileging of the phallus/masculine in understanding or constructing meaning 
(Culler 2008:61). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SUBJECTIVITY 
AND EQUALITY IN THE WORK OF LUCE 
IRIGARAY  
 
I   Introduction 
In this chapter, the main themes of the philosophy of Luce Irigaray will be introduced, with 
specific reference to, firstly, her insistence on the necessity of dismantling the singular 
Cartesian subject of the western patriarchal order through an authentic acknowledgment of 
sexual difference, secondly, her discussion of the need to replace the Cartesian subject with 
two concrete, embodied and differently sexed subjects, and lastly, the implications that this 
rethinking of the subject has for equality and the role of the law in the achievement of 
equality.  
In this chapter it will be shown that Irigaray’s work offers insight into the nature of the 
transformation that is necessary for the empowerment and emancipation of women. I will 
argue that these insights are of particular value in the South African context, where the 
position of women remains precarious despite numerous legislative measures that are in place 
to promote equality between the sexes and to protect women against forms of oppression like 
sexual violence. It will be seen that Irigaray frames the ideal of sex equality in terms of aims 
that depart from the traditional understanding of equality, which imply and enable the 
establishment of a new relationship between the sexes. In the second and third chapters I will 
then explore the South African legal system’s approach to sex equality and specifically 
sexual violence, in order to determine the extent to which it allows for the possibility of an 
Irigarayan transformation.  
In the first section of this chapter, I will explain how Irigaray traces the roots of patriarchy to 
the symbolic construction of the subject in metaphysical terms, a move which she already 
identifies in the work of Plato. She argues, in this regard, that the universal, disembodied 
subject of western philosophy represents an idealised version of the masculine, and is posited 
through the exclusion of the feminine, the embodied, and the particular. The symbolic order 
which underpins society is thus in service of the masculine, and is founded on the exclusion 
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of the feminine. The implication is that a complete overhaul of the symbolic order is 
necessary in order to dismantle patriarchy.  
In the second section, I will discuss Irigaray’s insistence that such transformation of the 
symbolic order, as explained above, will only be achieved through the acknowledgment that 
all human beings are sexed and embodied, and that such embodiment implies a necessarily 
partial position which renders the universalisation of one position obviously unjustified and 
unjust. An authentic acknowledgment of sexual difference in a non-hierarchical manner is 
therefore key to the dismantling of patriarchy in society.  
In the third section, it will be shown that the conception of equality that flows from Irigaray’s 
theory entails the establishment of a culture in which a positive feminine identity is 
acknowledged, so that women can understand and experience themselves not merely as 
passive towards, secondary to and derivative of men, but as beings in their own right (Stone 
2007:135). Irigaray thus conceives of sex equality as something far more radical than equal 
treatment - namely, that feminine subjectivity is allowed a place alongside masculine 
subjectivity in the symbolic and legal order, and that persons are granted the space and 
freedom to develop and cultivate a feminine identity that is different from the established 
masculine norm, but equally valued. The question as to whether the ideal of equality is too 
limited to encapsulate these aims, so that the ideal of equality should be replaced with 
something else altogether, will also be addressed.  
Thereafter, I will explain how Irigaray implicates the law in the process of breaking open a 
space for feminine subjectivity to develop and flourish by arguing that the law should provide 
sex-specific rights that correspond to the needs and vulnerabilities of feminine and masculine 
subjectivities respectively. 
Finally, the charge of essentialism that is often raised against the work of Irigaray will be 
critically discussed.  
II   Opening up subjectivity through difference 
Irigaray’s work is grounded in the radical recognition of sexual difference as the crucial first 
step to sex equality. Her aim is, firstly, to undo the conflation of masculinity with rationality 
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and universality, and secondly, to create, through her writing, the possibility of a feminine 
subjectivity that is freed from the confines of patriarchal prescriptions (Braidotti 1994:130).  
Irigaray argues that in the western social order, masculine subjectivity is elevated to the 
position of the only subjectivity (Irigaray 1993a:8), and that the social imaginary is 
accordingly not neutral, but unashamedly shaped by, and in the service of, the idealised 
masculine subject. She writes: 
In actual fact, the self-proclaimed universal is the equivalent of an idiolect of men, a 
masculine imaginary, a sexed world. With no neuter. This will come as a surprise 
only to an out-and-out defender of idealism. It has always been men who spoke and, 
above all, wrote: in science, philosophy, religion and politics (1993b:121). 
Idealised masculine subjectivity is posited as universal subjectivity in opposition to, and to be 
achieved through the transcendence of, the material and the particular (Irigaray 1985a:133). 
Irigaray writes strikingly: 
Subjectivity denied to woman: indisputably this provides the financial backing for 
every irreducible constitution as an object: of representation, of discourse, of desire. 
[...] for he can sustain himself only by bouncing back off some objectiveness, some 
objective. If there is no more “earth” to press down / repress, to work, to represent, 
but also and always to desire (for one’s own), no opaque matter which in theory does 
not know herself, then what pedestal remains for the ex-sistence of the “subject”? 
(1985a:133). 
Accordingly, the universal, disembodied subject of western thought is dependent on the 
existence of the material and particular other for its unity and coherence (Caldwell 2002:21). 
Irigaray argues that women, whose embodiment has been regarded as their defining feature in 
patriarchal society where their primary significance lies in giving birth and providing sex, 
have been relegated to the order of the material, the changing and the natural (“earth”), which 
functions as the foil for the emergence of an unchanging, disembodied, universal subjectivity. 
Irigaray writes in this regard that “[w]oman-as-other” occupies the position of “natural 
substratum” (Irigaray 1993b:45) in the patriarchal social construction. The feminine 
represents the “‘[m]atter’ upon which he [the ‘universal’ masculine subject] will ever and 
again return to plant his foot in order to spring farther, leap higher” (Irigaray 1985a:134). In 
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other words, the universal subject, which presents itself as being neutral, is in fact modelled 
on an idealised conception of masculine subjectivity which is made possible through the act 
of sacrificing feminine subjectivity, in so far as the material is needed as foil for the 
emergence of the universal. Irigaray explains this univeralisation of the masculine subject as 
follows: 
And by centering man outside himself, it has occasioned above all man’s ex-stasis 
within the transcendental (subject). Rising to a perspective that would dominate the 
totality, to the vantage point of greatest power, he thus cuts himself off from the 
bedrock, from his empirical relationship with the matrix that he claims to survey 
(1985a:133 – 134).  
What is at stake here is thus an idealised masculine subjectivity, in so far as it is rooted in a 
mythical conception of a fully autonomous, disembodied and therefore invulnerable 
masculinity which does not conform to the lived realities of men. Bergoffen (2003:131) 
explains in this regard that the vulnerable body is feminised so that “only one sex lives the 
humanity of vulnerability” and “[m]en’s lived vulnerable bodies are encased/erased in 
imaginary, god-like, invulnerable bodies”.  
Accordingly, the feminine has been pushed to the margins of subjectivity, in that it is not 
regarded as a category of human being alongside the masculine - and thus as a category of 
being in its own right - but merely as a foil or material basis for the emergence of an 
hyperbolic masculine subjectivity presented as the universal subject. In this sense “the 
feminine has become […] the non-masculine, that is to say an abstract nonexistent reality” 
(Irigaray 1993b:20). In other words, women “are stripped of their identity insofar as they are 
a non-manifestation of forms corresponding to male-sexed-chromosomes” (Irigaray 
1993b:46). 
Irigaray shows how the process of the exclusion of feminine subjectivity in order to enable 
the development of an exclusive ‘universal’ subjectivity can already be recognized in Plato’s 
cave myth, where the cave can be argued to represent the feminine womb from which the 
prisoner emerges in pursuit of the masculine or patriarchal Idea (Irigaray 1985a:247).  
Following Irigaray, Braidotti explains that the feminist project rests on the rejection of this 
universal subject, on the basis that it is a “falsely generalized standpoint” (Braidotti 1994:98), 
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because it speaks on behalf of everyone while occupying only the position of the white male. 
In the western symbolic order, subjectivity is thus constructed as a singular and exclusive 
standpoint of which difference is the enemy, because the latter exposes and undercuts the 
false claim to universality. In this regard, Braidotti argues that because western thought is 
founded on dualistic oppositions, the concept of difference has always functioned as an 
exclusionary mechanism, in so far as it creates “sub-categories of otherness” where 
“‘different-from’ came to mean to be ‘less than’” (Braidotti 1994:147). Accordingly, Irigaray 
regards the death of the logocentric subject as the condition of the possibility of the 
development of feminine subjectivity (Braidotti 1994:130), to the extent that its demise 
would allow the development of new forms of subjectivity by creating a space where sexual 
difference can flourish. Furthermore, the radical acknowledgment of sexual difference 
inevitably delegitimises the singularity and supposed neutrality of the subject of the western 
symbolic order. In this regard, Irigaray writes: “[w]omen’s exploitation is based upon sexual 
difference; its solution will come only through sexual difference” (Irigaray 1993b:12). 
Difference is thus regarded as the central value of the liberation and empowerment of 
women, in that a respect for difference undercuts the phallocentric formation of subjectivity 
and allows for the flourishing of an authentic feminine sexual identity.   
At this point, I want to pause briefly at the concept of ‘sexual difference’. Alison Stone, an 
English feminist philosopher, explains that the term ‘sexual difference’ is mostly used as an 
alternative to concepts of sex and gender (Stone 2007:112). In this regard, it is held that 
sexual difference captures something that sex and gender do not, namely “that as human 
beings we always live and experience our bodies as imbued with meaning, never as bare 
biological things” (Stone 2007:112). As was explained in the introductory chapter, the term 
sex is traditionally regarded to refer only to the biologically sexed body, and gender is 
regarded to refer to a culturally constituted sexual identity. Sexual difference refers then, 
firstly, to the cultural symbolisation of the difference between male and female, and secondly, 
to the difference in how men and women “live their bodies” in the context of the cultural 
symbolisation thereof (Stone 2007:112). Accordingly, Irigaray’s references to sexual 
difference do not merely refer to the biological differences between male and female bodies, 
but also to the cultural interpretation of what these differences symbolise and represent 
(Stone 2007:120).  
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Irigaray’s point is therefore that in so far as, on the one hand, sexual difference is denied, and 
on the other hand, that the characteristics that distinguish women from men are seen as 
rendering women inferior and less than human, the feminine is lacking in our symbolic order 
(Irigaray 1993b:46). She explains: 
[T]he feminine will be allowed and even obliged to return in such oppositions as: 
be/become, have/not have sex (organ), phallic/non-phallic, penis/clitoris or else 
penis/vagina, plus/minus, clearly representable/dark continent, logos/silence or idle 
chatter, desire for the mother/desire to be the mother, etc. All these are interpretive 
modalities of the female function rigorously postulated by the pursuit of a certain 
game for which she will always find herself signed up without having begun to play. 
Set between – at least – two, or two half, men. A hinge bending according to their 
exchanges. A reserve of negativity sustaining the articulation of their moves [...] Off 
stage, off-side, beyond representation, beyond selfhood (1985a:22) 
Furthermore, the difference between the sexes is illogically regarded to be situated within the 
feminine. In other words, femininity is marked with the difference between the sexes and has 
to bear the full burden thereof. Feminine sexual difference is thus colonized, domesticated 
and in service of the masculine order. Du Toit writes markedly: 
As other of the same, woman’s supposed femininity is exalted, and equated with her 
reproductive and nourishing functions, and with her function of sheltering man in his 
journey of becoming. Also in this mode, woman’s sexuality is objectified and 
commodified, and her difference is reduced to a calculable, exchangeable and 
exploitable difference. As other of the same, woman’s own journey of becoming is 
erased (2009:156). 
The term ‘other of the same’ is used by Irigaray to describe the feminine as she is (mis- or 
un-) represented within the phallocratic order (a system of masculine dominance) of western 
philosophy (Irigaray 1985a:246). This term powerfully expresses the idea that the feminine is 
burdened with the difference between the sexes while the masculine is seen as representing 
the neutral or the same. As a result, femininity is understood only as a deviant position rather 
than a category of being in its own right.  
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An authentic acknowledgment of sexual difference then means, firstly, that where women are 
different from men - for example in that they get pregnant and men don’t - that difference 
should be acknowledged and respected. It means, secondly, that difference should not be 
constructed as meaning ‘less than’ and justifying discrimination in the sense of unequal 
treatment. Accordingly, the fact that women get pregnant should not mean that they get fewer 
opportunities in the professional world. Thirdly, certain perceived ‘differences’ should be 
recognised as ideological constructions of patriarchy, for example, the idea that women are 
inferior to men intellectually, because they lack the ability to think rationally. In this sense, an 
authentic acknowledgment of sexual difference is absent from our symbolic order.      
Part of the feminist project would then be to redefine difference (Braidotti 1994:175) as 
something that lies in the space between the sexes. It aims to show that women are different 
from men in the same and equal way that men are different from women, and that sexual 
difference thus entails a position of being equal in difference (Mackinnon 1987:37).  
Furthermore, Irigaray calls for a new attitude towards such difference. She describes this 
attitude in terms of Descartes’ first passion, namely, wonder (Irigaray 1993a:12). She 
explains: 
This passion has no opposite or contradiction and exists always as though for the first 
time. Thus man and woman, woman and man are always meeting as though for the 
first time because they cannot be substituted one for the other. I will never be in a 
man’s place, never will a man be in mine. Whatever identifications are possible, one 
will never exactly occupy the place of the other – they are irreducible one to the other 
(1993a:12). 
For present purposes, there are at least two important ideas in the quoted passage. The first is 
the positive and deferential status ascribed to difference: always meeting someone as though 
for the first time implies that no assumptions are made as to who and what the other is. This 
suggests an openness to be surprised by the other and an unconditional acceptance of the 
other. This gives the other the freedom to flourish. It also allows for “positive expression of 
female difference” (Du Toit 2009:156) in that “as women we give expression to our different 
identity in its fullness, rather than simply expressing our difference from men in so far as that 
‘difference from’ is usually understood only in terms of a ‘falling away from’ the masculine-
universal norm, and thus as a deviance, a lack or an excess” (Du Toit 2009: 156). The second 
important idea here is that the other cannot be subsumed into the same. If wonder entails that 
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every meeting with the other is like the first, this means that the other is always approached 
as the unknown, and therefore as that which is outside of myself. Irigaray writes: 
Who or what the other is, I never know. But the other who is forever unknowable is 
the one who differs from me sexually (1993a:13). 
This implies an acknowledgment of the other sex as unequivocally other, as separate from 
and outside of the self. Accordingly, any attempt of one sex to speak for the other, or to 
regard itself as occupying a universal position, is delegitimised. Therefore, if difference is 
evoked in the Irigarayan sense, it renders the universal subject impossible. Irigaray’s 
philosophy thus calls for a shift on the part of men who must self-limit their subjectivity from 
the universal norm to a partial, embedded, embodied and sexually differentiated position. 
Irigaray (1996:106) writes that “[b]eing a man or a woman already means not being the 
whole of the subject or of the community or of spirit”. This non-hierarchical understanding of 
difference that renders subjectivity an inevitably partial position not only influences our 
approach to sexual others, but could also be argued to allow for all other differences, such as 
race, age, class and ethnicity, to be approached with the greatest respect. Hegemonic centres 
or positions of sameness that are traditionally regarded to set the standard for being human 
(such as being white, western and middle class) are exposed as only partial positions 
alongside others.   
In a similar vein, Braidotti evokes Adrienne Rich’s notion of “politics of location” to enhance 
her description of the subject’s inherent situatedness (Braidotti 1994:237). The politics of 
location entails the subject’s recognition of her own experience as necessarily partial. The 
thinking process is therefore not abstract, disembodied and objective, in that it can lay claim 
to universality, but is merely a voice from a certain place of enunciation (Braidotti 1994:237). 
Similarly, Jantzen argues that an unavoidable consequence of the acknowledgment of 
gendered embodiment is the acceptance of a partial perspective, and therefore the acceptance 
of one’s limit or boundary as subject (Jantzen 1998:212). This makes it impossible for the 
one to occupy the space of the other.  
Irigaray also regards the radical respect for sexual difference, or the passion of wonder 
between the sexes, to be a precondition for real love between the sexes. She argues that in our 
symbolic order, where the feminine is not symbolically mediated and does not have a place as 
a category of being alongside the masculine, there is no “double pole of attraction and 
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support, which excludes disintegration or rejection, attraction and decomposition, but which 
instead ensures the separation that articulates every encounter and makes possible speech, 
promises, alliances” (Irigaray 1993a:10). Accordingly, taking sexual difference seriously 
means that a reciprocal relationship between the sexes, which is not “a disguised or polemical 
form of the master-slave relationship”, becomes possible for the first time (Irigaray 
1993a:17). 
For Irigaray then, difference must be activated as the foundation for equality, in so far as a 
radical recognition thereof allows for a new understanding of subjectivity as a necessarily 
partial perspective. Difference is therefore reconceptualised, not as a pejorative quality, but as 
an inevitable underpinning of all human relationships, which evokes wonder and respect 
through the mere fact that it establishes the other as outside of the self and unknown to the 
self. This allows for the collapse of any hierarchical constructions of self/other or us/them. 
Boshoff explains this shift: 
The male obsession with unity, totality and purpose (flowing from the visibility of the 
penis) is provided with an alternative, namely a female preoccupation with the plural 
and the dynamic. The implications of this shift in focus for cultural perceptions are 
profound. The traditional/male priority given to unity and consistency of meaning and 
identity in western culture is replaced by a much more complex feminine culture built 
around an implicit difference from itself (2007:47). 
This echoes Irigaray’s comparison between the male and female sex organs: 
The one of form, of the individual, of the (male) sexual organ, of the proper name, of  
the proper meaning ... supplants, while separating and dividing, what contact of at 
least two (lips) which keeps woman in touch with herself, but without any possibility 
of distinguishing what is touching from what is touched (1985b:26). 
Through such an approach to subjectivity and difference, a space is opened up for a feminine 
subjectivity to flourish as a sexual identity in its own right. 
III   The embodied subject 
Irigaray argues that the placement of the Cartesian subject at the centre of our culture has 
resulted in the calamity that we have no culture of the sexual, and this means that our culture 
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is impoverished in that it is “reduced to a single pole of sexed identity” (Irigaray 1993b:21). 
The sexual, and by implication also the bodily, are thus not regarded as being relevant to 
what it means to be a human being in the symbolic and cultural sense. Irigaray’s aspiration to 
work towards the development of a sexual culture is thus the aspiration to reach a point in 
history where the subject is seen, in the first place, as an embodied being, and where sexual 
specificity or difference is therefore crucial to the formation and identity of the subject. 
Braidotti calls this the “oversexualising [of difference] in a strategic manner” with the 
purpose of “reversing the attribution of differences in a hierarchical mode” (Braidotti 
1995:169). This means that if the body is understood as the “material basis of the self”, 
sexual duality is a central factor in the constitution of the human subject (Du Toit 2009:153). 
Accordingly, sexual difference is acknowledged as being central to subjectivity rather than a 
marginal or accidental factor which justifies discrimination. Again, Braidotti points out how 
such rehabilitation of sexual difference lays the foundation for the reconsideration of all other 
differences between persons (such as race, religion and sexual preference) as worthy of 
respect, because “[s]exual difference stands for the positivity of multiple differences, as 
opposed to the traditional idea of difference as pejoration” (Braidotti 1994:239). 
Irigaray (1993:69) explains that the Cartesian split between mind and body leads to the 
failure to conceive of being, and as a result, also thought and discourse, as residing in, or 
emerging from, the body. She argues that this results in discourse and thought being reserved 
for male bodies, in so far as “bodily tasks remain the obligation or the duty of a female 
subject” (Irigaray 1993:87). Irigaray (1993:127) writes strikingly:  
In all his creations, all his works, man always seems to neglect thinking of himself as 
flesh, as one who has received his body as that primary home [...] which determines 
the possibility of his coming into the world and the potential opening of a horizon of 
thought, of poetry, of celebration, that also includes the god or gods. 
The idea is thus that an acknowledgment of the embodiment of the subject will allow a sexual 
culture to flourish, which would entail the acceptance and celebration of the material 
foundation of subjectivity. This would pave the way for the possibility of the symbolic and 
cultural emancipation of women, because their bodies will no longer be regarded as the 
justification for their exclusion. Irigaray makes use of the term “sensible transcendental” to 
introduce an understanding of subjectivity that is not constituted through the exclusion or the 
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sacrifice of the material in favour of the Idea/intelligible/universal, but where the material and 
the intelligible are inseparable: 
This creation would be our opportunity, from the humblest detail of everyday life to 
the “grandest,” by means of the opening of a sensible transcendental that comes into 
being through us, of which we would be the mediators and bridges. Not only in 
mourning for the dead God of Nietzsche, not waiting passively for the god to come, 
but by conjuring him up among us, within us, as resurrection and transfiguration of 
blood, of flesh, through a language and an ethics that is ours (1993a:109). 
Accordingly, Irigaray wants to overcome the split between the material and the symbolic that 
forms the basis of western metaphysics (in terms of which the feminine is relegated to the 
realm of the material), by rooting the symbolic in the material. This would allow for the 
symbolic mediation of feminine subjectivity without sacrificing embodiment and sexual 
particularity. It would also facilitate a more realistic conception of masculine subjectivity in 
so far as it allows for its material basis and vulnerability to be acknowledged. Accordingly, 
“[t]he transition to a new age requires [...] a transformation of forms, of the relations of 
matter and form and of the interval inbetween” (Irigaray 1993a:9). In this regard, Whitford 
argues that the sensible transcendental is offered “as a horizon in which we are all 
implicated” in so far as it, firstly, enables the masculine subject “to shift his position”, and 
secondly, enables feminine subjects to “to build and create a different place for themselves in 
the social order” (Whitford 1991:144).    
IV   Equality as transformation rather than mere inclusion 
At this point, it should be clear why Irigaray is extremely critical of the form that equality 
takes in the (dominant liberal) western social and legal order, where the universal subject 
represents ‘man’. In legal terms, this form of equality is referred to as formal equality. Formal 
equality is founded on the Aristotelian principle of treating like cases alike and unlike cases 
differently.  
Feminist criticism of formal equality is based on the argument that in a society where the 
universal conception of the human being is modelled on an exaggeration of masculine 
characteristics, it is men (and traditionally also white men) who develop the standard of 
equality. In terms of this model, being different to men warrants unequal treatment. Sameness 
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is the key to equality, while difference is construed in a hierarchical way. The implication of 
this in sex equality cases is that, in so far as the complainant cannot prove sufficient 
similarities between herself and the relevant man, or between her position and his position, 
the matter is not treated as an equality issue. As a result, issues like pregnancy, abortion and 
sexual violence are automatically excluded from the scope of claims to equal treatment. 
MacKinnon explains: 
A system-level consequence of this mainstream approach, rectified nowhere, is the 
failure to see as inequality issues many that are, especially those that are sexual or 
reproductive. Sexual violence, because of the overwhelming predominance of male 
perpetrators and female victims, and its rootedness in normative images of sexuality 
seen as naturally gendered, has tacitly been construed as an expression of the sex 
difference, therefore not an issue of sex inequality at all. Because overwhelmingly one 
sex is the perpetrators and the other is the victims, sexual violence is not sex 
discrimination, it is sex, that is, a “difference.” [...] Similarly, because women and 
men contribute differently to reproduction, women’s needs for reproductive rights 
have been brought under equality law only partially, as exceptions, with severe 
doctrinal strain, or, in the case of the right to abortion, not at all (2005:51). 
MacKinnon’s point is thus, firstly, that under the formal model of equality, reproductive 
issues are not recognised as equality issues, because men cannot get pregnant and 
accordingly, in the context of pregnancy, women are not ‘similarly situated’ to men and can 
therefore not appeal to the right to equality. However, MacKinnon goes further by arguing 
that, under the formal model of equality, sex inequalities are often understood and naturalised 
as difference – which therefore places the situation beyond the scope of the right to equality 
in so far as it is not a ‘like case’, because women’s treatment cannot be compared to anything 
similar in the case of men. The formal model of equality thus allows patriarchal society to be 
selective about the injustices that are recognised as inequalities. Through the formal model of 
equality, many injustices are simply construed as natural differences that are regarded to 
justify the discriminating treatment. 
Furthermore, a successful claim to equality will result in the mere inclusion of a certain 
category of women in the masculine position in the hierarchy, where they will be treated in 
the same way as men and where they will have the same benefits as men, which will still be 
to the detriment of other women. MacKinnon (2005:50) writes in this regard: 
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If equality is a sameness and gender a difference; if first-order equality is defined in 
terms of sameness, and women as such are “not the same” as men, women cannot be 
equal to men until they are no longer women. 
In other words, the underlying hierarchical binary through which men enjoy a superior 
position to women, and which is based on the cultural symbolisation of the masculine ideal as 
the human norm, is not addressed, but rather sustained, through the formal model of equality. 
Critics thus argue that formal equality is not a tool to dismantle hierarchies and to create more 
inclusive and open structures in society, but rather determines the basis upon which women 
are ‘man enough’ to be granted access to the masculine position. 
Serene Khader, an American feminist philosopher, explains that Irigaray’s critique of 
(formal) equality draws on two insights: firstly, that western thought operates according to a 
‘logic of the same’, and secondly, that there is a lack of symbols to represent women’s 
experiences, which results in them being distortedly represented as masculine, or as inferior 
versions of masculinity, or not represented at all (Khader 2008:50). Irigaray sets out the logic 
of the same in her book Speculum of the Other Woman with reference to Freud’s narrative of 
sexual development. Freud claims the girl’s clitoris to be a “penis equivalent” (Irigaray 
1985a:25). Irigaray regards this as a manifestation of the logic of the same, in so far as two 
different things (in this case the boy and the girl) are likened to each other based on their 
mutual likeness to a third thing (Irigaray 1985a:27). However, this comparison is problematic 
in so far as the third thing is more like one of the two things than the other. In the context of 
Freud’s account of the development of sexuality, the third thing is the phallus (Irigaray 
1985a:25). Irigaray quotes selectively from Freud’s essay Femininity: 
From the onset of the phallic phase, the differences between the sexes are completely 
eclipsed by the agreements.... THE LITTLE GIRL IS THEREFORE A LITTLE 
MAN....The little girl uses, with the same intent [as the little boy] her still smaller 
clitoris .... a penis equivalent....man more fortunate [than she] (1985a:25). 
According to Irigaray, the boy and the girl are thus likened to each other on account of the 
fact that both of them can in a sense be said to possess a phallus. However, based on this 
scheme of comparison, the girl inevitably appears deficient: 
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So we must admit that THE LITTLE GIRL IS THEREFORE A LITTLE MAN. [...] A 
little man with a smaller penis. A disadvantaged little man. [...] A little man who 
would have no other desire than to be, or remain, a man (1985a:25). 
The validity of the third term as an appropriate standard for comparison is never questioned, 
because it is regarded as operating on a different ontological level from the other two terms, 
in that it is supposedly universal (Khader 2008:52). Irigaray explains: 
“Sexual difference” is a derivation of the problematics of sameness, it is, now and 
forever, determined within the project, the projection, the sphere of representation, of 
the same. The “differentiation” into two sexes derives from the a priori assumption of 
the same, since the little man that the little girl is, must become a man minus certain 
attributes whose paradigm is morphological – attributes capable of determining, of 
assuring the reproduction-specularization of the same. A man minus the possibility of 
(re)presenting oneself as a man = a normal woman (1985a:26 – 27).  
Khader notes that Irigaray’s theory can be distinguished from other similar theories to the 
extent that the third term that Irigaray refers to “is not wholly identifiable with one of the two 
‘lower’ terms” (Khader 2008:53). Khader explains: “[a]lthough the universal third term 
presents a standard to which the first term conforms more readily than the second, the first 
term also appears to conform incompletely to the standard” (Khader 2008:53). Accordingly, 
in the context of Freud’s narrative of sexual development, the actual living boy also fails to 
wholly conform to everything that the western order ascribes to the symbol of the phallus.  
It is clear how Irigaray’s theory of the logic of the same can be applied to criticise the formal 
model of equality. The universal gender-neutral subject is the third term upon which the 
likeness between the first two terms, men and women, is based. The gender-neutral Cartesian 
subject, however, resembles masculine subjectivity much more closely than it does feminine 
subjectivity. And yet, as explained above, the Cartesian subject is also not wholly identifiable 
with masculine subjectivity in so far as it does not encompass the vulnerability and 
embodiment of men, which is an unavoidable aspect of their embodied (as opposed to their 
idealised) subjectivity. The implication is that the universal Cartesian subjectivity, to which 
masculine subjectivity aspires, also disadvantages men, because it requires them to identify 
with something to which they do not conform completely. Du Toit argues that the myth of 
men as “rational, self-contained, autonomous, physically invulnerable and independent 
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beings” (Du Toit 2011:3) who transcend the limitations of their sex-specific embodiment, is 
withholding actual, living men from acknowledging or exposing any sign of vulnerability 
(Du Toit 2011:8). In this sense, “the construct of the masculine subject in the current 
symbolic order is thus an inherently fragile and demanding one because it is so unrealistic 
and because it needs to constantly prove itself by ‘overcoming’ those as aspects of itself” (Du 
Toit 2011:6). 
On the other hand, women’s embodiment constantly disrupts the illusion of disembodiment 
(in so far as women are defined by their sexual and reproductive functions in the patriarchal 
order, as well as the fact that the female body is continuously changing and moving through 
cycles). When women make a claim for formal equality, their likeness to men is established 
with reference to their conformity to universal Cartesian subjectivity. Accordingly, feminine 
bodily issues like pregnancy, abortion and sexual violence are regarded to lie beyond the 
scope of equality, because the comparison to Cartesian subjectivity leads to the denial and 
negation of embodiment as a central aspect of human subjectivity. Pregnancy, sexual 
violence and abortion are thus instances where women deviate from the human (masculine) 
norm, and in terms of which they are not similarly situated to men – which disqualifies them 
from making a claim to equality. In this sense femininity is “both construed as imperfect 
masculinity and repressed within the masculine imaginary of the western philosophical 
tradition” (Du Toit 2009:154). Therefore, the seemingly ‘neutral’ position of sex equality can 
be said to be modelled on an idealised masculine subjectivity, and requires that women 
denounce that which makes them most concretely different from men. The neutral position is 
therefore never neutral, but always already sexed, in the specific sense that it splits women’s 
sexual specificity off from their humanity. In this regard, it is useful to refer to Cornell’s use 
of the term ‘wound of femininity’ to describe the way in which conventional femininity is 
imposed on woman in a way that splits her off from herself as a sexual being and “rips her 
away from her identification of herself as a woman and as a person beyond the persona or 
masquerade of femininity” (Cornell 1995:7). Put differently, women’s sexual embodiment is 
defined in opposition to the covertly masculine ideal of the human as such.  
Accordingly, Irigaray holds that the demand for (formal) equality by women is a “mistaken 
expression of a real objective” (Irigaray 1993b:12). She writes strikingly: 
Women must not beg for or usurp a small place in patriarchal society by passing 
themselves off as half-formed men in their own right. Half the citizens of the world 
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are women. They must gain a civil identity with corresponding rights; human rights, 
as well as rights respecting work, property, love, culture, etc. (1994:63). 
On this basis then, Irigaray argues for a different kind of equality, which is rooted in the idea 
that the illusion of a universal subject must be discarded in favour of the development of a 
sexual culture where sexual specificity/difference is acknowledged as crucial to the formation 
and identity of the human subject. The ideal of equality must therefore not aim to establish 
sameness that is grounded in the masculine order and based on phallocratic models, but rather 
to provide both sexes with the opportunity to develop their own human identities, by allowing 
them to define the values of what it means to belong to either gender (Irigaray 1993b:12). 
Irigaray writes: 
This does not mean that it is entirely as men that women come into today’s systems of 
power, but rather that women need to establish new values that correspond to their 
creative capacities. Society, culture, discourse would thereby be recognized as sexuate 
and not as the monopoly on universal values of a single sex – one that has no 
awareness of the way the body and its morphology are imprinted upon imaginary and 
symbolic creations (1993a:67). 
For Irigaray then, true equality would entail that women, like men, are enabled to develop 
their own identity, free from the constraints that patriarchy has placed upon them until now 
by reducing feminine subjectivity to a function of men’s lives. Such an identity for women 
would be one that, on the one hand, cannot be reduced to motherhood, and on the other hand, 
cannot be reduced to being “just like men” (Irigaray 1993b:94). Sex equality is then achieved 
when women also lead validated lives in being who they are and becoming what they want to 
be. She writes: 
In order to obtain a subjective status equivalent to that of men, women must therefore 
gain recognition for their difference. They must affirm themselves as valid subjects, 
daughters of a mother and a father, respecting the other within themselves and 
demanding that same respect from society (1993b:46). 
Irigaray explains that this means that:  
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the female body is not to remain the object of men’s discourse of their various arts but 
that it become the object of a female subjectivity experiencing and identifying itself. 
Such research attempts to suggest to women a morpho-logic that is appropriate to 
their bodies. It’s aimed at the male subject, too, inviting him to redefine himself as a 
body with a view to exchanges between sexed subjects (1993b:59). 
By understanding the subject in embodied and particular terms, Irigaray thus opens up a 
space for a new kind of equality which is not based on similar treatment, but rather on a 
respect for the other in all her difference. She is working towards a cultural and social 
transformation where both women and men can identify with themselves as sexed beings in 
their own right, and where femininity is not merely a negative - in other words, non-
masculine - but where it is also a positive subjective identity (Irigaray 1993b:56).  
The difficulty of this task lies in what Cornell terms the paradox of feminism: “Feminism, 
particularly in the complex area of sexuality, demands that we live with the paradox that we 
are trying to break the bonds of the meanings that have made us who we are as women” 
(Cornell 1995:99). In developing a new model of subjectivity, the subject has to transcend 
what she has become through imagination. In this sense the feminist ideal represents a 
utopian3 moment.  
At this stage, the question can be posed as to whether Irigaray’s ideal of valid subjectivity for 
men and women, to be achieved through a fundamental respect for sexual difference, can be 
termed ‘equality’ at all, or whether the term is too limited to encompass such an ideal. 
Bergoffen (2003:119) writes, for example, that “Irigaray’s equity politics veers away from 
the ideal of equality to preserve the specificity of difference”. Bergoffen thus regards 
equality, with its traditional focus on sameness and its inability to deal with particularity, as 
antithetical to Irigaray’s ‘equity politics’ which is rooted in sexual difference. The question is 
thus whether it is appropriate to argue for an Irigarayan interpretation of sex equality or 
whether ‘equality’ as an ideal should rather be completely abandoned. I want to argue, in this 
regard, that the concept of equality need not be replaced by something else, but that it can be 
                                                          
3 It is useful to note here that the word “utopia” was first used by Thomas More, in his book with the same 
title, to refer in an ambiguous way both to a place which does not exist (derived from the Greek word Outopía 
which means “no land”) and a good place (derived from the Greek word Eutopiā, literally meaning “good 
place” (Engelbrecht 2003:4). The classic utopia is thus a desired place which does not and cannot exist 
(Engelbrecht 2003:4). 
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reinterpreted and broadened to allow for an Irigarayan approach. It will be seen in the next 
chapter that the notion of equality is not inherently and necessarily linked with an Aristotelian 
emphasis on sameness. In this regard, it will be shown that equality, as conceptualised and 
framed in the South African constitutional order, has already taken on a new form that allows 
for a concern with difference and particularity, and which is thus much closer to Irigaray’s  
‘equity politics’ than to formal equality. On this basis, it is submitted that an Irigarayan 
approach to the transformation of sex and gender relations does not necessitate the discarding 
of the ideal of equality, but merely that the aims and informing values of equality must be 
reinterpreted. In the same vein, Khader notes that she reads Irigaray’s critique of equality “as 
an enumeration of the dangers facing egalitarian political strategies rather than a rejection of 
egalitarian ideals” (Khader 2008:50). 
V   Sexed rights 
Irigaray’s sexual difference theory culminates in the powerful, but highly controversial notion 
of sexed rights as a strategy to achieve legal enforcement of the kind of equality that she 
envisions. In this regard, Irigaray argues that the identity of women cannot be constructed in 
the absence of a legal framework that regulates horizontal and vertical relations in society 
with respect for the fact that women and men are sexual and embodied beings who are 
different from each other (Irigaray 1993b:82) and who need different things from the law. 
She thus deems it crucial for the achievement of basic justice that women be granted a civil 
identity (Irigaray 1994:41), in so far as women must, like men, be able to assert their 
subjectivity through public means and channels, rather than being relegated only to the realm 
of the personal. In the absence of such a civil identity, women will continue supporting a 
male tradition and society that marginalize and oppress them (Irigaray 1994:41). The 
development of a civil identity for women will also necessitate the redefinition of the rights 
and responsibilities of male citizens (Irigaray 1994:62). Crimes like violence against women, 
non-consensual pornographic trade, involuntary prostitution, kidnapping of children and 
incest indicate that there is still a blatant lack of appropriate human rights for women and 
children in our societies (Irigaray 1994:41). Irigaray (1994:59) explains how the written law 
is aimed at a society of “men-amongst-themselves”. She writes: 
The pretext of the neutral individual does not pass the reality test: women get 
pregnant, not men; women and little girls are raped, boys very rarely; the bodies of 
women and girls are used for involuntary prostitution and pornography, those of men 
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infinitely less; and so on. And the exceptions to the rule or custom are not valid 
objections as long as society is for the most part run by men, as long as men are the 
ones who enact and enforce the laws (1994:59). 
Her point is thus that the legislation that is in place still allows, on a large scale, for women’s 
bodies to be treated as property, and is thus actively complicit in barring women from 
becoming fully fledged subjects. On this basis, Irigaray demands that women’s positive civil 
identity be written into law by way of granting them sex-specific or ‘sexed’ civil rights. This 
point is crucial in the context of the problem of sexual violence against women. Irigaray 
holds that it is the alleged/false neutrality of legal systems that is supporting the masculine 
order in its denial of feminine subjectivity, by not providing for the particularly embodied 
and sexual needs and vulnerabilities of women.  For Irigaray, then, the oppression of women, 
and therefore also sexual violence, cannot be fought and eradicated in the absence of sexed 
rights.  
Irigaray writes that civil rights must operate, firstly, to open up all arenas of public expression 
to women, secondly to allow them to enter the labour market in a way corresponding to their 
status as adult citizens, and thirdly “to give them rights that enable them to escape from the 
alienation of the family and the state, the world of men-amongst-themselves, but also from 
the possible alienation stemming from other women” (Irigaray 1994:83). Accordingly, 
Irigaray aims at formulating rights that would enable women to participate as subjects in the 
spheres of family, state and society, so that these institutions include and empower women 
rather than functioning through their exclusion and isolation. The specific sexed rights that 
Irigaray argues for are, in short, the right to human dignity (which is aimed specifically at an 
end to the commercial use and exploitation of women’s bodies and legitimate representation 
of them in public spaces); the right to human identity; mutual mother-child duties, so that a 
mother can protect her children and be assisted by them under the law; the right of women to 
defend their lives and those of their children, their homes, their traditions and their religion 
against any unilateral decision based on men’s law; some financial rights; the restructuring of 
systems of exchange in order to ensure that women and men have a right of equivalent 
exchange; and lastly, the right to be represented everywhere that civil or religious decisions 
are made (Irigaray 1994:60). These rights will be explained in more detail below in my 
defence of Irigaray against the charge of essentialism. 
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Accordingly, Irigaray advocates for the active engagement of the law in the quest for equality 
for women through the explicit inscription of the fundamental recognition of sexual 
difference within legislation. In terms of this theory, the illusion of the neutral, abstract 
individual will be destabilised by extending concrete rights to embodied and sexually 
particular persons. 
VI  Response to the charge of essentialism in the work of Irigaray 
Irigaray’s theory often falls prey to the charge of essentialism, in so far as ontological 
importance is attached to being either male or female. Braidotti (1994:184) explains that 
Irigaray’s deconstruction of sexual polarization in western metaphysics “mimes perfectly the 
conceptual operation of essentialist logic as the key of phallogocentric discourse” in so far as 
she does not dissociate questions of the feminine from the presence of real-life women. In 
equating the feminine with women and the masculine with men, Irigaray thus seems to be 
repeating the “binary perversion of phallocentrism” (Braidotti 1994:184). Critics argue that 
this is problematic because it, amongst other things, firstly assumes that all persons fit into 
either the category of male or female and that no other sexual categories of human beings 
exist, and, secondly, could lead to the re-encoding of oppressive stereotypes of male and 
female identities.  
In this section, I will address this criticism by specifically responding to Cornell’s 
formulation thereof. Cornell voices her disagreement with Irigaray in response to the 
following assertion from Irigaray:  
Each man and each woman is a particular individual, but universal through their 
gender, to which must correspond an appropriate law, a law common to all men and 
to all women (1996:51). 
Irigaray writes these words in justification of her argument regarding the necessity of sexed 
rights. Cornell formulates her critique in the following way: 
I strongly disagree with Irigaray that our sexed identity is a natural reality and that our 
particularity as a person can be adequately expressed through legally defining gender 
as a universal (1998:122).  
She continues: 
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Although women would be given a civil identity, the attempt to give rights, thought 
through sexual difference as a universal, denies women the freedom to reimagine their 
sexual difference. For Irigaray, there are naturally two sexes. Her ontologization of 
the two denies that women live their biology in infinitely different and original ways. 
In the imaginary domain, sexes cannot be counted because what we will become 
under freedom cannot be known in advance (1998:122). 
Cornell’s criticism of Irigaray thus hinges on two related points: firstly, that Irigaray tries to 
exhaustively express our particularity through legally defining gender, and secondly, that 
Irigaray ontologises sexual difference in an oppressive way by encoding a new hegemonic 
stereotype of women into the law, and as a result, denies women the opportunity to develop 
their sexual identities in ways that they want to. According to Cornell, this latter denial also 
implies that the differences between women are denied.  I will respond to each of these points 
in what follows below.  
With regard to Cornell’s first point of criticism, I want to argue that a simple analysis of the 
sexed rights for which Irigaray advocates reveals that Irigaray is not attempting to 
“adequately express” the particularity of a person through her sexed rights. On the contrary, 
these rights are aimed at breaking open a space of freedom for women to create their own 
identities, something which the legal system has to date been complicit in fighting against.  
The first sexed right that Irigaray deems necessary is the right to human dignity. This entails 
an end to the commercial use of women’s bodies or images; the legitimate representation of 
women in actions, words and pictures in all public spaces; and an end to the exploitation of a 
functional part of women, for example motherhood, by civil and religious powers (Irigaray 
1994:60). This right is concerned with the legitimate representation of women in public 
spaces and is directed toward allowing women to decide over and control their ‘functional’ 
aspects (for example motherhood). Here the question can arise as to who decides what 
constitutes “legitimate” representation of women, and in this regard Irigaray might be read as 
being willing to be prescriptive about what “legitimate” womanhood entails. However, this 
right can also be interpreted simply as a prohibition of public displays of pornography and 
any explicit or sexist material that promotes the harmful stereotyping of women as objects at 
the disposal of men. Cornell herself argues that pornographic and explicit images of women 
should be “zoned” so that everyone has a choice about whether they want to be confronted 
with them or not, because “[n]o woman should be forced to view her own body as it is 
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fantasized as a dismembered, castrated other, found in bits and pieces” (Cornell 1995:103). 
Read in this way, this right is not intended to be an adequate expression of the particularity of 
women, and is necessary to create the freedom for women to determine their own identities.  
The second sexed right that Irigaray formulates is the right to a human identity. This entails 
“the enshrining in law of virginity as a component of female identity that cannot be reduced 
to money” (Irigaray 1994:60). In justification of this right, Irigaray writes: 
This component of female identity gives girls a civil status and the right to keep their 
virginity (for their own relationship to the divine, too) as long as they like, and to 
bring charges against anyone inside or outside the family who violates it. [...] Girls 
need a positive identity to which they can relate as individual and social civil persons 
(1994:61). 
Accordingly, in defining this right, Irigaray is intensely concerned with the freedom of girls 
to develop their own embodied, sexuate and sexual identities and their own relationships to 
the divine, and their ability to defend this freedom through the official channels of the law. 
Again, she is not attempting to inscribe what it means to be a woman in law, but is rather 
trying to get the legal system behind the project of enabling women to develop and explore 
their own subjectivities. This resonates with Cornell’s idea that the law should function in a 
way that enables women to become persons – where personhood refers to the Latin meaning 
of Persona as a “shining through” (Cornell 1995:4). Accordingly, for Cornell, being a person 
entails a development of subjectivity or identity which distinguishes human life from a mere 
banal bodily struggle for survival. Irigaray’s formulation of the right to human identity serves 
such a project. 
Irigaray’s right to human identity also entails the right to motherhood as a component of 
feminine identity. Here Irigaray makes it abundantly clear that she is not saying that 
motherhood is a necessary component of being a woman. She writes: 
If the body is a legal issue, and it is, the female body must be identified civilly as both 
virgin and potential mother, this means that it is a woman’s civil right to choose to be 
pregnant, and how many times (1994:61). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
45 
This therefore entails the right not to get married, not to have sex, and especially, not to have 
children. This point can be explained in terms of Martha Nussbaum’s notion of capabilities, 
in that the capability of bodily integrity for her entails, crucially, choice in matters of 
reproduction (Nussbaum 2000:78). Irigaray is thus not saying that womanhood inevitably 
entails motherhood, but that women should be able to choose for themselves whether they 
will live their womanhood as mothers. In our society, many young girls do not experience 
this as a real choice, as the majority of teenage pregnancies in South Africa are unplanned 
and unwanted (Vundule et al 2001:73). In addition, studies have shown that many teenage 
girls regard pregnancy as a way to demonstrate ‘successful womanhood’ (Mkhwanazi 
2010:348). 
Irigaray’s third sexed right - that mutual mother-child duties should be defined in the legal 
code - is directed at enabling women to protect their children and to be protected by them 
under the law (Irigaray 1994:61). “This will allow her to bring charges on behalf of civil 
society when children, especially girls, are raped, battered, or kidnapped” (Irigaray 1994:61). 
Again, this right is aimed at putting in place legal protection against the infringement of 
bodily integrity for women and their children - it is not trying to define womanhood in any 
prescriptive way. The same goes for the fourth sexed right, which gives women the right to 
defend their lives and those of their children, as well as their homes, traditions and religion, 
against unilateral decisions made through and by men’s law (Irigaray 1994:61). Irigaray’s 
reference to men’s law here can be read as the patriarchal practices that are so often 
embedded in the home, family, tradition and religion. And the same can be said for Irigaray’s 
fifth sexed right, which is aimed at empowering women financially by not discriminating 
against women through systems like taxation or state subsidies. Such financial empowerment 
would contribute to the bolstering of women’s financial, sexual and reproductive autonomy 
by allowing them to become less dependent on men.  
The sixth sexed right that Irigaray formulates entails that “systems of exchange, languages, 
for example, will be restructured to ensure that women and men have a right of equivalent 
exchange” (Irigaray 1994:62). She also writes: 
 Even in technologies based on language and its coding, it seems a good idea to review 
women’s relations to natural and artificial languages before concluding that their easy 
access to this type of work represents a social victory for them. It may also contribute 
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to a more subtle alienation of their identity and, thus, to a new type of alienation of 
society as a whole (1994:63). 
Irigaray is thus concerned with the development of symbolic forms and linguistic skills that 
would allow women to represent, verbalise, or communicate in a way that serves their 
development of specifically feminine identities. Cornell also regards this kind of symbolic 
mediation as essential for the becoming of feminine subjectivity in so far as she lists “access 
to symbolic forms sufficient to achieve linguistic skills permitting the differentiation of 
oneself from others” as a minimum condition of becoming a person (Cornell 1995:4).  
Accordingly, the rights formulated by Irigaray clearly refrain from prescribing what it means 
to be a woman, and are open-ended rights that are aimed at enabling women to enjoy equal 
sexual, bodily, financial, political and religious freedom to men. In Cornellian terms, Irigaray 
is thus working to undermine and dislodge the conventional femininity that is imposed upon 
women and to create a space for the flourishing of the person and the woman “beyond the 
masquerade of femininity” (Cornell 1995:7). In other words, Irigaray wants the law to carve 
out a legal space where the ‘other of the other’ or feminine subjectivity can be born and 
sustained.  
As noted above, Cornell’s second objection to Irigaray’s work is that Irigaray ontologises 
sexual difference in an oppressive way by encoding a new hegemonic stereotype of women 
into the law. According to Cornell, the result of this is that, firstly, women are denied the 
freedom to develop their sexual identities in ways that they want to, and secondly, the 
differences between women are denied. 
The ontologisation of sexual difference by Irigaray has been defended by many thinkers. The 
most convincing argument in this regard is put forward by Braidotti, and holds that Irigaray’s 
radicalization of the categories of male and female is the basis for a new kind of ethics in 
which alterity is fully respected and accepted as a fundamental element of human existence 
(Braidotti 1994:133). Accordingly, the enabling of a new feminine humanity through sexual 
difference breaks open the exclusionary zone of the singular subject based on sameness. 
Subjectivity is therefore opened up in a movement toward the recognition and love of the 
other, thus enabling a fertile relation with alterity.  
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Braidotti also regards Irigaray’s strategic ontologisation of the female as a sex alongside the 
male as a necessary step in activating sexual difference as a political option (Braidotti 
1994:177). Braidotti explains this point as follows: 
The factual element that founds the project of sexual difference, and that is also a 
sign, is not biological, it is biocultural, historical. Its importance lies in the fact that it 
allows me, and many like me in the sameness of our gender – all differences taken 
into account – to state that “we” women find these representations and images of 
“Woman” highly insufficient and inadequate to express our experience as women. 
Before any such assertion is being made, however, the consensus point needs to be 
cleared, that “being-a-woman” is always already there as the ontological precondition 
for my existential becoming as a subject (1994:188). 
 Accordingly, Braidotti interprets Irigaray’s position as a strategic move aimed at the opening 
up of a space, through the breaking open of the singular and universal subjectivity, in which 
women can begin to define their own sexual subjectivities. Essentialism is thus used as a 
lever to activate difference as a central notion of our understanding of subjectivity. Braidotti 
formulates this as follows: 
As women we are firmly attached to a culture and to logic of discourse that has 
historically defined Woman/woman, woman and the feminine, in a pejorative sense. 
The conscious political realization of our being already present, however, in a system 
that has turned a blind eye/I to the fact of what we are and that we are, instead of 
becoming a statement of defeat, could pave the way for a new ethical and political 
project aimed at affirming the positivity of the difference we embody (1994:190).  
On such an interpretation, at least, Irigaray’s notion of sexual difference changes difference 
from a ground for discrimination and a “mark of pejoration” (Braidotti 1994:160) to a 
positive constitutive element of human existence, so that the differences between people can 
be regarded as cause for respect and celebration. Accordingly, for Irigaray, ontologising 
sexual difference is a tool which allows for a move away from the ‘sameness’ model of 
subjectivity and which creates a space for love for the other. Her position is thus not an 
exclusionary one, but the basis of an ethics that is marked by full respect for otherness and 
difference. On this basis, thinkers like Braidotti refer to it as “love ethics” (Braidotti 
1994:133). 
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With regard to the charge that this ontologisation of the two sexes can result in the legal 
entrenchment of a new hegemonic stereotype of women, Cornell argues that ethical feminism 
resists the urge to rigidly produce the categories of men and women, which inevitably results 
in the exclusion of persons who do not identify with either of these categories, or who prefer 
to move more fluidly between them (Cornell 1995:26). Cornell’s argument is thus that the 
law must not entrench respect and protection for the category of woman, because this entails 
that a certain static conception of woman is written into the law. The law must rather allow 
and enforce the equal valuation of women and men in principle, so that women need not 
conform to a specific conception of femininity in order to be respected and protected. Cornell 
argues: 
We also want to refrain from imposing other constraints in the very name of trying to 
give women the right to speak. Paradoxically, a feminist program of legal reform 
must be aware of the limit imposed upon such reforms by the unlimitedness of 
feminist aspirations to search out a world beyond accommodation to current forms of 
gender confinement (1995:106).  
Cornell’s point is an important one in so far as there exists general consensus among 
feminists that feminism should guard against repeating patriarchy’s sin of prescribing a 
model of femininity, and, as a result, excluding women who do not conform to it, on the basis 
that such women are ‘unnatural’ or undignified. I want to argue that Irigaray is not guilty of 
this. Irigaray regards the feminine as still merely a horizon of becoming, and accordingly, she 
is in no way claiming to know what the feminine entails or what it is capable of becoming, 
and she is therefore not attempting to inscribe it into the law in any way. In fact, Irigaray 
emphasises the importance of each woman giving form to her own subjectivity: 
 I must open out my female body, give it forms, words, knowledge of itself, a cosmic 
and social equilibrium, in relation to the environment, to the different means of 
exchange with others, and not only by artificial means that are inappropriate to it 
(1993:116). 
The passage quoted above also again alludes to the possibility of symbolic mediation of 
femininity as a category of being. Braidotti (1994:131) describes Irigaray’s project as 
follows: 
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‘The feminine’ she is after is a woman-defined-feminine and as such it is still a blank, 
it is not yet there, we are to think of it in the conditional mode: how can the feminine 
of/in/by women come into being in the sexually undifferentiated system of our 
culture? What are the conditions that would make the first coming of the female 
subject possible? 
Similarly, Du Toit points out that for Irigaray, Woman is not something that yet exists in the 
masculine order of western thought, and therefore remains rather “a horizon of becoming 
awaiting us in the future” where the female sexed body is a material basis or genre from 
which this becoming emerges (Du Toit 2009:174).  
Accordingly, the recognition of and respect for sexual difference that is at issue in Irigaray’s 
work is more radical than merely respecting members of the other sex for what they are, but 
also entails recognition and respect for whatever they want to become. It is about enabling the 
feminine to develop a sexed identity that has been denied to her under patriarchal rule, and 
enabling the development of a kind of masculinity that is freed from the straitjacket of the 
Cartesian subject. The respect for sexual difference that Irigaray promotes therefore does not 
merely entail respecting sexually particular persons when they behave and appear in a certain 
way that conforms to the prevalent idea about what a woman or man is, but rather entails 
unconditionally respecting them in whatever way they choose to live and express their sexed 
identity. In this sense, an authentic respect for sexual difference therefore has a temporal 
element which allows for the surpassing and transcendence of sexual stereotypes, in that it is 
not only about allowing people to be who they are, but also about creating a space for their 
becoming.  
Furthermore, Irigaray explicitly responds to the concern that in emphasising sexual 
difference, differences among women are ignored, by criticising women who “confuse their 
unmediated will with a model of law or the way to happiness for all women” (Irigaray 
1996:3). On this basis, Irigaray holds that it is “necessary for a gender to learn to oppose 
itself” (Irigaray 1996:4), and that women should not project their “contradictions onto other 
women [...] side-step[ping] the labor of the negative amongst them” (Irigaray 1996:4). 
Caldwell explains Irigaray’s positions as follows: 
Her attention to a negative among women would – or should – reject any one 
woman’s efforts to present her particular experiences as a universal experience or 
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identity for women. It is also important to recall her definition of the feminine 
universal as a sensible transcendental that simultaneously precedes me and is 
constituted by me. Given these parameters, a feminine universal cannot refer to one 
set of characteristics (2002:31).  
It is thus clear that Irigaray’s sexed rights are not aimed at providing the exact content of, and 
thereby formulating prescriptions for, a new kind of femininity, but are rather directed 
towards enabling women to define their own contours. Accordingly, Irigaray should not be 
read as re-encoding a new hegemonic conception of the feminine into the law through her 
sexed rights, because her whole point is that the Feminine does not exist yet. In this regard, 
Braidotti (1994:130) writes that “[t]here is a visionary, utopian, and at times even prophetic 
quality in Irigaray’s writing, which expresses her faith in the force of the feminine as a new 
symbolic and discursive economy”. Nussbaum’s words find interesting application here: 
We want an approach that is respectful of each person’s struggle for flourishing, that 
treats each person as an end and as a source of agency and worth in her own right. 
Part of this respect will mean not being dictatorial about the good, at least for adults 
and at least in some core areas of choice, leaving individuals a wide space for 
important types of choice and meaningful affiliation. But this very respect means 
taking a stand on the conditions that permit them to follow their own lights free from 
tyrannies imposed by politics and tradition (2000:69).  
In these terms, Irigaray’s sexed rights can be regarded as an instance of “taking a stand” 
against the “tyrannies” of the western and African patriarchal orders which bar women from 
taking on the struggle for flourishing. 
VII   Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how, for Irigaray, equality lies not in the equal treatment of similar 
categories of people, but is rather grounded in a new conception of subjectivity which is not 
based on singularity, disembodiment and universality, but on plurality, difference and 
embodiment. Sex equality would therefore flow from a radical re-envisaging of the self as 
having its material basis in the body, which results in an inevitable shift in attitude toward the 
sexed other, and if Irigaray is read generously, also toward otherness in race, class, age, and 
so on. As explained earlier, Irigaray uses the concept of the sensible transcendental to express 
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this idea of a subjectivity that is constituted by a dynamic interaction between the material 
and the intelligible. The shift in attitude toward the other is born out of the recognition that as 
an embodied being, every subject only has access to a partial perspective, and that the sexed 
other therefore remains unknown to and outside of the self. The universalisation of one sex as 
representative of humanity becomes incongruous, and sexual difference is acknowledged as a 
constitutive element of subjectivity and the foundation of any relationship with the other. 
Through the understanding of subjectivity as embodied, and undeniably and inevitably sexed, 
so that sex gains ontological importance, the oppression of one sex by the other through the 
relegation of one set of sexual particulars to an inferior position is rendered absurd, as well as 
absurdly unjust. Furthermore, this also applies to other differences between persons in 
society, in so far as the recognition of the partial perspective of the embodied subject also 
leads to an acknowledgment of the partiality of being white or of belonging to a certain 
ethnic, cultural or age group. Accordingly, Irigaray’s approach to subjectivity enables the 
emergence of a society in which all difference is respected and approached with wonder.   
It has been shown that the kind of equality envisaged by Irigaray’s philosophy cannot be 
accomplished by the formal model of equality, in so far as this model merely leads to the 
perpetuation of existing gender hierarchies. Accordingly, Irigaray’s philosophy calls for a 
reinterpretation of equality as an ideal that is underpinned by difference, and thus 
fundamentally concerned with particularities. Irigaray regards the supposedly gender-neutral 
and universal language of legal discourse as incapable of bringing forth and supporting this 
kind of equality, and as a result proposes the legal inscription of sexual difference through the 
entrenchment of sex-specific rights.  
Irigaray’s identification of patriarchy as an institution that is rooted in the symbolic order 
helps to explain the pervasiveness of patriarchy across most cultures and religions, as well as 
the difficulty of overcoming it. Furthermore, her philosophy contributes to an understanding 
of the nature of the transformation that is necessary to empower women. Irigaray shows that 
such a transformation needs to happen at a fundamental symbolic level and that it will result 
in a complete overhaul of the symbolic and social structures of society. It is this that renders 
her work relevant to the South African context, where the legislative attempts to address the 
oppression of women have failed to effect a significant improvement in the prevailing social 
attitudes and beliefs in terms of which women’s bodies are treated as men’s property.  
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Following Irigaray, I want to submit that in order to bring about real transformation of sex 
and gender relations in South Africa (and thereby to address the problem of sexual violence) 
the legal system should facilitate the necessary symbolic change through altering the way in 
which it approaches and posits the subject. On this basis, I want to argue that replacing the 
disembodied, universal subject of traditional legal discourse with a sexed and embodied 
subject within the South African Constitution and legislation could be the first step to a 
deeper transformation of sex and gender relations in South African society. This will enable 
the legal system to start taking the needs and vulnerabilities of concrete and actual living 
women seriously so that they can develop as subjects alongside men, without having to 
conform to the masculine norm in order to be respected as subjects and persons by the law.  
In the next chapters I will explore the South African constitutional equality jurisprudence and 
the sexual offences legislation in order to determine the extent to which the legal system’s 
approach to sex equality and sexual violence allows for an Irigarayan approach to subjectivity 
and equality.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
EMBODIMENT, SEXUAL PARTICULARITY AND 
DIFFERENCE: AN EXPLORATION OF 
SUBJECTIVITY AND EQUALITY IN THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 
I   Introduction 
From the arguments in the introductory chapter of this thesis, which framed sexual violence 
as fundamentally a problem of inequality, and moreover, a deeply gendered one, it can be 
concluded that if the legal system is to address sexual violence effectively, more drastic 
measures than the mere criminalisation of rape are called for. The eradication of sexual 
violence against women, then, demands that the law should contribute to an interruption of 
sex and gender relations by working to uproot the deep hierarchical structures through which 
masculine and feminine identities were defined for centuries. 
In the previous chapter it was shown that Irigaray argues that the empowerment of women 
requires transformation at the level of the symbolic order. Such transformation would begin 
with a rethinking of subjectivity, so that the disembodied and falsely universal subject of the 
western symbolic and philosophical order (and accordingly, also the legal order), which 
represents an idealised masculine subjectivity and emerges through the exclusion and 
sacrifice of the feminine, is replaced with an embodied and sexually particular subject. Such 
transformation will entail and support a new approach to sexual difference, in which 
subjectivity is recognised as being rooted in the sexed body, and in terms of which sexual 
particularity is thus respected and embraced rather than denied or misused. In this way the 
hierarchical dichotomies of same/other, universal/particular, disembodied/embodied, 
culture/nature, public/private, and so on, which are all underpinned by the 
masculine/feminine hierarchy (where all the secondary terms are associated with femininity 
and regarded as inferior while the primary terms correspond with masculinity) can be 
dismantled and collapsed. Irigaray argues that this will allow, on a symbolic level, for the 
feminine to emerge as a sex in its own right, and accordingly, women will be able to develop 
human identities and subjectivities that are not merely derivative of and in service of men. 
For Irigaray, sex equality then entails the recognition of all sexed persons as valid subjects. It 
has also been shown that Irigaray ascribes a strategic and radical role to the law in this 
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transformation, in so far as she argues that the law should enable women, through sex 
specific rights, to develop civil identities that are denied through gender-neutral laws that are 
covertly in service of the masculine.  
Thus far I have argued that Irigaray’s work is important because she provides a convincing 
account of the level at which transformation of sex and gender relations must begin and the 
legal system’s role in such transformation. In South Africa, where women remain the victims 
of large scale oppression through sexual (and other forms of) violence, it would therefore be 
of value to determine the extent to which our constitutional equality jurisprudence, which is 
aimed at fighting this oppression, allows for an Irigarayan approach to transformation by 
addressing the deep problems on the level of the symbolic order. In this regard, the question 
will be posed as to whether the South African equality jurisprudence, with reference to the 
Constitution, relevant legislation, case law and academic literature, can be interpreted so as to 
enable the emergence of an embodied and sexually particular legal subject, and the extent to 
which the right and value of equality can be interpreted so as to allow for an authentic 
acknowledgment of the sexed self as the foundation for sex equality.   
I will start in the next section by introducing the form that equality takes within the South 
African equality jurisprudence. This section will explain that the much criticised model of 
formal equality is largely replaced in the South African constitutional dispensation by the 
substantive model of equality. It will be shown that this model immediately draws the ideal of 
equality closer to an Irigarayan conception thereof, in so far as it is not simply concerned 
with similar treatment of certain categories of people, but with dismantling systemic 
inequalities and power asymmetries in society which withhold concrete individuals and 
groups from enjoying their basic constitutional rights and freedoms. 
In the subsequent section, I will expand on the preceding discussion by focusing specifically 
on the kind of legal subject that features in the equality jurisprudence of South Africa. Here I 
will show that within the specific context of the right to equality, the subject is mostly 
approached not as an abstract, gender-neutral and disembodied legal category, but as a 
concrete, sexed and embodied being. It will also be shown that an authentic recognition of 
sexual difference is written into our equality jurisprudence through PEPUDA’s listing of sex-
specific instances of unfair discrimination on the basis of gender. I will argue that our right to 
sex equality is thus informed and enhanced by what closely resembles sexed rights in the 
Irigarayan sense. 
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In the third section, I will explore the approach of the South African constitutional order to 
sexual difference in the context of sex equality. Here I will show that the Court’s 
acknowledgment of difference as a positive feature of society which, according to the Court, 
should underpin our understanding of equality, allows for difference to be dislodged from its 
automatic association with hierarchy. It therefore lays the foundation for a society where 
‘different from’ does not mean ‘less than’, and where equality is pursued through a respect 
for difference. A concern with the particular and the concrete is therefore not understood as 
inimical to the quest for equality, but rather, as being in service thereof. It will be argued that 
this lays a promising foundation for an Irigarayan-type acknowledgment and application of 
sexual difference. However, it will be shown that the Court has not yet explicitly 
acknowledged the implications of such an approach to difference in the context of the 
relationship between the sexes. Accordingly, sexual difference has not yet been directly 
included in the constitutional discussion of equality and difference. Furthermore, with 
reference to case law, I will show that the Court has to date still relied too much on sameness 
in sex equality cases, which contradicts its emphasis in other contexts on the importance of 
difference. However, I will argue that even though sexual difference has not yet been 
activated in our equality jurisprudence to an extent that fulfils its full potential as catalyst for 
transformation of sex and gender relations in South Africa, a foundation for this has been laid 
through the Court’s understanding of equality as an ideal that is underpinned by difference 
rather than sameness. There is thus an opening in our equality jurisprudence for the 
emergence of an Irigarayan approach to sexual difference as a core value in a strategy for sex 
equality.  
It will therefore be argued throughout the course of these discussions that the South African 
equality jurisprudence does lay a foundation for an Irigarayan approach to the transformation 
of sex and gender relations in so far as our right to equality can be interpreted to be 
underpinned by an acknowledgment of embodiment, sexual particularity and difference. 
II Formal Equality and Substantive Equality 
From the outset, the South African Constitution proclaims its commitment to gender equality 
to be just as strong as its commitment to racial equality, by listing non-sexism together with 
non-racism as founding values of South Africa.  Gender and sex are also listed alongside race 
as prohibited grounds of discrimination in the equality clause. Furthermore, from PEPUDA’s 
preamble, it can be seen that the Act recognises that gender inequality is just as big a problem 
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as racial inequality. In this regard it is explicitly stated that patriarchy, as a form of 
domination which is systemic in nature has, alongside colonialism and apartheid, “brought 
pain and suffering to the great majority of our people”. Accordingly, the Constitution and 
PEPUDA openly proclaim and insistently emphasise the country’s commitment to the 
achievement of sex equality. This constitutionally proclaimed commitment to sex equality 
creates the possibility of the achievement of a powerful break with the past.  
In the establishment of the South African constitutional democracy, it was recognised that a 
robust model of equality is needed for the kind of transition that has to be made from a 
severely unequal society to one where all people live together as equals. As a result, the 
formal model of equality was discarded in favour of a substantive model of equality.  
As explained in the previous chapter, the traditional form that equality takes within liberal 
legal systems is formal equality. From a feminist perspective, the formal model of equality is 
highly problematic because within the application of formal equality, the masculine norm is 
regarded as the standard for the ‘likeness’ that must be established as a basis for a claim to 
equality. As explained in the previous chapter, the implication of this is that to the extent that 
the complainant is not similarly situated to men (in that her case is not regarded to be a ‘like 
case’ to those of men), she is not granted access to equality. Furthermore, a successful claim 
to equality will result in the mere inclusion of a certain category of woman into the masculine 
position in the hierarchy, where she will be treated in the same way as men and will have the 
same benefits as men, which will still be to the detriment of other women and possibly 
herself. Through the formal model of equality, a pernicious attitude toward difference is thus 
entrenched in the law, in so far as, on the one hand, difference is constructed hierarchically 
and is regarded as justification for discrimination, and on the other, existing inequalities are 
interpreted as differences which remove the case from the scope of a claim to equality. 
MacKinnon (2005:53) explains this point as follows: 
Sex equality for the “similarly situated” best provides equality for whoever is “the 
same as men.” Actually, these people have been men: white men have brought most 
of the leading Supreme Court sex discrimination cases. Next in line are women whose 
biographies most closely approximate those of men, elite women with privileges 
(white skin, money, education, and so on). Unrecognized here is that it is hierarchy, 
not difference as such, that is the opposite of equality. The inequality that is hierarchy, 
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existing theory builds in as difference, meaning something that can be treated 
differently –that is, less well, hierarchically lower [.] 
MacKinnon’s point here is that in terms of the formal model of equality, socially and 
ideologically constructed hierarchies (thus inequalities) between people and groups of people 
are naturalised and then construed as difference, which disqualifies the issue from being a 
‘like’ case to that of the more privileged person or group. Inequalities are thus understood as 
difference which places the issue beyond the scope of equality, because it does not pass the 
‘similarly situated’ test. Formal equality therefore necessitates no critical evaluation of the 
law itself or of other entrenched systems of inequality within society. Rather, it sustains the 
hierarchical, binary logic which keeps masculine privilege invisible and firmly in place. 
Accordingly, the pursuit of formal equality has the anomalous effect that hegemonic relations 
are enforced and perpetuated under the guise of equality.  
With the advent of democracy in South Africa, the drafters of the Constitution decided from 
the outset that in the ‘new’ South Africa, a stronger and more complex model of equality will 
be needed in order to overcome the gross inequalities created by the previous dispensation.  
The formal model of equality was thus replaced with a substantive approach, which is evident 
from section 9(2) of the equality clause in the Constitution: 
Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote 
the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or 
advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination 
may be taken. 
Accordingly, the meaning of the notion of equality in the South African Constitution is 
extended beyond mere formal equal treatment of all persons to the active promotion of 
equality through legislation and other actions.  The Constitutional Court in the case of 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (NCGLE) and Another v Minister of Justice 
and Others 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC), quoting Judge Goldstone in the case of President of 
the Republic of South Africa and another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC), states that the 
notion of substantive equality as opposed to formal equality has been encapsulated in the 
following way: 
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We need, therefore, to develop a concept of unfair discrimination which recognises 
that although a society which affords each human being equal treatment on the basis 
of equal worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve that goal by insisting upon 
identical treatment in all circumstances before that goal is achieved. Each case, 
therefore, will require a careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the 
discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned to determine whether its 
overall impact is one which furthers the constitutional goal of equality or not (par 61). 
The substantive model of equality is thus not concerned with treating everyone the same, but 
rather with treating people in a way that will result in the achievement of equality. Therefore, 
substantive equality is regarded by scholars, as well as the Constitutional Court, to be a 
transformative tool. Albertyn explains that substantive equality does not entail a process of 
comparison where one group is seen as embodying the neutral standard of sameness 
(humanness), but that the disadvantaged group or person is instead compared in a concrete 
way to the advantaged group or person in order to determine how the former is kept from 
enjoying their full human potential (Albertyn 2004:4.3.1). Albertyn further writes that, by 
providing for a conception of equality that entails the equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms 
set out in the Bill of Rights, section 9(2) “envisages a society in which all people enjoy a 
level of psychological, physical and material well-being that enables them to participate fully 
in society” (Albertyn 2004:4.24). This resonates strongly with Cornell’s understanding of 
equality as requiring that each person has an equal chance to pursue the project of becoming a 
person (Cornell 1995:4). Accordingly, substantive equality represents a decisive shift away 
from the requirement (or assumption) of sameness to an emphasis on the ideal that all people 
should be enabled to an equal extent to enjoy their full human potential.  
The transformative potential of substantive equality is also highlighted in PEPUDA. Its 
preamble repeatedly refers to systemic inequalities that necessitate large scale transformation 
of social structures, practices and attitudes: 
 Although significant progress has been made in restructuring and transforming our 
 society and its institutions, systemic inequalities and unfair discrimination remain 
 deeply embedded in social structures, practices and attitudes, undermining the 
 aspirations of our constitutional democracy. 
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The preamble of PEPUDA states that the constitutional values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom constitute the basis for progressively redressing systemic equalities which were 
generated historically by colonialism, apartheid and patriarchy, in order to create a “non-
racial and non-sexist society where all may flourish”. 
PEPUDA thus also emphasises that the right to equality has a more radical role to play than 
simply ensuring that like cases are treated alike. Furthermore, PEPUDA clearly embraces the 
substantive model of equality by defining equality in section 1 as “the full and equal 
enjoyment of rights and freedoms as contemplated in the Constitution and as including de 
jure and de facto equality and also equality in terms of outcomes”. One of the guiding 
principles set out in section 4 of the Act is that “the existence of systemic discrimination and 
inequality, particularly in respect of race, gender and disability in all spheres of life as a result 
of past and present unfair discrimination, brought about by colonialism, the apartheid system 
and patriarchy” must be taken into account in the application of the Act, as well as “the need 
to take measures at all levels to eliminate such discrimination and inequalities”.  
Furthermore, PEPUDA offers progressive responses to the acknowledgment that the route to 
equality does not lie in mere equal treatment, but in the dismantling of systemic inequalities 
in order to create a society in which everyone has an equal chance to flourish. In this regard, 
PEPUDA firstly reverses the burden of proof in section 13 in cases of unfair discrimination. 
This reflects an acknowledgment that systemic inequalities in society often make it very 
difficult to prove that discrimination has taken place, because the discrimination is an 
accepted practice in society, or alternatively, because the discrimination is so subtle and 
embedded in community attitudes and structures that it is regarded as being unavoidable or 
natural. In this context, PEPUDA stipulates that the complainant merely has to make a prima 
facie case of discrimination, after which the burden of proof is on the respondent to prove 
that the discrimination did not take place or that the discrimination was not based on one or 
more of the prohibited grounds. Sex, pregnancy, gender, sexual orientation and marital status 
are all prohibited grounds in terms of section 9 of the Constitution. Similarly, if it is 
established that discrimination did take place on a prohibited ground, then the discrimination 
is deemed to be unfair, unless the respondent can prove otherwise.  
From an Irigarayan perspective, this shift from formal to substantive equality allows for the 
dismantling of the seemingly gender-neutral, but unashamedly phallocentric standard of 
sameness which obstructs women’s access to equal opportunity for full participation in 
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society. This is made possible by the fact that the emphasis is not on sameness of treatment 
for similar categories of people, but on the ideal that all people, in all their differences, should 
be enabled to equally enjoy basic human rights and freedoms. The emphasis on the necessity 
of dismantling systemic inequalities thus resonates strongly with the kind of equality 
envisioned by Irigaray, in so far as the role of equality goes much further than merely similar 
treatment to encompass the aim of removing obstructions to every person’s development as a 
valid subject with a positive identity that is unconditionally recognised and acknowledged by 
civil society. The substantive model of equality thus undermines the logic of the same, which 
forms the basis of Irigaray’s critique against formal equality, on three important grounds. 
Firstly, it does not grant equality only on the basis of sameness and therefore does not 
necessitate that individuals conform to an idealised (masculine) standard of subjectivity 
before being granted legal access to equality.  Secondly, rather than prescribing how one 
should be in order to deserve equal treatment, substantive equality seeks to open up a space in 
which everyone is enabled to develop their own identity and subjectivity. Lastly, rather than 
culminating in equal treatment so that women become ‘social males’, substantive equality 
focuses instead on equal enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, which might entail 
difference in treatment.  
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court informs the right to equality with the value of human 
dignity by arguing that equality means equal human dignity and that unfair discrimination is 
thus a violation of human dignity. This resonates strongly with Irigaray’s idea that equality 
means that all persons are equally regarded as valid subjects without establishing sameness or 
similarities as the basis thereof. The idea is therefore that the inherent worth of every sexed 
being must be recognised. This move of the Constitutional Court of informing the right to 
equality with the value of human dignity is a contentious issue among scholars4, but a 
discussion of this criticism is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
                                                          
4 In this regard see for example Ackermann, L. 2000. Equality and the South African Constitution: The role of 
dignity. Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, vol. 63: 537 – 556; Cowen, S. 2001 Can 
‘dignity’ guide South Africa’s equality jurisprudence? South African Journal for Human Rights, vol. 17: 34 – 58; 
De Vos, P. 2000; Equality for all? A critical analysis of the equality jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. 
Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg ,vol. 63: 62 – 75; Botha, H. 2004. Equality, dignity, and the 
politics of interpretation. South African Public Law, vol. 19: 724 – 751.  
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It can thus be argued that the South African legal system has managed to respond in a 
sophisticated way to the problems that have been raised with regard to formal equality by 
legal scholars as well as thinkers like Irigaray. Substantive equality’s attention to the concrete 
person and its aim of dislodging systemic barriers to the development of subjectivity can be 
praised in this regard. This point will be elaborated on in the next section with reference to 
the approach to the subject that is found in our constitutional equality jurisprudence. 
Importantly, it can be seen that we have departed decisively from the traditional notion of 
equality as sameness and that the concept of equality is broadened so as to enable it to deal 
with particularity and difference in an authentic way.  
III   Equality and the embodied subject 
The disillusionment with the abstract, universal and the absolute that is seen in Irigaray’s 
work is also reflected in the equality analysis in the South African constitutional context, 
through the newly established emphasis on context and the impact of inequality on the lives 
of concrete individuals.  
In the 2008 case of Harksen v Lane  NO 1998 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) a test was formulated in 
terms of which courts should determine whether unfair discrimination had occurred.  This test 
provides that in order to determine whether a discriminatory provision has impacted on 
complainants unfairly, various factors must be considered, including: the position of the 
complainants in society and whether they have suffered from patterns of disadvantage in the 
past or not; the nature of the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it, 
and whether it is aimed at achieving a worthy and important societal goal; any other relevant 
factors; the extent to which the discrimination has affected the rights or interests of 
complainants; and whether it has led to an impairment of their fundamental human dignity or 
constitutes an impairment of a comparably serious nature (par 51). This same test was 
incorporated in largely the same terms into PEPUDA in 2004, so that PEPUDA provides that 
the Court must take the following factors (among others) into account when deciding whether 
an instance of discrimination was unfair: the context; the impact or likely impact of the 
discrimination on the complainant; the position of the complainant in society and whether he 
or she suffers from patterns of disadvantage or belongs to a group that suffers from such 
patterns of disadvantage; and whether and to what extent the respondent has taken reasonable 
steps to accommodate diversity. PEPUDA is now the route through which allegedly 
discriminating actions of persons can be brought before the Court, while the Harksen test is 
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still used to challenge the constitutional validity of legislation that is argued to discriminate 
unfairly. The point that I want to make here is that the test that is used to determine whether 
unfair discrimination occurred, pays great attention to the particularities of the complainant’s 
situation, and in this way she is approached as a concrete human being and not as a merely 
abstract legal category. On this basis it can be said that equality is conceived of in particular 
rather than abstract terms in our constitutional order. 
Here the distinction between the ‘generalised other’ and the ‘concrete other’ made by Seyla 
Benhabib, an American political philosopher, is instructive. Benhabib refers to these 
categories as two incompatible conceptions of self-other relations in contemporary moral 
theory (Benhabib 1992:158). The conception of the generalised other “requires us to view 
each and every individual as a rational being entitled to the same rights and duties we would 
want to ascribe to ourselves” (Benhabib 1992:158). This entails an abstraction from the 
individuality and concrete identity of the other. The moral dignity of the other is based on 
“what we, as speaking and acting rational agents, have in common” and not in that which 
differentiates us from one another (Benhabib 1992:159). Our relations to this generalised 
other are governed by the norm of formal equality, and the moral categories that are 
implicated are those of right, obligation and entitlement (Benhabib 1992:159). On the other 
hand, the standpoint of the concrete other “requires us to view each and every rational being 
as an individual with a concrete history, identity and affective-emotional constitution” 
(Benhabib 1992:159). The focus is thus not on commonality, but on individuality, and 
accordingly, difference (Benhabib 1992:159). In terms of this standpoint, our relationship 
with the other is not governed by formal equality, but instead by equity and complementary 
reciprocity, in so far as “each is entitled to expect and to assume from the other forms of 
behavior through which the other feels recognized and confirmed as a concrete, individual 
being with specific needs, talents and capabilities” (Benhabib 1992:159). The moral 
categories that are implicated are those of responsibility, bonding and sharing (Benhabib 
1992:159).  
Following Benhabib’s discussion, it can be argued that the focus on the particularity of the 
situation of the complainant in the South African equality analysis effectively means that 
self-other relations are approached in terms of the standpoint of the concrete other. As was 
noted above, this standpoint corresponds to a more substantive idea of equality where the 
focus is on difference rather than sameness. In this regard, it will be argued in the rest of this 
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chapter that by grounding equality in the embodied subject, the South African right to 
equality has the potential to work with and through difference in a truly transformative way, 
in so far as it allows for the possibility of rethinking the subject in terms of the sexed body. In 
other words, as explained in the previous chapter with reference to the work of Irigaray, if the 
body is regarded as being a central part of the subject rather than something which should be 
overcome, difference is by implication acknowledged as an undeniable constitutive element 
of human subjectivity in so far as the human body cannot be universalised. For women, this 
means that their bodily differences will not qualify as justification for their exclusion from 
subjectivity and public participation, but will rather be recognised as the basis of being. It can 
be said that this works against the symbolic split that Cornell identifies between the bodies 
and selfhood of women.  
The South African equality jurisprudence allows for the emergence of a sexually particular 
and embodied legal subject in another significant way. Although South Africa’s 
constitutional equality clause is formulated in gender-neutral terms, even with regard to the 
transformation of sex and gender relations, PEPUDA transcends this neutrality by listing a 
range of sex-specific practices which would qualify as gender discrimination. These include: 
sexual violence; female genital mutilation; the system of preventing women from inheriting 
family property; any practice, including traditional, customary, or religious practice, which 
impairs the dignity of women and undermines equality between women and men, including 
the undermining of the dignity and well-being of the girl child; any policy or conduct that 
unfairly limits access of women to land rights, finance, and other resources; discrimination on 
the ground of pregnancy; limiting women’s access to social services or benefits, such as 
health, education and social security; and lastly, systemic inequality of access to opportunities 
by women as a result of the sexual division of labour.  
PEPUDA thus couches gender discrimination in sex-specific terms with regard to many 
instances thereof. In this sense, the South African right to equality is informed by what is 
close to sexed rights in the Irigarayan sense. This is a progressive move, which reflects 
Irigaray’s insight that in a society that is founded on a masculine social order, gender-neutral 
rights fail to achieve equality between men and women and are complicit in the perpetuation 
of the established sexual hierarchy. This move can also be applauded in so far as it is a first 
step towards equality starting to function as an ideal which opens up the space for a sexual 
culture to develop, as advocated by Irigaray. Within such a sexual culture, sexual particularity 
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is recognised as a constitutive factor in the formation of subjectivity, and the “sexual 
dimension” can thus be “recognized as part of civil identity” (Irigaray 1994:81). As a result, 
women, in all their difference, can become fully fledged subjects. Irigaray formulates this 
point powerfully: 
What this implies is that the female body is not to remain the object of men’s 
discourse or their various arts but that it become the object of a female subjectivity 
experiencing and identifying itself [...] It’s aimed at the male subject, too, inviting him 
to redefine himself as a body with a view to exchanges between sexed subjects 
(1993b:59). 
Furthermore, many of these listed instances of unfair discrimination on the ground of gender 
closely resemble the kinds of sexed rights advocated for by Irigaray. Irigaray’s emphasis on 
human dignity, which entails among other things the prohibition on exploitation of 
motherhood by civil and religious powers, is reflected in PEPUDA’s listing as an instance of 
unfair discrimination any practice which impairs the dignity of women and undermines the 
equality between women and men, including the undermining of the dignity and well-being 
of the girl child.  
Furthermore, Irigaray argues for a specific conception of the right to human identity which 
entails the legal encodification of virginity (that she explicitly links with physical and moral 
integrity) as a component of female identity that is not reducible to money (Irigaray 
1993b:87). By divesting virginity of the monetary value that it has obtained in patriarchal 
societies, Irigaray attempts to restore ownership of feminine sexuality to girls and women 
themselves on a practical and symbolic level. This move is indirectly evoked in PEPUDA’s 
listing of gender-based violence, female genital mutilation, as well as the undermining of the 
dignity and well-being of the girl child by tradition, customary or religious practice as 
instances of unfair discrimination on the ground of gender. In this regard it is obvious how 
gender-based violence results in the violation of the right to identity of a girl in so far as it 
constitutes an attack on her physical and moral integrity even if she was not a virgin. 
Furthermore, countless girls are deprived of the right to their virginity and to decisions about 
their own sexuality through sexual violence and domination. The practice of female genital 
mutilation is another instance where the moral and physical integrity of girls is violated. 
Moreover, these practices form part of traditional rituals to ensure that girls remain virgins 
until they marry. The broad prohibition of any traditional, customary or religious practice 
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which undermines the dignity and well-being of the girl child can be interpreted to include 
practices such as virginity testing, which can be physically and psychologically harmful and 
which is once again aimed at the patriarchal control of the sexuality of women (Rankhota 
2004:87).  
Irigaray’s formulation of women’s right to be represented in equal numbers in all civil and 
religious decision-making bodies is reflected to an extent in PEPUDA’s listing as instances of 
unfair discrimination any practice which undermines equality between women and men as 
well as any policy or conduct that unfairly limits access of women to any resources and 
systemic inequality of access to opportunities by women.   
It is significant that in PEPUDA the prohibition against discrimination on the ground of 
gender directly entails the prohibition of sexual violence. This means that PEPUDA 
acknowledges sexual violence as a manifestation of inequality. This is a progressive step in 
terms of which South Africa is ahead of countries like America. In this regard, MacKinnon 
laments the fact that even though the United States Supreme Court has started to 
acknowledge that rape is an issue of gender equality, this insight is not reflected at all in the 
United States criminal law (MacKinnon 2005:242). She writes: 
Although sexual assault is always sexual and often physically violent, the awareness 
that rape is not so much an act of violence or sex as it is an act of sex inequality – 
specifically of sex eroticized by the dominance that inequality embodies and permits, 
of which physical violence is only one expression – is barely traceable in U.S. 
criminal law (2005:242). 
PEPUDA’s explicit recognition of rape as an instance of sex inequality can thus be 
applauded. However, I will argue in the next chapter that, like the American criminal law, the 
South African sexual violence legislation sadly also fails to reflect this insight.  
PEPUDA’s listing of gender-based violence as an instance of unfair discrimination on the 
ground of gender can also be praised for allowing sexual violence to become a constitutional 
issue. Instead of remaining merely a criminal matter, where it is understood as a crime 
against society and is accordingly prosecuted by the state, sexual violence is now also seen as 
an attack on the constitutionally guaranteed human right to equality, and by extension 
dignity, of women. This serves to give women agency in the process of the prosecution of 
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sexual violence by being the applicants in their own cases5 and litigating for the protection 
and promotion of their own rights. This actively undercuts the narrative that sexual violence 
is a way of attacking other men or a society (thus the ‘owners’ of the woman), rather than the 
woman herself, which was the historical basis for criminalising rape (Du Toit 2009:36) and 
which still manifests in circumstances of war where civilian women are raped as part of the 
strategy against the opposition army (Sjoberg 2011:21). In Irigarayan terms, the listing of 
sexual violence as an instance of unfair discrimination on the ground of gender contributes to 
the establishment of a civil identity for women in law, by, firstly, providing them with agency 
to utilise the law for the protection of their own bodies, and secondly, directly linking the 
sexual violation of their bodies to an attack on human rights. In this way, women’s sexual 
bodies are written into the law. Accordingly, from an Irigarayan perspective, this can be said 
to be a highly significant moment in the emancipation of South African women. However, to 
date, there has been no case before the Constitutional Court where the complainant based her 
rape complaint on PEPUDA’s prohibition of unfair discrimination on the ground of gender 
rather than only working through the criminal legal system. The reason for this is unclear, 
and it would be highly interesting to see the direction in which these issues are developed if 
such a case is brought.  
In more general terms, although the instances of unfair discrimination on the basis of gender 
listed in PEPUDA are narrower and less enabling than Irigaray’s sexed rights (in so far as 
Irigaray’s formulation of the rights covers a much larger range of oppressive and potentially 
oppressive practices than the specific instances prohibited by PEPUDA), the fact that they 
address some of the issues that Irigaray prioritises in her formulation of sexed rights is a 
promising sign. The South African right to equality, as developed in PEPUDA, is thus 
moving in the direction of granting women rights that are specific to their needs and 
vulnerabilities as women, which should be able to address forms of oppression that are left 
untouched by a neutral right to equality in a phallocratic society, such as sexual violence. The 
South African notion of equality is therefore directly informed by an acknowledgment of 
sexual difference. In this way, a sexed and embodied notion of subjectivity is written into our 
equality law, which allows for attention to be paid to the particular and concrete details of 
women’s lives when applying the right to equality, such as, for example, the direct and 
                                                          
5 This differs significantly from the process followed in terms of the criminal law, where the rape case is 
between the state and the accused and where the victim is merely a witness. 
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indirect harms of rape referred to in the introductory chapter. From an Irigarayan perspective, 
it can be said that this opens up a space for the development of a civil identity for women 
along with a sexed culture in law and society. Accordingly, rooting the South African right to 
equality within the concrete and embodied subject is an important step in positioning the right 
to equality for the kind of transformation that is necessary for the fight against sexual 
violence.  
IV   The constitutional recognition of the central role of difference in equality 
Another aspect of the South African constitutional equality jurisprudence that is highly 
significant for present purposes is that the Court places a fundamental recognition of and 
respect for difference at the centre of its interpretation of the right to equality. This aligns it 
with Irigaray’s theory wherein difference plays a crucial role in the dismantling of oppressive 
hierarchies. The concurring judgment of Judge Sachs in the case of NCGLE v Minister of 
Justice (1998) offers an inspiring and eloquent description of the crucial role of difference, 
without discrimination, in the young democracy of South Africa. In this case, the 
criminalisation of sodomy was declared as constitutionally invalid. Here Judge Sachs insists 
that “the success of the whole constitutional endeavour in South Africa will depend in large 
measure on how successfully sameness and difference are reconciled” (par 131). He writes: 
The present case shows well that equality should not be confused with uniformity; in 
fact, uniformity can be the enemy of equality. Equality means equal concern and 
respect across difference. It does not pre-suppose the elimination or suppression of 
difference. Respect for human rights requires the affirmation of self, not the denial of 
self. Equality therefore does not imply a levelling or homogenisation of behaviour but 
an acknowledgment and acceptance of difference (par 132). 
The Court thus envisages a kind of equality that establishes itself within and across 
difference. The idea that equality does not imply a levelling of identity and behaviour opens 
up the notion of equality to become a non-comparative mechanism which frees difference 
from the constraints of societal norms in order to flourish. Judge Sachs continues by saying: 
What the Constitution requires is that the law and public institutions acknowledge the 
variability of human beings and affirm the equal respect and concern that should be 
shown to all as they are. At the very least, what is statistically normal ceases to be the 
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basis for establishing what is legally normative. More broadly speaking, the scope of 
what is constitutionally normal is expanded to include the widest range of 
perspectives and to acknowledge, accommodate and accept the largest spread of 
difference. What becomes normal in an open society, then, is not an imposed and 
standardised form of behaviour that refuses to acknowledge difference, but the 
acceptance of the principle of difference itself, which accepts the variability of human 
behaviour (par 134).  
The principle of difference itself is thus envisaged as the basis for equality in the sense that 
equality is not achieved when everyone is simply treated the same, but when everyone has the 
freedom to pursue and celebrate their own divergent paths, while receiving equal respect 
from society. The Constitutional Court thus describes a kind of equality that enables every 
person to be who she wants to be, rather than having to conform to a specific standard or 
identity in order to be respected as a human being. Furthermore, in the same case, Judge 
Ackermann’s reasoning bears testimony to an acknowledgment that no one subject can speak 
on behalf of humanity. He writes:  
To understand ‘the other’ one must try, as far as is humanly possible, to place oneself 
in the position of ‘the other’ (par 22). 
The Court thus recognises the necessarily partial perspective of subjectivity which means that 
no one category of persons can be universalised as representing the human being. The best 
one can do is to try to imagine the position of the other, and even here one must be aware of 
the final impossibility of such an endeavour. As was seen in the previous chapter, Irigaray 
argues that it is this impossibility that enables dialogue with and love for the other (Irigaray 
1993a:12). The problematic approach to difference that is entrenched in the law through 
formal equality is therefore overcome by the Court’s acknowledgment that difference is an 
inevitable underpinning of the relationship with the other, and that it should be celebrated and 
approached with wonder rather than being regarded as a negative aspect which renders the 
other inferior, or as an element that must be repressed in the name of equality as sameness. 
The kind of approach to difference described in the quoted passages above thus enables a 
collapse of hierarchical constructions of the relationship between the self and the other.  
The Constitutional Court’s conception of equality thus reflects a sophisticated approach to 
difference, which in principle allows for the establishment of the kind of sex equality that is 
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advocated for by Irigaray. However, the Court has unfortunately thus far not explicitly 
acknowledged the full implications of these insights in the context of the relationship 
between the sexes. Sexual difference has thus not yet been activated in an Irigarayan sense to 
break open the hierarchical masculine/feminine dichotomy. Such an application of the 
Court’s insights regarding difference between people in general to sexual difference in 
particular would entail, firstly, the admission that sexual difference is also an inevitable 
difference which must be approached with wonder; secondly, an understanding that sexual 
difference necessarily results in a partial perspective, so that I can never speak for the sexed 
other, and that one sex cannot be universalised as representing humanity; and thirdly, the 
admission that the sexual hierarchy that is so institutionalised in our society is not natural, but 
a superficial construct of patriarchal society.  
Furthermore, not only have the implications of the Court’s insights regarding the relationship 
between difference and equality not yet been acknowledged and voiced in the context of sex 
inequality, but case law shows that the Constitutional Court has thus far not prioritised 
difference as a core value of substantive equality by making full use of its transformative 
potential in cases regarding discrimination on the ground of sex. 
Albertyn’s distinction between an inclusionary approach to equality, on the one hand, and a 
transformative approach, on the other, is useful in this regard. The former entails the 
inclusion of the complainant in the status quo, on the basis that the complainant is ‘just like 
us’ and should therefore be treated the same, while the latter is concerned with the 
transformation of the status quo so that the structural conditions that create systemic 
inequalities and which excluded the complainant in the first place, are eradicated or 
changed/extended to include more variation (Albertyn 2007b:256).  
Albertyn explains that inclusionary equality can be achieved through formal equality alone, 
without the emphasis that substantive equality places on context, impact, difference and 
values (Albertyn 2007b:256). Accordingly, instead of breaking down the structures of 
domination, an inclusionary approach to equality merely results in the assimilation of certain 
groups into the hegemonic group. The point is not that there is no place for inclusionary 
approaches to equality in our constitutional dispensation, but rather that inclusion should not 
be regarded as the only function of equality. Albertyn points out elsewhere that inclusionary 
and transformative approaches to equality are not mutually exclusive, but that the concept of 
equality has “both backward- and forward-looking components: the removal of past 
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disadvantage and the creation of conditions for future equality and equal social citizenship” 
(Albertyn 2007a:95). She explains that the “backward-looking” component is mainly 
concerned with socio-economic equality and the emphasis is accordingly on the remedial 
aspect of the right (Albertyn 2007a: 95). On the other hand, the “forward-looking” 
component focuses on “the need for conditions that permit women to live to their full human 
potential, and which affirm their personhood, their choices and integrity” (Albertyn 
2007a:95).   
Although both of these functions of equality have a place in our constitutional order, 
Albertyn writes that in the South African constitutional discourse substantive equality is 
closely linked with the idea of “transformative constitutionalism”, and that accordingly it 
does not aspire to mere inclusion, but rather to the achievement of a social and economic 
revolution which requires the dismantling of systemic inequalities on a social and economic 
level (Albertyn 2007b:257). In a lecture on transformative adjudication, Judge Moseneke 
asserted that a “commitment [...] to transform our society [...] lies at the heart of the 
constitutional order” (Moseneke 2002:315). Judge Langa also writes that “it is clear that the 
notion of transformation has played and will play a vital role in interpreting the Constitution” 
(Langa 2006:351). Accordingly, the transformative function of the right to equality has a 
crucial role to play in our democracy. It is thus of great importance in the South African 
context that the Constitutional Court does not restrict the role of equality to mere inclusion. 
However, Albertyn shows that, to date, the Constitutional Court’s approach to equality in 
gender matters tends to be more inclusionary than transformative, in that equality is regarded 
to be achieved when previously marginalized groups are included within the status quo 
through arguments that they are in fact ‘just like us’ (Albertyn 2007b:273). She further argues 
that not only does our Constitutional Court mostly limit the struggle for equality to 
inclusionary solutions, but this inclusion tends “to occur within clearly defined institutional, 
doctrinal and normative boundaries that limit the possibilities of fundamental shifts in power 
relations in society” (Albertyn 2007b: 273). She ascribes this to the “powerful tug of formal 
equality” (Albertyn 2007b:273). The defined doctrinal boundaries that she refers to include 
conventional notions of choice, marriage, sexuality and gender roles, where certain traditional 
norms (like marriage) are upheld as standards against which equality needs are assessed 
(Albertyn 2007b:274). According to her argument, the judgments thus focus on how or 
whether to include outsider groups within the institutionalized norms of society, and thereby 
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fail to bring such norms and standards themselves into question and to explore the 
possibilities of constructing other, more inclusive, open or flexible standards and structures in 
society. South Africa’s affirmative action policy also falls within the inclusionary category. 
Although the inclusion of women within the hierarchies of the workplace is indeed a 
welcome improvement, it remains a mere inclusionary measure which does not question or 
challenge the masculine nature of the structures and types of workplaces into which women 
are included. 
The Constitutional Court’s reasoning in the case of NCGLE v Minister of Home Affairs and 
Others 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC)6 is a very good example of the inclusionary approach to 
equality, which functions through the identification and pursuit of sameness and which is 
accordingly closer to formal equality than to substantive equality. In this case, the 
constitutional validity of section 25(5) of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 was challenged 
on the basis that it discriminated unfairly on the grounds of sexual orientation. The section 
conferred the advantage of gaining an immigration permit through application exclusively 
upon “spouses” of people residing permanently in South Africa, thereby excluding 
homosexual life partners (who were at the time still prohibited from marrying). The Court 
quotes the judge in the Canadian case of Vriend v Alberta (1998) 156 DLR (4th) in saying the 
following: 
It is easy to say that everyone who is just like ‘us’ is entitled to equality. Everyone 
finds it more difficult to say that those who are ‘different’ from us in some way 
should have the same equality rights that we enjoy. Yet, as soon as we say any […] 
group is less deserving and unworthy of equal protection and benefit of the law all 
minorities and all of […] society are demeaned. It is so deceptively simple and so 
devastatingly injurious to say that those who are handicapped or of a different race, or 
religion, or colour or sexual orientation are less worthy (par 385).   
The Court in NCGLE v Minister of Home Affairs (2000) endorses this statement, which 
reflects the inclusionary logic of formal equality in that it sets up a dichotomy between ‘us’, 
who are ‘the same’ and who represent the standard for sameness, and ‘them’, who are 
different. The purpose of the judgment would then be to show that ‘they’ are actually not that 
different from ‘us’ and therefore deserve the same treatment as ‘us’. The Court then proceeds 
                                                          
6 Note that this is a different case to the previous case cited in which the NCGLE was also a party. 
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to give a lengthy description of the sacrosanct institution of marriage which is characterized 
by the consortium omnis vitae and concludes that homosexual people are just “as capable as” 
heterosexual people of “expressing and sharing love in its manifold forms including 
affection, friendship, eros and charity”; “forming intimate, permanent, committed, 
monogamous, loyal and enduring relationships; of furnishing emotional and spiritual support; 
and of providing physical care, financial support and assistance in running the common 
household” as well as of “adopt[ing] children and in the case of lesbians to bear them” (par 
53). The Court concludes: 
In short, they have the same ability to establish a consortium omnis vitae. Finally, and 
of particular importance for purposes of this case, they are capable of constituting a 
family, whether nuclear or extended, and of establishing, enjoying and benefiting 
from family life which is not distinguishable in any significant respect from that of 
heterosexual spouses (par 53). 
What the Court manages to do is to strike down the artificial difference between heterosexual 
and homosexual relationships, constructed by a patriarchal society, by countering the 
traditional portrayal of lesbians and gays as “hyper-sexualized, promiscuous, and immature” 
(Robson 2007:420). On this basis, the Court then decides in favour of the complainant by 
extending the rights of heterosexual couples to homosexual couples. The Court’s application 
of inclusionary logic can accordingly be said to fulfil an important function. However, it is 
not entirely unproblematic. Ruthann Robson, an American legal scholar, who spent some 
time analysing the South African Constitutional treatment of homosexuality, writes in this 
regard: 
When the basis of the claim is an unfair distinction between married heterosexual 
couples and unmarried same-sex couples, the extent to which the couples are deemed 
the same enhances the argument for equal treatment. Yet the ‘sameness’ approach 
requires the same-sex couple to argue that they are functionally if not legally like the 
most traditional married couple (2007:420). 
She thus argues that the Court tends to construct homosexuality as a “model minority” in that 
it “prefers its sexual minorities to be comparable to its romanticized version of 
heterosexuals”, and uses this as a basis for treating them equally to heterosexual couples 
(Robson 2007:431). Accordingly, “the best lesbian plaintiffs are those who ‘but for’ their 
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lesbianism are ‘perfect’” (Robson 2007:240). Robson’s point is thus that equality is granted 
here on the basis of sameness, rather than through a respect for difference.  
Moreover, this inclusionary approach of the Court is limited to the extent that it fails to 
identify marriage as an ideologically loaded institution that has an important role to play in 
the maintenance of heterosexual and patriarchal power structures. In this regard Robson 
writes: 
Yet honouring the sexual in a democracy means more than being inclusive regarding 
marital forms, such as recognising same-sex, customary and Muslim marriages. It also 
means interrogating the very form of marriage itself and the state’s role in the marital 
relationship (2007:428). 
Accordingly, instead of questioning the idea that family life can only persist and flourish 
within the confines of the institution of marriage (traditionally a very exclusive institution in 
South Africa which has prohibited unions between people of religions other than Christianity, 
as well as customary unions, unions between people of the same sex and mixed race unions), 
the Court relies on the fact that gays and lesbians are capable of being included in the 
hegemonic heterosexual norm in so far as they are ‘just like’ heterosexuals with regard to 
their ability to have relationships that conform to the heterosexual requirements for marriage. 
The hierarchical structure producing disadvantage and discrimination is thus not challenged, 
but merely slightly adjusted and thereby confirmed.  
I want to emphasise again that the point is not that there is no place for an inclusionary 
approach to equality in our constitutional order. On the contrary, an authentic approach to 
difference will in many cases require the Court to reverse forms and instances of exclusion 
that are based on superficial differences produced by patriarchal ideology. However, the 
transformative element of equality requires that this should not be done uncritically in a way 
that confirms and sustains entrenched hierarchies and systems of domination on a symbolic 
level. The Court must thus be sensitive to systemic inequalities that are embedded deeply in 
the structures and institutions of society and should aim to dismantle these structures by 
applying the right to equality in a forward-looking way, rooted in respect for difference rather 
than in an assumption of sameness.   
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A closer look at the sex equality cases that have been decided by the Constitutional Court 
points to the same problem: the cases that are about simple inclusion of women in the 
institutions and rights of men are decided easily and uncritically in favour of the women 
making the inequality claims, while cases that demand more than inclusion fail to evoke a 
satisfactory response from the Court in which deeper transformation is embraced. Classic 
examples of inclusionary sex equality judgments include Brink v Kitshoff NO (1996) 6 BCLR 
725 (CC)7 and Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole and 
Others; SA Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the RSA and Another 2005 
(1) BCLR 1 (CC)8. On the other hand, examples of sex equality cases that have yielded 
controversial results because they do not merely hinge on a claim for inclusion, but 
necessitate deeper transformation of the existing structures, are Jordan and Others v S and 
Others 2002 (11) BCLR 1117 (CC) and President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC). 
In Jordan (2002), the majority of the Court decided that section 20(1)(aA) of the Sexual 
Offences Act 23 of 1957, which criminalises the conduct of the prostitute but not of the client 
in instances of sex for reward, does not discriminate unfairly against women in so far as the 
provision is gender neutral and punishes the conduct of the prostitute regardless of gender. 
The majority judgment in the Jordan case has been criticised extensively for its “superficial 
approach” which lacks a “contextual understanding of the substantive issues of sex work and 
the unequal gender relations in society that shape this occupation” (Albertyn 2007b:269), as 
                                                          
7 In Brink (1996) the complainant challenged certain provisions of the Insurance Act 27 of 1943 which 
discriminate against married women by depriving them, in certain circumstances, of all or some of the benefits 
of life insurance policies ceded to them by their husbands, while the Act contains no similar limitation upon 
the effect of a life insurance policy ceded or effected in favour of a husband by a wife. The Constitutional Court 
decided that South Africa’s commitment to equality demands that no such discrimination should be allowed 
and that the impugned provisions of the Insurance Act are thus unconstitutional. It is therefore a clear-cut case 
of putting an end to an instance of formal discrimination through the inclusion of women into the status quo 
(which is the normal and fair position that men occupy with regard to the inheritance of life insurance 
policies). 
8 In the Bhe case, the rule of male primogeniture in the context of African customary law was found to be 
constitutionally invalid to the extent that it excludes or hinders women and extra-marital children from 
inheriting property. Again, the case is an instance of including women in the status quo, the position in which 
men as the hierarchically dominant group have found themselves for centuries.  
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well as for its “failure [...] to situate section 20(1)(aA) within a context of sexual double 
standards, material inequality and systemic discrimination against women” (Botha 2004:728).  
Judge Ngcobo argues on behalf of the majority: 
And if there is any discrimination, such discrimination can hardly be said to be unfair. 
The Act pursues an important and legitimate constitutional purpose, namely to outlaw 
commercial sex. The only significant difference in the proscribed behaviour is that the 
prostitute sells sex and the patron buys it. Gender is not a differentiating factor. 
Indeed one of the effective ways of curbing prostitution is to strike at the supply (par 
15). 
The reasoning of the Court focuses uncritically on sameness of treatment of certain categories 
of people, without sensitivity as to the impact and context of that treatment. The provision in 
the Sexual Offences Act represents a typical instance of a gender-neutral provision which is 
not really neutral at all, but which embodies the interests of the dominant group - in this case, 
men. The law draws its distinction between prostitutes and their clients and finds it 
appropriate to treat them differently – by punishing the one and not the other. This is 
regarded as being gender neutral because prostitutes can in principle be either male or female, 
and their clients could likewise be of either sex. The distinction between prostitute and client 
is thus not acknowledged as being a highly gendered distinction. The Court ignores the fact 
that in the overwhelming majority of cases, the prostitute is a woman and her client a man. 
Furthermore, in a society where men wield the power, prostitution is often a symptom of the 
systematic oppression of women, where they are left without many options for earning 
money and making a living, and where their bodies are quite naturally regarded as 
commodities and objects. The distinction between the prostitute and the client is thus a clear 
instance of the law blatantly siding with men, which perpetuates harmful stereotypes and 
patterns of discrimination under the guise of gender neutrality. This is a powerful example of 
the hypocrisy that legal systems are often guilty of – namely, applying a seemingly or 
ostensibly gender-neutral rule to a highly gendered phenomenon.  
Furthermore, the Court’s reasoning clearly falls short of the demands of substantive equality, 
if substantive equality is understood to be aimed at the removal of barriers to equal 
participation in society and the creation of conditions under which every person is able to 
reach his or her full human potential. It can thus be argued that a substantive equality 
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approach would at least recognise that the Act’s distinction between prostitute and client 
constitutes a distinction between women and men, and that by punishing only the prostitute in 
a crime which entails “intimate, shared conduct engaged in by two people” (par 73 of the 
minority judgment of O’Regan and Sachs), it is discriminating blatantly and cruelly against 
women. In contrast, a true sensitivity to the ingrained patterns of oppression at work here 
(and a truly substantive approach) would have gone even further by questioning the justice of 
the punishment of the prostitute in the first place. It would have recognised that the real 
equality issue is, firstly, that women are often left with no choice but to resort to prostitution, 
secondly, that women’s bodies are so devalued by society that they are regarded as 
commodities, and thirdly, the implication that women who pursue sex work are regarded as 
less worthy of respect and human dignity simply because of their sexual decisions. The 
majority decision in Jordan fails to do this, and instead sticks to the masculine-biased 
formula of treating like cases alike and different cases differently. The minority decision of 
Judges O’Regan and Sachs9 does better in applying a substantive approach to equality, but 
treads too deferentially around the central question, namely, whether prostitutes should 
receive punishment and marginalisation at the hands of the law at all.  
Hugo (1997) is another case which is widely criticised with regard to the Court’s application 
of the right to equality. In this case, a man claimed that he was being unfairly discriminated 
against on the ground of gender, because the President issued a pardon in accordance with 
which women who had children below the age of twelve could be released from prison. The 
President justified this decision by arguing that women played a special role in the care and 
nurturing of children. There was general agreement among the judges that the distinction that 
was made between men and women amounted to discrimination against men, although they 
disagreed about whether it was unfair or not. The question that they grappled with was 
whether the fact that women historically bear a greater burden and responsibility than men 
with regard to the rearing of children justified the discriminatory act by the President. The 
majority of the Court decided that, even though the President’s act was based on a harmful 
stereotype regarding women’s role in society, it was acceptable to rely on such a stereotype if 
                                                          
9 Judges O’Regan and Sachs argue that prostitutes and their customers both consent to engage in sexual 
activity, and that there are only three differences between them. Firstly, the prostitute is paid while the 
customer pays; secondly, in general the prostitute is female and the customer is male; and thirdly, the 
prostitute’s actions are rendered criminal by the Sexual Offences Act, while the actions of the customer are 
legal. Judges O’Regan and Sachs then argue that criminalising only the behaviour of the prostitute reinforces 
the patterns of sexual stereotyping and is in conflict with the principle of gender equality (par 60). 
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it for once served the purpose of conferring an advantage on women. Judge O’Regan argued 
in this regard that it is a social fact that women bear the greatest burden of child rearing 
responsibilities (even if it is not how it should be), and the reliance on this fact to confer a 
benefit on women does not constitute unfair discrimination. 
In his minority judgment, Judge Kriegler argued that the notion of women as primary 
caregivers of children is “a root cause of women’s inequality in our society” (par 80) and that 
the Court’s reliance thereon perpetuates the relegation of women to a “subservient, 
occupationally inferior yet unceasingly onerous role” (par 80). He says that the President’s 
pardon may confer an advantage on the few women who are involved, but it legitimises the 
harmful stereotype that is the cause of extreme disadvantage to all women in society (par 85). 
What makes this case complicated for the purposes of the present analysis is that the issue of 
the stereotyping of women as the primary caregivers of children was not raised by the 
complainant, but by the Constitutional Court itself in the process of its evaluation of the 
justification offered for the President’s differentiation between men and women. 
Accordingly, the discrimination complained of was discrimination against men, and in terms 
of the minority judgment, this complaint was upheld on the basis of the act’s discriminatory 
effect on women. It is this paradox which makes it so difficult to evaluate the judgment. 
Accordingly, the issue before the Court was turned on its head, in so far as it started with the 
request by Hugo that he too be granted the opportunity to take care of his child, and turned 
into a debate about whether it is acceptable for the Court to ascribe the role of care giving to 
women at all. I will return to this point below. 
The difference between the decisions of the majority and minority can be understood in terms 
of the distinction between being and becoming that was highlighted in the previous chapter. 
In terms of the work of Irigaray, the other (and women in particular) must be respected and 
celebrated for what they are while being granted the opportunity to become, in so far as it is 
argued that a space should be created in which all sexed beings can be free to establish new 
values that correspond to their bodies and creative capacities. In this sense, the minority 
judgment can be praised for taking seriously the position in which women find themselves at 
present, but criticised for not creating a space for becoming. The majority judgment is thus 
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criticised by South African feminists such Karin Van Marle10 for its failure to apply the right 
to equality in a transformative way. This is the result of basing the decision purely on the 
situation that women find themselves in, without attempting to transform this situation. On 
the other hand, it can be argued that Judge Kriegler bases his decision on a conception of 
what women could be if they were granted the freedom to transcend their current situation, 
while not sufficiently taking into account where and what they are presently. 
The fact that the President only considered women to be responsible for the task of caring for 
children confirms the stereotype that feminine identity is necessarily bound to the role of 
nurturing. In this regard, Judge Kriegler’s judgment proves to be more in line with the 
transformative ideal of substantive equality in so far as it dislodges the automatic association 
between women and nurturing and thus opens up a space for their becoming by allowing 
them to choose their own destinies. It creates an opportunity for women to decide for 
themselves the extent to which they want their main characteristic to be their propensity for 
nurturing. In this regard Van Marle, a South African legal philosopher and feminist, argues 
that Judge Kriegler’s approach is closer to an “ethical interpretation of equality” than the 
majority judgment in that it is based on a vision of a future which transcends the current 
social reality (Van Marle 2000:605). However, a problem with the minority judgment comes 
to light here. I want to submit that Judge Kriegler’s judgment betrays a hierarchical 
construction of the difference in roles between nurturing and pursuing a professional career. 
In terms of Judge Kriegler’s judgment, care giving and nurturing are established as inferior 
roles. He thus assumes that in a truly equal society where women have the freedom to decide 
on their own roles, they will choose not to be nurturers. This betrays a subscription to 
patriarchy’s pernicious approach to difference where certain roles or functions (which have a 
central place in human existence, but which are split off from the masculine ideal and 
projected onto or relegated to women) are marked as inferior because they do not conform to 
the characteristics of the universal subject which is modelled on a hyperbolic and 
phantasmatic conception of masculine subjectivity. What is thus at work here is a covertly 
masculine human norm that transcends bodies and their care, while such transcendence is 
only possible on the basis of women’s unacknowledged and naturalised care work (Kroeger-
Mappes 1994:116). This prejudice as to the value of the role of caring explains why Judge 
                                                          
10 See Van Marle, K. 2000. Equality: An ethical interpretation. Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse 
Reg, vol. 63: 595 – 607. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
79 
Kriegler switches the focus from the question as to whether Hugo should also be regarded as 
an actual or potential nurturer, to whether women should be regarded as nurturers at all. 
While he thus has the insight to dislodge the assumption that women are necessarily carers, 
his motivations for this betray an uncritical acceptance of the harmful approach to difference 
that is central to the maintenance of the power structures of patriarchy. It is therefore 
submitted that the minority judgment in Hugo is not less problematic than the majority 
decision. 
Therefore, just like in the Jordan case, the Court in Hugo fails to rise to the occasion by 
effecting transformation on a deeper, more symbolic level. The point here is that the 
Constitutional Court is confident and capable in applying the right to sex equality in so far as 
it can rely on sameness in order to effect inclusion, but where a case resists reliance on 
sameness or demands understanding and caution with regard to the acknowledgement and 
treatment of sexual difference, the Court’s judgments display an insensitivity to the 
entrenched hierarchical structures that are at stake, and a reluctance to make the leaps 
necessary to dislodge these hierarchies. This falling back onto sameness, or the inability to 
deal decisively with a case that resists such an approach, is inimical to the Court’s own 
conception of substantive equality, as set out above, as something that should be rooted in 
difference rather than sameness.  
Respect for difference, which is explicitly recognised by the Constitutional Court as a driving 
force behind transformation, has therefore not yet been activated in order to achieve the full 
potential of the substantive model of equality in the context of sex and gender in South 
Africa, in so far as the Court, firstly, has not yet explicitly acknowledged the full implications 
of its approach to difference with reference to sexual difference, and secondly, struggles to 
decisively abandon a formal application of equality rooted in sameness in the case of sexual 
matters. However, it can at least be said that the Constitutional Court’s recognition of 
difference as a positive feature of society and as a necessary underpinning of equality marks 
the beginning of a new legal approach to the relationship between difference and particularity 
on the one hand, and equality or justice on the other. A concern with difference and 
particularity is no longer set up in opposition to the pursuit of justice and equality, and the 
right to equality is aimed at fighting the kind of systemic inequalities that were perpetuated 
through formal equality’s pernicious approach to difference. The Court’s recognition of 
difference as a positive feature of society can therefore be argued to create the possibility for 
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a future acknowledgment of sexual difference in the Irigarayan sense as a central value and 
catalyst of the transformation of sex and gender relations.  
V   Conclusion 
In this chapter, the South African constitutional dispensation’s approach to equality was 
critically explored and analysed with reference to the ideas of Irigaray, in order to determine 
the extent to which the right to equality in the South African Constitution can be interpreted 
as allowing for an Irigarayan pursuit of transformation of sex and gender relations. It was 
argued throughout the chapter that the way in which the right is formulated in the 
Constitution and PEPUDA and interpreted by the Constitutional Court can be shown to 
resonate strongly with central aspects of Irigaray’s theory. In this regard, it was firstly argued 
that the substantive model of equality that replaced formal equality allows for an approach to 
equality that is concerned with the dismantling of the kind of systemic inequalities that were 
naturalised as difference under formal equality. Furthermore, the equality jurisprudence 
displays a concern with the concrete and particular rather than merely striving toward an 
abstract ideal of equality rooted in sameness. It was also shown that, within the equality 
jurisprudence, the subject is approached as a concrete, sexually particular and embodied 
being rather than a disembodied, universal and unsexed legal construct. PEPUDA’s listing of 
sex-specific instances of unfair discrimination on the basis of sex was said to reflect 
Irigaray’s strategy of sexed rights while further dismantling the idea of the unsexed and 
abstract legal subject. Lastly, it was shown how the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of 
equality, as something that is rooted in difference rather than sameness, provides the basis for 
an Irigarayan notion of sexual difference to infuse the Court’s approach to sex equality. It 
was argued that, even though the full implications of these insights have not yet been 
acknowledged by the Constitutional Court with reference to sexual difference, and the Court 
still fails to apply difference in a truly transformative way in sex equality cases, these insights 
lay the foundation for the future acknowledgment of a new relationship between sex equality 
and sexual difference.   
In this regard, it is useful to refer to Albertyn’s identification of the five characteristics in the 
South African Constitutional Court’s approach to substantive equality that infuse it with 
transformative potential: firstly, an acknowledgment of the importance of understanding 
inequality not in an abstract way, but within its social and historical context; secondly, a 
primary concern with the impact of the alleged inequality on the lives of concrete human 
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beings; thirdly, a recognition of difference as a positive feature of society; fourthly, attention  
to the purpose of the right and the values underpinning it that demonstrates concern with 
remedying systemic inequality; and fifthly “its ability to affirm or imagine a future society 
through practical [...] and normative [...] means” (Albertyn 2007b:258).  
These characteristics can also be argued to be the characteristics that open up the South 
African equality jurisprudence toward an Irigarayan approach to equality. Should the 
Constitutional Court thus develop these characteristics in such a way that their full 
implications are acknowledged in the context of sex and gender inequality, the emergence of 
a new feminine subjectivity and civil identity in the Irigarayan sense might become possible 
in our democracy.    
In the following chapter, it will be shown how the progressive insights that manifest in the 
constitutional context with regard to sex equality and sexual difference, as well as in the 
relationship between sex inequality and sexual violence, are largely ignored and undercut in 
the South African sexual offences legislation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE, EQUALITY AND SEXUAL 
DIFFERENCE: A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW SEXUAL 
OFFENCES ACT 
I   Introduction 
A few years after the advent of democracy, South Africa’s Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957, 
along with the common law on sexual violence, was subjected to extensive revision by the 
Law Reform Commission and replaced in 2007 with the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Amendment Act, 32 of 2007 (the New Sexual Offences Act). The New 
Sexual Offences Act was aimed at addressing the problems with the previous outdated Act, 
for example the fact that, in the eyes of the law, only women could be raped and only men 
could rape, and that many acts of sexual assault that are arguably equally as humiliating and 
invasive as rape were not included in the definition of rape (for example coerced penetration 
of the anus). In this chapter, the South African legal system’s newly reformed approach to 
sexual violence, and specifically rape, will be explored critically in light of the discussions in 
the previous two chapters.  
In Chapter Two it was argued that the South African equality jurisprudence lays a foundation 
for an Irigarayan approach to the transformation of sex and gender relations in so far as our 
right to equality can be interpreted as being underpinned by an acknowledgment of 
embodiment, sexual particularity and difference. It was seen that our Constitution envisions 
equality as a value informed by difference rather than sameness. In accordance with 
Irigaray’s work, it can be said that the implication of this is that sex equality and an 
acknowledgment of sexual difference are not mutually exclusive, as was assumed under 
formal equality (where the ideal of equality was framed with reference to sameness and 
identical treatment), but that sex equality should instead be based on a fundamental 
recognition of sexual difference and an authentic response to the demands thereof. 
The criticism that I will raise against the New Sexual Offences Act is that it counters the 
progress made on a constitutional level regarding the possibility of the emergence of an 
Irigarayan approach to the transformation of sex and gender relations, rooted in sexual 
difference. This is done by entrenching a problematic approach to sexual difference in the 
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definition of the crime of rape through, firstly, defining the crime of rape in gender-neutral 
terms, and secondly, retaining the concept of consent as the distinguishing characteristic 
between sex and rape.  
With regard to the gender neutrality of the rape, I will show that within the definition of rape 
in the New Sexual Offences Act, the subject is approached as an unsexed and disembodied 
being, which is in contradiction to the embodied and sexually particular subject of the 
equality jurisprudence. In an attempt to serve justice with regard to male victims of rape, the 
legislature reformulated the definition of rape so that perpetrator and victim are completely 
sexless and interchangeable. The equal treatment of male and female victims of sexual 
violence was thus understood as necessitating a denial of sexual difference. However, as was 
shown in the previous chapters, the result of denying sexual difference is not gender 
neutrality, because what is deemed neutral in our symbolic and legal order is informed by an 
implicit masculine norm. Following Irigaray it can be said that through subscribing to a 
universal subjectivity, the influence of the masculine norm (that is so deeply entrenched in 
the western symbolic and legal order) is rendered invisible and thereby confirmed and 
sustained through the application of the definition of rape in the New Sexual Offences Act. I 
will argue that this has numerous problematic effects. It results, firstly, in the legislation 
retaining a hidden masculine bias which is especially harmful to women in the context of 
rape. Secondly, the New Sexual Offences Act cannot account for rape as a gendered and 
gendering phenomenon in so far as the gender-neutral language strips the crime of any sexual 
meanings, and thereby depoliticises it. This is also problematic in light of the fact that sexual 
violence is explicitly recognised in the constitutional context as an issue of masculine 
domination of the feminine. Thirdly, the latter two problems result in the legal system 
struggling to recognise when rape had occurred, because it does not facilitate an adequate 
legal understanding of what rape entails. Lastly, it will be argued that a gender-neutral 
definition of rape blinds the criminal law system to the various harms of rape. On these 
grounds, I will argue that a sex-specific definition of rape, which can still account for female 
perpetrators and male victims, must be written into the law. This argument will be concluded 
with a discussion of the question as to whether it is appropriate and possible for the criminal 
law to allow for a focus on sexual particularity. 
The concept of consent is the second characteristic of the definition of rape in the New 
Sexual Offences Act that undercuts the possibility, created on a constitutional level, of 
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pursuing the transformation of sex and gender relations through an acknowledgment of and 
respect for sexual difference. My argument in this regard is that the concept of consent 
infuses the definition of rape with a pernicious rendition of sexual difference, because it 
feminises the position of the victim in so far as feminine sexuality is automatically 
associated, in our symbolic order, with the passive role of consenting to intercourse, while the 
position of the perpetrator who is active and acting in accordance with desire corresponds 
necessarily to the idealised masculinity of patriarchy. Furthermore, because the definition is 
so deeply rooted in a naturalised sexual hierarchy, and because it largely limits the court’s 
enquiry to what happened in the mind of the victim, the definition obstructs the identification 
of the inequality and force that underlie instances of rape. The argument here is that what 
makes something rape cannot be found in the victim’s state of mind, but is rather based in the 
coercive circumstances surrounding the act. The concept of consent focuses the rape enquiry 
on the victim’s mental state, while blinding the court to the inequalities that constitute 
coercive circumstances. It is thus doubly problematic.  
Thus, contrary to the gender-neutral language of the definition, sexual difference is 
acknowledged through the concept of consent, but in a problematic way. In other words, non-
consent as the defining characteristic of rape implies an admission that feminine sexuality is 
different from masculine sexuality, but it construes  feminine sexuality as less than; inferior, 
secondary, or responsive to; or derivative of, masculine sexuality. Accordingly, the way in 
which an acknowledgment of sexual difference is incorporated into the definition of rape 
through the concept of consent is inimical to equality, in that it works to perpetuate existing 
inequalities through the construal of the masculine dominant sexual hierarchy as given in 
nature. It therefore implies that ‘normal’ feminine sexual subjectivity amounts to the minimal 
form of agency called “consent”. It will also be argued that, paradoxically, the consent 
doctrine (the theory that rape equals ‘normal’ sex without consent) simultaneously assumes 
equality between the victim and perpetrator, in so far as it attaches a great deal of weight to 
the victim’s reaction, as though the victim will always be in a position to voice her non-
consent or that her non-consent will always be effective in warding off rape. Accordingly, it 
will be argued that the consent-based approach to rape is so deeply rooted in hierarchy, that it 
is insensitive to, and perpetuates instead of dismantling, the inequalities underlying the crime 
of rape. This stands in contrast to the constitutional insights regarding the relationship 
between rape and inequality.   
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Therefore, whereas the gender neutrality of the definition denies or erases sexual difference 
by positing masculine subjectivity as the standard for all persons, the concept of consent 
introduces a hierarchical approach to sexual difference into the definition. Accordingly, 
sexual difference is assumed through the concept of consent, but in a way that marks the 
feminine with difference that is construed as automatically rendering it inferior to the 
masculine. In terms of Irigaray’s theory, these two problems constitute two sides of the same 
coin in so far as the positing of a universal subjectivity (and thereby the denial of sexual 
difference), modelled on an exaggerated notion of masculinity, inevitably results in the 
construction of femininity as something less than the universal human being to the extent that 
femininity is different from masculinity. The denial of sexual difference in our symbolic 
order thus leads to a hierarchical construction of sexual difference, and both of these 
moments feature in the South African definition of rape.    
Accordingly, the New Sexual Offences Act constitutes a textbook example of the problems 
that Irigaray, as well as other feminist thinkers like MacKinnon, identify with legal language 
and the legal system. It denies sexual difference through gender-neutral language, while 
covertly privileging the masculine. Furthermore, when it acknowledges sexual difference, it 
does so in an hierarchical way, in terms of which difference is regarded to be situated in the 
feminine and is understood as rendering women inferior. 
This chapter will start by providing a brief overview of the law reform process which 
culminated in the current sexual violence legislation. The subsequent section will be devoted 
to redrawing the connection between sex, rape and sex inequality. Thereafter, two separate 
sections will address the problems of gender neutrality and consent in the definition of rape. 
At this stage, it is necessary to reiterate the acknowledgment that the origin of the problem of 
sexual violence lies deeper than in the criminal justice system, and that an altered approach in 
the courts will not, on its own, eradicate sexual violence. However, it will be argued that our 
rape legislation, in particular, as it stands, it is still actively complicit in society’s tolerance of 
sexual violence in that it is permeated with masculine bias and promotes an understanding of 
rape from a masculine perspective. This probably contributes significantly to the low 
conviction rate as well as to the high percentage of attrition in rape cases. Accordingly, the 
criminal law, as society’s official channel for the prosecution and condemnation of certain 
behaviour, still blatantly sides with the rapist. This cannot be excused. Therefore, even 
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though rape law reform will not magically solve the problem of sexual violence, it is an 
essential step towards addressing the situation at the symbolic and practical levels.  
Lastly, as point of departure for this chapter, it is necessary to again emphasise the specific 
South African constitutional context in terms of which the problem of sexual violence must 
be addressed. It was explained in the introductory chapter that not only is sexual violence 
explicitly acknowledged as an instance of unfair discrimination on the ground of gender, but 
the Constitutional Court has emphasised on several occasions the constitutional duty of the 
state to protect women against sexual violence on the basis of the right to freedom and 
security of the person as entrenched in section 12 of the Constitution. Accordingly, it is clear 
that the South African Constitution goes out of its way to condemn and fight violence against 
women. The fact that the South African sexual violence legislation remains inept to deal with 
rape and sexual violence is thus highly problematic and can be argued to render the 
legislation vulnerable to constitutional attack.   
II   The reform of rape law in South Africa 
Prior to the recent reforms, the prevailing definition of rape in the South African criminal law 
hailed from the common law in terms of which rape was defined as “the intentional unlawful 
sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent” (Burchell & Milton 2000:699). Sexual 
intercourse was defined as the penetration of the vagina by the penis. In the Masiya case 
(2007) the meaning of rape was extended to include acts of non-consensual penetration of a 
penis into the anus of a female. The common law definition of rape was severely criticised by 
South African scholars and courts alike. The most obvious reason is that according to the 
definition only women could be victims of rape and only men could be rapists. Accordingly, 
the gender specific common law definition of rape was not able to account for male victims 
or female perpetrators of rape (Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 85:81). It was 
also argued that such a gender specific definition ‘sexualises’ the crime of rape and as a result  
“women are confirmed and entrenched as the eternal passive victims of sexual violence” 
(Naylor 2008:25). Accordingly, the argument is that the stereotypes that promote sexual 
violence are perpetuated and entrenched through a gender-specific approach to rape. On this 
basis law reform was deemed necessary to provide for a gender-neutral definition of rape. in 
order to include male victims and female perpetrators of rape and to destabilise naturalised 
sexual hierarchies in accordance with which femininity is automatically associated with 
victimhood.  
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A further problem that was identified with the common law definition is the fact that many 
acts that are just as harmful and humiliating as the forced or coerced penetration by a penis of 
a vagina, like the penetration of the mouth by the penis, or the penetration of an anus by a 
penis or any other object, did not fall within the category of rape. It was thus argued that the 
definition of rape should be broadened in order to include such acts under the crime of rape 
(Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 85: 81). 
Lastly, consent as the distinguishing factor between sex and rape was identified as a highly 
problematic concept for various reasons. In this regard Naylor (2008:42) explains that the 
South African Law Reform Commission (the Law Reform Commission) declared in its 1999 
Discussion Paper 85, after thorough comparative research regarding rape law reform, that:  
It is essential to redefine the offence of rape to be reliant on ‘coercive circumstances’ 
rather than absence of consent in order to establish prima facie unlawfulness. A shift 
from ‘absence of consent’ to ‘coercion’ represents a shift of focus of the utmost 
importance from the subjective state of mind of the victim to the imbalance of power 
between the parties on the occasion in question. This perspective also allows one to 
understand that coercion constitutes more than physical force or threat thereof, but 
may also include various other forms of exercise of power over another person: 
emotional, psychological, economical, social or organisational power (114). 
Discussion Paper 85 also states that as a result of the difficulty of interpreting the meaning of 
consent, the courts often rely on stereotypical notions of consenting sexual behaviour in order 
to come to a decision regarding the guilt of the accused. Such stereotyped views then inform 
the decisions of police and other role players in the prosecution process to screen out cases in 
which consent seems to be a major issue (112). There are three main problems with the 
consent approach as recognised by the Law Reform Commission. Firstly, there is the 
difficulty of proving rape when its defining characteristic (namely lack of consent) is to be 
found in the head and possibly in the behaviour of the victim, rather than in the objective 
facts of the occurrence. Secondly, the consent approach is insensitive to the hierarchical 
relations and issues of inequality underlying rape. Thirdly, consent contributes to the 
construction of harmful stereotypes of women and their behaviour, which are then used 
against them in rape cases. These will be discussed below, along with other problems 
resulting from the consent approach. The Law Reform Commission thus advocated the 
replacement of the term ‘without consent’ by the term ‘under coercive circumstances’. 
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The abovementioned problems, as well as other considerations, resulted in the initiation of 
the rape law reform process by the Law Reform Commission. In the Law Reform 
Commission‘s Discussion Paper 85, rape was defined gender neutrally, with reference to 
“sexual penetration” (which was defined in a much broader way than penetration of a vagina 
by a penis) and in terms of coercive circumstances: 
Any person who intentionally and unlawfully commits an act of sexual penetration 
with another person, or who intentionally and unlawfully causes another person to 
commit such an act, is guilty of an offence. For the purposes of this Act, an act of 
sexual penetration is prima facie unlawful if it takes place in any coercive 
circumstances (115). 
Coercive circumstances were described as including, but not being limited to, the 
circumstances where: 
 there is any application of force, whether explicit or implicit, direct or indirect, 
physical or psychological against any person or animal; 
 there is any threat, whether verbal or through conduct, direct or indirect, to 
cause any form of harm to any person or animal; 
 the complainant is under the age of 12 years; 
 there is an abuse of power or authority, whether explicit or implicit, direct or 
indirect, to the extent that one person is inhibited from communicating his or 
her resistance to an act of sexual penetration, or his or her unwillingness to 
participate in such an act; 
 a person is unlawfully detained; 
 a person believes that he or she is committing an act of sexual penetration with 
another person; 
 a person mistakes an act of sexual penetration which is being committed with 
him or her for something other than an act of sexual penetration; or 
 a person’s mental capacity is affected by – 
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o sleep; 
o any drug, intoxicating liquor or other substance; 
o mental or physical disability, whether temporary or permanent, 
to the extent that he or she is unable to appreciate the nature of an act of sexual 
penetration, or is unable to resist the commission of such an act (116 – 117). 
The proposed inclusion of ‘coercive circumstances’ was welcomed by scholars as bringing 
South African rape legislation in line with international developments and trends (Albertyn et 
al 2007:317). Although Discussion Paper 102 that was released in 2001 contained a 
somewhat altered version of the definition of rape to that which was included in Discussion 
Paper 85, the implications were largely the same.  
However, the Redrafted Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill B20-2003 that 
was released in 2006 returned to a consent-based definition of rape. Following on this 
redrafted Bill, the current definition of rape in section 3 of our New Sexual Offences Act is as 
follows: 
Any person (“A”) who unlawfully and intentionally commits an act of sexual 
penetration with a complainant (“B”), without the consent of B, is guilty of the 
offence of rape. 
“Sexual penetration” is defined as including: 
  Any act which causes penetration to any extent whatsoever by 
(a) the genital organs of one person into or beyond the genital organs, anus, or 
mouth of another person; 
(b) any other part of the body of one person or, any object, including any part 
of the body of an animal, into or beyond the genital organs or anus of 
another person; or 
(c) the genital organs of an animal, into or beyond the mouth of another 
person. 
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The New Sexual Offences Act also includes in its definitional section a list of circumstances 
under which a person (“B”) does not voluntarily or without coercion agree to an act of sexual 
violation. These include, but are not limited to: 
(a) Where B (the complainant) submits or is subjected to such a sexual act as a result 
of – 
the use of force or intimidation by A (the accused person) against B, C (a third 
person) or D (another person) or against the property of B, C or D; or 
a threat of harm by A against B, C or D or against the property of B, C or D; 
(b) where there is an abuse of power or authority by A to the extent that B is inhibited 
from indicating his or her unwillingness or resistance to the sexual act, or 
unwillingness to participate in such a sexual act; 
(c) where the sexual act is committed under false pretences or by fraudulent means, 
including where B is led to believe by A that – 
B is committing such a sexual act with a particular person who is in fact a 
different person; or 
such a sexual act is something other than that act; or 
(d) where B is incapable in law of appreciating the nature of the sexual act, including 
where B is, at the time of the commission of such sexual act- 
asleep; 
unconscious; 
in an altered state of consciousness, including under the influence of any 
medicine, drug, alcohol or other substance, to the extent that B’s 
consciousness or judgment is adversely affected; 
a child below the age of 12 years; or  
a person who is mentally disabled. 
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Naylor (2008:48) explains that this definition is the exact definition of rape that is contained 
in the United Kingdom Sexual Offences Act of 2003, except that our Act fails to include the 
detailed evidential and conclusive presumptions regarding consent that accompany the 
definition of rape in the UK Act. This entails a list of examples where consent is not present 
in section 74 of the Act. The prosecution only has to prove that sexual activity occurred in 
one of the circumstances on the list, in which case the evidential burden to prove consent is 
shifted onto the defendant. Accordingly, although consent is retained in the UK definition of 
rape, the prosecution is relieved of the notorious difficulty of proving non-consent. This is not 
the case in the New Sexual Offences Act of South Africa, where the onus remains on the 
prosecution to prove that consent was not present, even if the alleged rape occurred in the 
context of one of the listed ‘coercive circumstances’. 
Therefore, even though the reform process was largely driven by a critique of the consent-
based definition, the element of consent was retained in the reformed New Sexual Offences 
Act. The biggest change that was effected by the reform process is that the definition of rape 
is now couched in gender-neutral terms.  
Du Toit (2012a:48 – 49) notes that this new definition can be praised for four reasons: it 
allows for the recognition of male rape victims, it allows for the possibility of female 
perpetrators, it facilitates a broader understanding of sexual injury caused by rape in so far as 
the definition is not limited to the penetration of a vagina by a penis, and the explicit 
inclusion of male rape victims and female perpetrators of rape may to some extent contribute 
to the destabilising of the naturalised sexual hierarchy in which masculine sexuality is 
associated with domination and feminine sexuality with submission.  
However, in the following sections I will argue with reference to thinkers like Cahill, Du Toit 
and MacKinnon that, although these positive developments are deserving of praise, they are 
achieved in a way which not only fails to solve many other problems of the previous Act, but 
also causes some new problems. The rape law reform process which presented a rare and 
valuable opportunity to better the plight of women in South Africa can therefore be said to 
have had disappointing results.  
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III   Rape, sex, violence and equality 
In the introductory chapter to this thesis it was argued, with reference to the work of Cahill, 
that rape cannot be reduced either to its violent or its sexual aspects exclusively. It was 
explained that an understanding of what is at stake in the act of rape, as well as the harms 
resulting from it, is dependent on the understanding of rape as a sexual act of violence. Rape 
is thus best understood as a form of masculine domination of the feminine through sexual 
means. Furthermore, it was shown how rape is sexual on a private and a political level and 
how it functions as a tool in the hands of patriarchy to maintain the large scale oppression of 
women and feminised men. An understanding of the sexual nature of the act on a private or 
personal level was also argued to be central to an understanding of the experience and 
injuries of rape. Lastly, the individual and political sexual effects and aims of rape were 
argued to be inextricably linked.  
If rape is understood as being sexual on a broader social level, in that it fulfils the political 
function of the hierarchisation of the sexes, the problem of rape becomes a problem of 
substantive inequality. PEPUDA’s listing of gender-based violence as an instance of unfair 
discrimination on the ground of gender constitutes a constitutional manifestation of this 
insight. Rape is thus constitutionally acknowledged as an act through which the equality of 
persons is undermined on the basis of their sex/gender. It is thus crucial that the legislation 
aimed at addressing sexual violence is able to recognise and deal with sexual violence as a 
tool through which the feminine is systematically subordinated in the sex/gender hierarchy. A 
failure to do this renders it inconsistent with the constitutional commitment to substantive 
equality and the explicit recognition by the Constitutional Court that sexual violence is a form 
of oppression and subordination of the feminine.  
The Law Reform Commission Report on Sexual Offences Discussion Paper 85 displays an 
awareness and understanding on the part of the Law Reform Commission of the issues 
discussed above. In Discussion Paper 85 it is stated: 
We recognise that acts of sexual violence against men and women constitute a 
violation of their human rights and fundamental freedoms and impair or nullify their 
enjoyment of those rights and freedoms. We do, however, recognise that violence 
against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men 
and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by 
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men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence 
against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced 
into a subordinate position compared with men (29). 
The Discussion Paper thus clearly acknowledges the social and political function that sexual 
violence fulfils. It shows adequate understanding of sexual violence as a phenomenon that 
serves patriarchy and by means of which woman or the feminine is systematically damaged 
and disempowered. Furthermore, the Discussion Paper also displays sensitivity to the sexual 
nature of the crime of rape on a personal and individual level in so far as it uses sexual means 
to inflict damage on a person’s body and psyche: 
Rape is a crime that is not comparable to any other form of violent crime. Unlike 
other crimes against the person, rape not only violates a victim’s physical safety, but 
their sexual and psychological integrity. It is a violation that is not only marked by 
violence, but by a form of ‘sexual terrorism’. The act of rape is invasive, 
dehumanising, and humiliating (63). 
What is evident here is an awareness on the part of the Law Reform Commission of the 
sexual meanings of rape with reference to the individual victim, as well as an understanding 
of the way in which the sexual nature of the attack fulfils an undeniably political function in 
society and is the result of, as well as a means to, the perpetuation of an oppressive, 
hierarchical relationship between the sexes.  
By quoting Andrea Dworkin (1997:23), the Discussion Paper also acknowledges that rape is 
a crime against the body just as much as a crime against personal autonomy: 
The boundary of the body itself is broken by force and intimidation, a chaotic but 
choreographed violence (63). 
The quote acknowledges that rape constitutes a particularly humiliating and harmful violation 
of the body, and that this violation is both violent and sexual. Furthermore, the violence is not 
merely random and pathological, but “choreographed”, in that it fulfils a strategic political 
function.  
However, these insights are already blatantly undermined in the Preamble of the New Sexual 
Offences Act. Although it recognises that women and children are particularly vulnerable to 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
94 
sexual violence11, it pushes the crime back into the private realm by labelling it a “social 
phenomenon” and ascribing it to the “dysfunctionality of society” rather than acknowledging 
it as a public and political problem of structural inequality: 
Whereas the prevalence of the commission of sexual offences in our society is 
primarily a social phenomenon, which is reflective of deep-seated, systemic 
dysfunctionality in our society, and that legal mechanisms to address this social 
phenomenon are limited and are reactive in nature, but nonetheless necessary. 
In the next sections of this chapter it will be shown how the insights of the Law Reform 
Commission and our constitutional order are further denied, ignored and undercut in the 
definition of rape contained in the New Sexual Offences Act. It will be argued that the Act 
follows a highly problematic approach to sexual difference by, firstly, denying sexual 
difference through gender-neutral language (which is not neutral, but informed by a hidden 
masculine norm), while secondly, through the concept of consent, constructing femininity as 
inferior to or derivative of masculine sexuality. The combination of the gender-neutral 
language and the concept of consent is especially pernicious, because the sexual hierarchy 
that is entrenched through the concept of consent is rendered doubly invisible through the use 
of gender-neutral language.   
IV   A critique of the gender neutrality of the New Sexual Offences Act 
Even though the gender neutrality of the definition of rape in the New Sexual Offences Act is 
successful in allowing for the inclusion of male victims and female perpetrators, it will be 
shown that it is highly problematic in many other ways, because its overt denial of sexual 
difference results in the implicit privileging of the masculine. On this basis I will argue that 
the legislature should find another way of including male victims and female perpetrators in 
the crime of rape, without resorting to gender-neutral language. My point is not that we 
should return to the previous definition of rape, but rather that the reform of the previous 
definition should have been concluded differently.  
                                                          
11 The Preamble states in this regard: 
Whereas women and children, being particularly vulnerable, are more likely to become victims of 
sexual offences, including participating in adult prostitution and sexual exploitation of children. 
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In what follows I will mainly use the work of Cahill and Du Toit in order to identify and 
discuss what I regard to be the four primary problems inherent in and arising from a gender-
neutral definition of rape, judged from an Irigarayan perspective. It will be seen that these 
problems all arise from the fact that the seemingly gender-neutral and universal subject of the 
western symbolic and legal order represents an hyperbolic form of masculine subjectivity. In 
this regard, it was explained that Irigaray argues that the universal subject is set up in 
opposition to the feminine, which represents the material or the particular. The ‘universal’ 
subject is thus modelled on an idealised masculine subjectivity and is sustained only through 
a continuous expulsion, exclusion or sacrifice of the feminine. The legal implication is that 
laws directed towards the needs and vulnerabilities of the supposedly universal human being 
primarily serve men. It was seen in the previous chapter that the constitutional jurisprudence 
has started to move away from the gender-neutral universal subject in its equality 
jurisprudence through an increased focus on the concrete situations of embodied persons. 
This indicates an awareness of the idea that legal concepts like justice and equality are served 
rather than undercut by a concern with particularities. It was also seen that PEPUDA 
develops the right to gender equality with express reference to the sexually particular subject. 
An explicit acknowledgment of sexual difference is thus incorporated into the law’s pursuit 
of equality. However, the gender neutrality of the definition of rape in the New Sexual 
Offences Act undermines these insights by implicitly positing sexual difference and justice or 
equality as being in opposition to each other, in that sexual specificity is seen as undermining 
the quest for equality and justice (as aims that should be pursued on ‘universal’ terms) and 
that sexual specificity is accordingly something that should not be taken into account by the 
law. This results in a covert privileging of the masculine, because the unsexed and 
disembodied perpetrator (‘A’) and victim (‘B’) who feature in the gender-neutral definition of 
the New Sexual Offences Act represent the universalised Cartesian subject of the western 
social order that was criticised in the first chapter.  
The problem with the gender-neutral definition of rape in the New Sexual Offences Act is 
thus the way in which the unequal power relations underlying a society in which rape fulfils a 
political function are perpetuated, in so far as the gender-neutral legal language is informed 
and permeated by implicit and unacknowledged masculine bias. The legislature’s attempt to 
provide male rape victims with equal protection to female rape victims by defining rape in 
gender-neutral language does not, therefore, result in equality or equal protection of men and 
women, but in the sustained oppression of women. It can be argued that masculine bias is 
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found in three ways or on three levels of the gender-neutral definition of rape in the New 
Sexual Offences Act.  
Firstly, the Cartesian unsexed and disembodied conception of the subject within the 
definition of rape results therein that certain qualities are implicitly ascribed to the victim and 
perpetrator and that certain assumptions are made about their actions and experiences. Du 
Toit argues that the placing of the Cartesian subject at the centre of the definition of rape 
either has the effect that women are judged in accordance with a masculine norm, or 
alternatively, that their femininity is constructed as a deviant position (Du Toit 2012a:51). 
Accordingly, when evaluating, for example, whether the victim has consented to intercourse 
or not, the courts implicitly measure the woman victim’s behaviour against the ‘reasonable 
man’ standard. Furthermore, she is assumed to be a disembodied rational being who can 
direct her actions in accordance with rationality, detached from a body and its experiences. In 
addition, she is regarded to be fully autonomous and not as influenced by or constituted 
through her relations to other people and their actions. This standard is very far removed from 
the flesh-and-blood victim who appears before the court. However, as stated above, Du Toit 
(2012a:51) explains that judging women according to an idealised masculine norm is only 
one side of the problem, and that the other possible outcome of the implicit masculine norm 
in the gender-neutral language of the definition of rape is that femininity is constructed as a 
deviant position. This is done through ascribing qualities such as “fickleness, 
untrustworthiness, excessive emotion, and an affinity with corporeality and sex” (Du Toit 
2012a:551) to women, thereby also making it extremely difficult for them to prove rape in a 
court of law. The denial of sexual difference in the formulation of rape in the western 
symbolic and legal order thus does not allow for an acknowledgment of the feminine as a sex 
in its own right: femininity is either denied altogether, or is regarded as inferior and lacking 
in comparison to the masculine norm. An acknowledgment of the sexual particularity of all 
subjects, and therefore of the fact that sexual difference is an inevitable underpinning of 
subjectivity, through sex-specific legal language and rights is thus necessary if femininity is 
to be recognised by the court as a valid position to be judged according to its own standards.     
The second level at which built-in masculine bias operates within the gender-neutral 
definition of rape is that the gender neutral-language serves to mask hidden gender 
assumptions. Du Toit argues that the gender neutrality of the definition merely hides (and 
therefore perpetuates) the gender assumptions that characterised the previous gender-specific 
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definition of rape (Du Toit 2012a:51). These assumptions include the “construction of rape 
perpetrator and victim around masculine-dominant and feminine-subordinate sexualities 
respectively” (Du Toit 2012a:51), as well as an understanding of the sexual domination 
inherent in rape as a natural or biological phenomenon in so far as masculine sexuality is seen 
as naturally active and feminine sexuality naturally passive (Du Toit 2012a:51). Again, this 
problem is also present in the context of rape with female perpetrators and male victims. The 
position of victim is feminised, even if the victim is a man, because in our symbolic order, the 
position of weak sexual agency, passivity and victimhood is construed as feminine. Similarly, 
the active position of the perpetrator is one of idealised masculine sexual agency, and this is 
also the case when the perpetrator is a woman. The survival of these gender assumptions in 
the gender-neutral definition results from the fact that the western symbolic and legal orders 
are not founded on an acknowledgment of and respect for sexual difference. Rather, as 
explained in the first chapter and reiterated above, our understanding of universal subjectivity 
is based on a masculine norm, and difference from that norm is constructed as ‘less than’. 
This has historically justified the construction of feminine subjectivity and sexuality as 
derivative of masculine subjectivity and sexuality. By referring to gender-neutral and 
disembodied ‘A’ and ‘B’, the submissive position of victim is automatically ascribed to the 
feminine while the dominant A is assumed to represent the masculine. Du Toit holds that the 
gender-neutral definition of rape in the New Sexual Offences Act reinforces these 
assumptions in so far as it does nothing to actively counter them (Du Toit 2012a:51). Cahill 
also notes that, to a large extent, the power of the patriarchal discourse which produces the 
vulnerable, rapeable feminine body lies in the invisibility of this discourse, which leads to the 
acceptance of its effects as natural or biologically necessary (Cahill 2001:163). Accordingly, 
if the harmful gender assumptions that were overtly manifest in the previous gender-specific 
definition of rape are to be confronted, it can be argued that it can only be done through sex-
specific legal language which responds in an authentic way to the demands of sexual 
difference. It is thus submitted that it is only through a definition that is founded on an 
explicit acceptance of and respect for sexual difference that the perpetrator/victim dichotomy 
can successfully be dislodged from its lingering association with masculine and feminine 
respectively, and can be explored and applied in a more fluid and flexible way.  
The third level at which the inherent masculine bias operates in a gender-neutral definition of 
rape which is centred in the disembodied Cartesian subject is found in the idea that the harm 
of rape is regarded to lie simply in the thwarting of the will of the victim, or in the physical 
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injuries incurred at the level of the body. Because Cartesian subjectivity is not rooted in the 
sexed body, but in the rational mind, the harm of rape is not understood to be very grave, 
because it is judged from a hyperbolic masculine perspective in which the sexed body is 
regarded only as a marginal element. The only harm of rape which is admitted to reach and 
affect the core of subjectivity is the undermining of the autonomy of the subject. By not 
acknowledging the harm of rape to be any deeper than the thwarting of the will of the subject, 
rape law is masculine biased in so far as the harm of rape, of which women are the primary 
targets and men the primary perpetrators, is underestimated. This stands in stark contrast to 
the insights of the Law Reform Commission discussed above, where the harm of rape is 
acknowledged to lie in the breaking of the “boundary of the body”. I will elaborate on this 
point below, where I discuss the problem that the gender-neutral definition of rape limits 
judicial understanding of the harms of rape, as well as in the discussion of consent.    
The levels at which masculine bias operates in the gender-neutral definition of rape in the 
New Sexual Offences Act are thus threefold: firstly, the victim is either judged according to a 
masculine norm, or her femininity is constructed as a deviant position, which results in severe 
damage to the status of the feminine subject; secondly, in the perpetuation of the hidden 
gender assumptions that the previous Act was criticised for; and thirdly, in the understanding 
of the harm of the rape as merely consisting in the thwarting of the will of the victim. Cahill 
(2001:123) formulates the problem as follows: 
There is no reason to believe that sex neutrality, or the denial of sexual difference, is 
any more likely to be a liberating force for women than the recognition of sexual 
difference. Because of both the particular, historical construction of the sexes and the 
bodily differences among differently sexed subjects, women are not identical to men. 
Demanding that they be treated as just humans (that is, as not sexed) is not, therefore, 
necessarily a step away from sexual hierarchization. Rather, because such a demand 
invokes an illusory generic that is implicitly sexed male, the result is that the 
meanings that are specific to women’s lives are rendered invisible.  
The next big problem with a gender neutral-legal definition of rape, which flows directly 
from the problem of the hidden masculine norm, is that it results in the depoliticisation of the 
act of rape, in that the structural patterns of domination that are enforced and perpetuated 
through the crime remain outside of the understanding of the nature of rape, and are also not 
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taken into account in the Court’s determination of the harm resulting from rape. Cahill 
(2001:32) writes: 
If the phenomenon of rape is directly linked to the oppressive structure by which 
women are dominated by men, if rape is a major tool of patriarchy, then a law that 
renders such sex-specific claims inaudible will not be able to take into account that 
very characteristic.    
Therefore, if rape is defined without any reference to the sexed bodies of perpetrator and 
victim and the sexual meanings of the act, the established understanding of rape as a tool of 
masculine domination and social control of the female/feminine is lost. It can thus be seen 
that the gender-neutral legal language works here to naturalise and privatise rape, and thereby 
to maintain established hegemonic relationships and oppressive structures instead of 
facilitating the dismantling of these structures in the pursuit of equality and justice. As 
explained above, this depoliticisation is especially problematic in the South African 
constitutional context, where the political function of rape is explicitly acknowledged in 
PEPUDA and has been reiterated on several occasions by the Constitutional Court. In 
denying the gendered and gendering sexual nature of the crime of rape, and thereby ignoring 
its implications for sex equality, the criminal law is thus not in line with the constitutional 
understanding of the crime of rape.    
Furthermore, if rape is depoliticised in the eyes of the law, and if the victim and perpetrator 
are regarded as disembodied rational subjects, the law cannot escape encountering problems 
in identifying and understanding when rape happens or what constitutes an act of rape. A 
prime example of this issue can be found in the case of S v Zuma [2006] 3 All SA 8 (W), 
where then ex-vice-president Zuma was accused of raping a young woman. Here the court 
used the fact that the victim, who was later nicknamed “Khwezi” by the media, was a 
traumatised and confused young woman, as a counter argument to the allegations that she 
was raped by Zuma. In the case, the fact that Zuma was a respected and very powerful figure 
while the complainant was perceived to be a “a sick person who needs help” (par 221(e)) 
served as an indication to the court that whatever happened that night was not rape, because 
she could not have managed to refuse consent and to portray her dissent unambiguously. The 
court stated that “[i]t is quite clear that the complainant has experienced previous trauma and 
it is quite possible that she perceives any sexual behaviour as threatening” (par 221(g)) and 
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used this to support the contention that it could not have been rape. Du Toit (2007:63) 
explains in this regard: 
By showing that this woman does not know what she sexually wants, and/or cannot 
communicate it unambiguously, that she is thus not a full and fully responsible sexual 
subject, lawyers for the defence proved to the Court that this woman (and ‘such’ 
women) cannot be raped. 
If rape is understood as a political act which is made possible by, and which simultaneously 
perpetuates, unequal gender relations, Khwezi’s weakness and Zuma’s power would have 
been interpreted in the opposite way, namely, that those power configurations made rape 
more likely. It is also clear that Khwezi’s femininity was represented in contrast to the 
masculine norm of the reasonable man, and was constructed as a deviant position in so far as 
she was portrayed as a “confused and troubled person” (par 221(g)) without agency (sexual 
and otherwise). Even though this case was decided in terms of the common law definition of 
rape, it is submitted that the gender-neutral definition of the New Sexual Offences Act will do 
nothing to actively improve the courts’ sensitivity to the issues at hand.  
On the contrary, the depoliticising of the crime of rape, as well as the inherent built-in 
masculine bias in the ostensibly gender-neutral formulation of rape in the New Sexual 
Offences Act, might even further obstruct the understanding of the courts about when rape 
actually occurs and what it entails. I will explain later in this chapter why the inclusion of a 
set of ‘coercive circumstances’ as part of the definition of non-consent does not solve these 
problems. 
The last problem with the gender neutrality of the definition of the crime of rape is that it 
results in the overlooking by the criminal justice system of the whole scope of injuries of 
rape. The argument is that the kind of experience that the female victim endures is grossly 
misunderstood if rape is not comprehended within the context of, firstly, the sexed body and 
subjectivity of both victim and perpetrator, and secondly, the systematic sexual oppression of 
women/the feminine by men/the masculine. Cahill writes:  
Hence, any theory that attempts to describe rape independently of the sexes of the 
attacker and the victim will necessarily fail to articulate meanings that are central to 
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any particular victim. The experience of rape is always substantially informed by the 
sexed quality of the bodies involved in the assault (2001:121).  
She notes that the experience of male rape victims “does not have the same, or even vaguely 
similar” social and personal meanings attached to it, because, for example, the threat of rape 
is not something that men have to confront and deal with on a daily basis (Cahill 2001:121). 
For women, the phenomenon of rape shapes their experience of their own safety and 
mobility, and in this regard rape has a function of social sexual differentiation (Cahill 
2001:121), as well as territorial control that entrenches masculine domination. Here it is 
important to repeat that Cahill does not argue for grading rapes in terms of harm and thereby 
establishing a hierarchy of victims. Rather, she wants to highlight the different meanings that 
rape can have with reference to the sexed bodies of the perpetrator and victim involved. 
Cahill thus argues that the problem does not lie with the mere act of distinguishing between 
the sexes, but is rather that rape enacts a kind of differentiation that constructs the difference 
between the sexes in a hierarchical way, where the feminine is deemed inferior. Cahill 
(2001:162) writes: 
A significant element of the woman victim’s experience of rape is directly related to 
the constitutive element of a power discourse that produces her body as violable, 
weak, and alien to her subjectivity. From the rape victim’s perspective, although not 
necessarily consciously (in fact, precisely in a bodily way), these meanings too are 
part of the crime in so far as that particular action is perceived as a threat fulfilled. 
She also writes: 
The sexual meanings of rape from the perspective of the victim have everything to do 
with the construction of the particularly feminine body, and as such are fundamental 
to the crime experienced by the victim (2001:163).  
Accordingly, the ever-present threat of rape as experienced by women results in the 
production of a specifically feminine bodily comportment (Cahill 2001:159). The pervasive 
threat of rape, as experienced by women in South Africa, produces a particularly vulnerable 
feminine body in so far as women cannot express their sex as freely as men, do not have the 
physical mobility and freedom that men experience, and are much more aware of their 
potential victimhood (Cahill 2001:159). The phenomenon of rape thus “produces and 
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presents women as pre-victims expecting to be victimised (not because men are rapists, but 
because women’s bodies are rapeable)” (Cahill 2001:159). Similarly, Albertyn et al 
(2007:307) write: 
We note that where the risk of sexual assault pervades a society or environment, 
women’s everyday freedom of movement and behaviour become restricted. Women 
are taught from an early age to avoid certain forms of dress and social interaction. 
Even where they have never been sexually assaulted themselves, the omnipresence of 
threatened violence serves a powerful symbolic function in shaping women’s lives. It 
has been argued that the ubiquitous threat of sexual assault, for instance, serves as a 
warning to women to watch their behaviour, curtail their freedom of speech and 
movement, and conform to social expectations concerning their demeanour, actions, 
and use of public space. Sexual assault also punishes women who stray beyond the 
boundaries of their accepted gender roles.  
Du Toit (2012a:55) highlights another very specific aspect of the feminine experience of rape 
that is obscured by a gender-neutral legal definition. She writes: 
Because the meanings of rape are already parasitical upon the abject meanings our 
culture attaches to the female sexual body, the meaning of being raped cannot be the 
same for men and women. Women are forced through rape into a shameful complicity 
with their own demise as subjects and forced to acknowledge on a deep level that a 
woman’s body particulars – her body as sex object – is incompatible with full 
humanity. Unable to escape their female embodiment, women rape victims can hardly 
escape the derogatory – or devaluated and degraded [(Cornell 1995:19)] – meanings 
imposed upon the particulars of that embodiment (2012a:57). 
According to Du Toit, women thus experience a specific type of harm through being raped 
that men do not necessarily experience, in so far as the sexual specifics of women’s bodies 
(here Du Toit mentions menstrual flow, breasts, the womb and pregnant body, breast milk, 
cellulite and ‘excess flesh’) are constructed as abject in the western symbolic order, because 
they betray the undeniable embodiment of the subject, and are thus seen as a threat to the 
social order which has carefully been constructed in opposition to the natural and material 
(2012a:56). When a woman is raped, she is thus forced to recognise her body as an object of 
shame, which leads to her undoing as subject (Du Toit 2012a:56). Although a man who is 
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raped also experiences great injury and harm, it does not “depend on the pervasive symbolic 
abjection of his body particulars, because those are still the valorised male particulars” (Du 
Toit 2012a:57). His injuries are based on other physical, psychological and symbolic 
particulars.  
The point is not that women’s experiences of rape are more injurious and harmful than the 
experiences of male victims, but that rape has different effects on women and men. Rape also 
produces subjects that are differentiated by sex (Cahill 2001:126). On this basis then, Cahill 
and Du Toit hold that a universal, generic and gender-neutral theory of rape (and therefore 
such a legal definition too) is incapable of picking up on and dealing with these differences 
among experiences of rape (Cahill 2001:118, Du Toit 2012a:56) and also does not facilitate 
legal understanding of the sexually differentiating social function of rape (Cahill 2001:122). 
Furthermore, it precludes the articulation of basic aspects of a victim’s experience in court 
cases which represent society’s official response to the crime (Cahill 2001:123).  
The problems arising from the denial of sexual difference through the gender-neutral 
formulation of rape in the New Sexual Offences Act are thus clear and manifold. The 
definition of rape in the New Sexual Offences Act thus constitutes a prime example of the 
way in which the implicit masculine norm functions within gender-neutral legal language and 
the injustices that it thus allows to pass as justice. Accordingly, even though the definition of 
rape in the New Sexual Offences Act seems gender neutral, it is not. The claim that it is 
gender neutral results in a double injustice to women/the feminine. Firstly, the gender 
assumptions built into the definition prejudice woman/the feminine. Secondly, the invisibility 
of the masculine-biased gender assumptions in a gender-neutral definition has the effect that 
the prejudice that woman/the feminine suffers as a result of these gender assumptions is held 
to be neutral, natural and just. Therefore, it is submitted that a description and definition of 
rape is needed in our criminal law that acknowledges the gendered and gendering nature of 
the crime, which remains intact even in the case of female perpetrators and male victims. In 
order for a definition to fulfil these requirements, it will have to incorporate a fundamental 
recognition of and respect for sexual difference and its significance through approaching the 
subject as embodied and sexually particular.  
A possible objection to this line of reasoning might be that the criminal law does not operate 
with reference to the particularities of the specific embodied experience of the victim and the 
larger political implications of an act. Rather, the criminal law’s strength lies in the way in 
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which it manages to isolate the central aspects of human action in order to create universally 
applicable categories of wrongs. Cahill (2001:115) formulates the dilemma of law and 
difference as follows: 
For if every rape is different, if every victim is radically different from every other, 
what can we claim of the crime in general? Isn’t it necessary to articulate some 
universal aspect of rape in order to fix its meaning (and hence its appropriate 
punishment) in the legal system, as well as to provide a generally acceptable and 
coherent understanding of the crime in society at large? Are we not compelled to 
determine an ostensibly comprehensive definition of rape, despite the obvious futility 
of such an attempt? The difficulty here (encountered with remarkable persistence in 
this discussion) is the difficulty of difference.  
Cahill thus identifies the problem as the legal system’s inability to account for difference 
while trying to measure all people against the same universal standard of justice. As 
mentioned above, it is exactly the legal system’s universality that gives it its power. 
However, in the context of rape, the legal system’s approach has been proven to be 
unsuccessful. Statistically, only eleven percent of reported rapes end in convictions (Gouws 
2012: 8)12. This indicates that the way in which the phenomenon of rape is universalised in 
law currently renders it unable to pick up on the particulars relevant to the crime. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to re-evaluate the universals that are employed in rape law. 
Cahill (2001: 115) offers a solution to this dilemma in the context of rape by identifying an 
element that is universal to all instances of rape and which can be used by the legal system as 
foundation for a coherent understanding of the crime: 
                                                          
12 The Law Reform Commission Criminal Case Outcome Research Report of 2000 shows that successful 
convictions in murder cases in South Africa are only marginally more than successful convictions in rape cases 
(11% of murder cases to 7% of rape cases) (Van Zyl Smit 2000:22). This might be an indication that the problem 
is not with the criminal law’s approach to rape per se, but rather with the entire South African criminal justice 
system. However, the same report shows that in America the successful conviction rate for murder is 49% 
while for rape it is only 19% (Van Zyl Smit 2000:22). Similarly, in England and Wales it is 56% for murder and 
10% for rape (Van Zyl Smit 2000:22). Accordingly, the low conviction rate of rape in South Africa cannot be 
solely ascribed to the general state of our criminal justice system, and the difference between successful 
convictions in the contexts of rape and murder is not coincidental or irrelevant. Rather, these statistics seem to 
indicate that in criminal justice systems in general, the crime of rape is approached in a way that tips the scales 
of justice in favour of the rapist. The fact that the successful conviction rate for murder in South Africa is also 
very low is thus not a valid counter argument to the idea that our rape law is in need of reform.  
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While experiences of rape are significantly differentiated by such factors as race, age, 
political climate, and many others, the differences among them do not, by their sheer 
multiple nature, imply that rape itself has no specificity. As a particularly sexual, 
bodily attack on the embodied subject, rape constitutes a fundamental and sexually 
specific undermining of that person’s subjective integrity. This specificity of the act 
of rape can produce a variety of experiences, because that undermining can be 
expressed and experienced to differing degrees and in differing ways. However, that 
variety is not limitless, and the nature of those experiences can be (although not, 
perhaps, exhaustively) understood through the lens of the significance of embodiment.  
Accordingly, Cahill argues that the universal aspect of rape that can be used in order to fix 
the meaning of the crime of rape within the criminal law system is the fact that it is a sexual 
attack on an embodied and sexed person, and thus an attack on the victim’s sexuality and 
subjectivity. If the central and underlying aspect of rape is understood to be a sexual attack on 
a specifically sexed body, the experience of the victim is relevant in understanding whether 
rape occurred and what harms resulted from it. Again, as was explained in the first chapter, a 
fundamental awareness of sexual embodiment opens the door for all other differences to be 
considered and respected. Cahill notes, for example, that because bodies are marked by race, 
rapes between persons from different races can have different meanings attached to them to 
rapes between persons of the same race (Cahill 2001:115). If, for example, the historical 
oppression of black people by white people is considered, the rape of a black woman by a 
white man might invoke narratives of racial superiority that are not present in the rape of a 
white woman by a white man (Cahill 2001:117). Cahill repeatedly emphasises that it is not 
about grading rapes in terms of seriousness, but about being sensitive to the different power 
relations, forms of domination and sexual degradation that are at stake when a body is 
sexually attacked (Cahill 2001:126). The point is that understanding rape, in the first instance, 
as a sexual attack on a specifically sexed body, allows for a more comprehensive and flexible 
understanding toward, firstly, the question as to whether rape occurred, secondly, the 
experience of the victim, and thirdly, the resultant harm. In this sense, through defining rape 
in terms of specifically sexed bodies, the definition of rape takes on a new kind of 
universality in so far as it is able to comprehend, include and pick up on a much greater scope 
of scenarios and issues that are relevant in cases of rape.  
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Here Benhabib’s distinction between the generalised and concrete other that was explained in 
the second chapter again becomes relevant. Benhabib argues that the universalistic standpoint 
of justice necessitates knowledge of the concrete history of the agents who are involved 
(Benhabib 1992:163). In this regard, Benhabib explains that every procedure of universality 
presupposes that “‘like cases should be treated alike’ or that I should act in such a way that I 
should also be willing that all others in a like situation act like me” (Benhabib 1992:163). 
However, to know whether it is a ‘like’ case requires knowledge of the particularities of the 
concrete persons involved (Benhabib 1992:163). Benhabib (1992:163 – 164) writes: 
I conclude that a definition of self that is restricted to the standpoint of the generalized 
other becomes incoherent and cannot individuate among selves. Without assuming the 
standpoint of the concrete other, no coherent universalizability test can be carried out, 
for we lack the necessary epistemic information to judge my moral situation to be 
“like” or “unlike” yours. 
Accordingly, Benhabib argues that the process of universalising necessitates the 
acknowledgment of particulars; otherwise the universal standpoint of justice becomes 
impossible. This argument regarding the functioning of the universalistic process is relevant 
to every application of the law in so far as the law creates rules which should be applied 
equally to all people who find themselves in situations that conform to certain requirements. 
My point is that the argument that the law functions in a universalistic way should not excuse 
it from acknowledging the particulars of the subject standing before it, in order to assess the 
extent to which the situation of the subject conforms to the requirements set out in the legal 
provision. Cahill’s argument that the crime of rape should be defined in terms of the 
specifically sexed body can thus be understood as enabling justice, rather than undercutting 
it. 
Moreover, Cahill notes that approaching the crime of rape as something that occurs between 
embodied subjects does not commit one to radical relativism, because material particularities 
are partly shared by all subjects and allow for communal experiences (Cahill 2001:114). 
Furthermore, the differences between embodied experiences are subject to certain limits, for 
example, the unpleasantness of a certain degree of pain (Cahill 2001:114). Accordingly, even 
though understanding rape in terms of embodiment broadens the range of particularities that 
the law needs to take into account when deciding whether a rape occurred and what harm was 
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incurred, embodiment remains a universally shared characteristic of all rapes and helps to 
anchor the Court’s enquiry.  
The question that now arises is whether such a definition must be formulated in sex-specific 
terms or whether the concept of the sexed body is robust enough to constitute a new universal 
which renders specific references to woman/the feminine and man/the masculine 
unnecessary.  
Here Bergoffen’s argument regarding the decision of the United Nations Hague war crimes 
tribunal in Prosecutor v Krstic (IT-98-33-T) (2001), where rape was identified for the first 
time as a crime against humanity, becomes relevant. Bergoffen (2003:120) argues that the 
classification of a crime against the sexed body of a woman as a crime against humanity, 
firstly, exposed the fallacy of regarding the masculine body as representing the universal, 
secondly, implied that the woman’s body is the mark of the universal, and thirdly, “directed 
us to the intersections of difference and universality; for it is not as the neutral/universal 
body, but as the specifically sexed body that the woman’s body is seen as speaking of our 
shared human condition”. Accordingly, Bergoffen calls for a universalisation of the sexed 
and vulnerable body. Bergoffen does not, therefore, deem it necessary to use sex-specific 
legal language in order to introduce a recognition of and respect for sexual difference into the 
law. She believes this to be possible through rethinking and broadening the universals that we 
use. The question is then whether this kind of approach - namely, substituting sex-specific 
definitions of rape with broadened universals grounded in the recognition of human beings as 
sexed and embodied – can be successful in rape law. 
 However, Du Toit warns against an overly swift return to gender neutrality, in so far as this 
too easily slides back into a masculine approach to and understanding of key concepts, so that 
feminine sexual specifics are again ignored and denied (Du Toit 2012a:61). On this basis, Du 
Toit then argues that a focus on the concrete sexual specificities of women is “a necessary 
detour” in order to come to terms with women’s sexual specifics and cultivate a legal 
understanding and recognition thereof (Du Toit 2012a:61). Following Du Toit, I want to 
argue that the issue of rape in South Africa is too fraught with harmful stereotypes, hidden 
gender assumptions and problematic rape myths to rely immediately on broadened or altered 
universals with the hope that the courts and society will now start to understand it in 
ideologically and theoretically appropriate terms. Even our newly appointed Chief Justice 
(which is the highest position that a judge in South Africa can occupy), Judge Mogoeng, 
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made shocking statements in decisions in rape cases when he was still a high court judge, 
displaying a profound lack of insight into the phenomenon of rape13. Accordingly, I want to 
submit that rape is an issue that is still so misunderstood in our society, that it is naive to 
think that our courts and criminal justice system will suddenly manage a consistent 
interpretation of existing universals in completely different and more nuanced terms so as to 
allow for an authentic incorporation of a concern for sexual difference into our rape law. A 
return to broadened universals can make sense only once a better understanding of the issue 
of rape, as well as an acknowledgment of and respect for sexual difference, have been 
cultivated in our courts and society. 
On these grounds, I want to argue in favour of a sex-specific definition of rape, which 
describes male rape and female rape separately with reference to the sexed bodies of the 
perpetrators and the victims and with regard to the specific individual and political harms and 
meanings of the rapes. The universal aspect of the crime of rape that constitutes a foundation 
for the coherent understanding of the crime would be that it is a sexual attack on a sexually 
particular subject. By working with a sex-specific definition of rape, we move away from an 
ostensibly gender-neutral but implicitly masculine-biased definition, towards a more robust 
understanding of the crime of rape which is broad and flexible enough to facilitate a much 
better understanding of the experience of the victim (both male and female) and the harms he 
or she incurred, as well as a stronger sensitivity toward the systemic inequalities that underlie 
the problem of rape.  
                                                          
13 In an appeal in the North West High Court in 2007, Judge Mogoeng suspended a convicted rapist’s jail 
sentence because: 
  
“[t]his is a man whose wife joined him in bed, clad in panties and a nightdress. When life was still 
normal between them, they would ordinarily have made love. The appellant must, therefore, have 
been sexually aroused when his wife entered the blankets. The desire to make love to his wife must 
have overwhelmed him, hence his somewhat violent behaviour. He, however, neither smacked, 
punched nor kicked her. Minimum force, so to speak, was resorted to in order to subdue the 
complainant’s resistance” (E Modise v The State (CA 113/06 Bophuthatswana Provincial Division) par 
19).  
 
Similarly, in the 2005 case of S v Moipolai 2005 (1) SACR 580 (BD), Judge Mogoeng drastically reduced the 
sentence of a man who was imprisoned after raping his wife, who was eight months pregnant, in front of 
another person. Judge Mogoeng reduced the sentence of ten years’ imprisonment to five years’ imprisonment 
on the basis that “the nature of the complainant and appellant’s relationship is such that it renders their 
intercourse incapable of being legally categorised as rape” (par 23).  
 
These judgments were passed 12 and 14 years after the criminalisation of marital rape in 1993 by the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993. 
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V   Consent and Inequality 
It is widely accepted that the element of consent introduces a range of problems into the 
criminal law’s approach to rape. As seen above in the overview of the rape law reform 
process in South Africa, removing consent from the definition of rape and replacing it with 
the notion of coercive circumstances was a central aim of the reform process. The 
legislature’s final decision to return to a consent-based definition was thus met with great 
disappointment (Artz & Smythe 2008:6). In this section, I will provide an exposition of the 
main practical and philosophical problems inherent in a consent-based approach to rape.   
Throughout this section I will argue that these problems persist despite the fact that certain 
coercive circumstances are explicitly named in the New Sexual Offences Act as instances 
where no consent is present. This is mainly as a result of the fact that by retaining consent 
(albeit a more nuanced understanding thereof) as the distinguishing factor between sex and 
rape, the gender assumptions inherent to and underlying the previous definition of rape, 
which was developed from a blatantly masculine and patriarchal perspective, are confirmed 
and perpetuated. In the context of rape law, consent is thus a concept that is so loaded with 
masculine bias and patriarchal meanings that the mere broadening of its definition is too 
weak a strategy to counter its harmful effects in the definition of rape.  
For purposes of this thesis, the main problem with a consent-based approach to rape is that 
the concept of consent introduces a highly problematic approach to sexual difference into the 
definition. The presence of consent in the definition of rape as the central distinguishing 
characteristic between sex and rape implies that sexual relations are naturally hierarchised, 
where masculine sexuality plays the role of asserting itself and feminine sexuality submits 
(Du Toit 2012a:52). As explained earlier, even though the sex of A, who initiates the sexual 
encounter, and B, who must decide whether to consent or not, is not specified in the New 
Sexual Offences Act, the definition does nothing to counter the established understanding of 
masculine sexuality as dominant and feminine sexuality as passive. The result of the 
combination of the gender-neutral language and the concept of consent is thus that A is 
assumed to be a man whose role is to initiate sex and B is assumed to be a woman whose role 
is to submit. Accordingly, the position of the victim remains implicitly feminised “since 
‘consent’ to masculine sexual initiative is seen as the appropriate form of weak sexual agency 
for those designated ‘female’ or ‘feminine’” (Du Toit 2012a:51). This one-sided 
understanding of normal sexual relations perpetuates an understanding of naturalised sexual 
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domination by men. In this way it allows for a much greater tolerance of rape and limits 
condemnation thereof in so far as the line between rape and normal sex becomes very fine 
and the complainant must always fight against the presumption of her consent.  
Consent thus remains a highly gendered concept which is rooted in a conception of 
femininity as inherently inferior to or derivative of masculinity. Through the concept of 
consent, a harmful approach to sexual difference is therefore written into the New Sexual 
Offences Act. Accordingly, where the gender-neutral formulation of the crime of rape denies 
sexual difference, the concept of consent acknowledges sexual difference, but in a harmful 
way. As explained above, in our symbolic order such an approach to sexual difference is an 
inevitable result of the denial of sexual difference, in so far as such a denial implies that 
masculine subjectivity is set up as representing the universal human being. The way in which 
femininity differs from masculinity is then regarded as a deviation from this norm which 
renders the feminine as something less than human.   
A further problematic aspect of the concept of consent in the definition of rape has to do with 
the relationship between, on the one hand, this hierarchical construction of sexuality, and on 
the other hand, sex inequality. Du Toit shows how the consent doctrine in rape law 
constitutes a performative contradiction in so far as it assumes a free and autonomous subject 
with full-blown sexual agency, while at the same time undercutting such freedom and agency 
by constructing femininity as naturally submissive and inferior (2007:59). Du Toit’s analysis 
is aimed at the previous definition of rape in South Africa; however, it remains relevant with 
regard to the definition in the New Sexual Offences Act as a result of the fact that this 
definition still frames the crime of rape in terms of consent. Du Toit argues that on the one 
hand, the law does not allow woman/the feminine any sexual agency by regarding sex as an 
act in which the woman/the feminine plays no active role and merely submits to the sexual 
agency of man/the masculine exercised on her (this is done by making rape an extension of 
normal sex by defining it as “sex without consent”). However, on the other hand, by making 
non-consent the defining factor of rape, the law assumes that it is working with a fully 
autonomous and free person who has full-blown sexual agency and no fear of exercising it. 
Du Toit articulates the dilemma powerfully: 
The law thus frames and constructs ‘normal’ heterosexual intercourse as a male-
driven, forceful and one-sided event involving woman’s essentially passive sexualised 
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body, but then in its tail, right at the end, it turns the woman’s consent, her response, 
into a crucial axis for determining the very nature of the event (2007:62). 
Du Toit (2007:62) then explains how, in rape cases, the defence capitalises on this ambiguous 
situation by focusing on the mental state of the rape victim and showing that she is too 
confused and weak to have had the agency to unambiguously experience and communicate 
non-consent. Accordingly, the less agency a victim is regarded to have, the less ‘rapeable’ 
she is, because the court finds it all the more unlikely that she could have taken a stand 
against the man forcing sex on her.  It was explained earlier how Du Toit makes this point 
with reference to the Zuma case. The implication is thus that the weak sexual agency afforded 
to women through the consent approach, is not regarded as an instance of inequality and is 
therefore not understood as something that influences their capacity for dissent.  
The implication is that, as was argued to be the case with the gender neutrality of the 
definition, a consent-based definition of rape remains unable to recognise and to deal with the 
systemic structures of inequality that simultaneously justify and are perpetuated by sexual 
violence. This is caused by the fact that the consent-based approach to rape is so deeply 
rooted in hierarchy which renders it insensitive to inequality. Accordingly, the way in which 
an acknowledgment of sexual difference is incorporated into the definition of rape through 
the concept of consent is inimical to equality, in that it works to perpetuate existing 
inequalities through the construal of the masculine dominant sexual hierarchy as natural. The 
hierarchy through which the masculine dominates the feminine is thus not understood as 
inequality, but as sexual difference. Accordingly, despite the existence of this hierarchy that 
is actively promoted through the definition of rape, the definition assumes equality between 
the sexes. This consent-based definition of rape is thus a prime example of how sexual 
difference should not be acknowledged and applied in the law.   
In this vein, and similar to Du Toit’s argument explained above, MacKinnon (2006:955) 
holds that rape legislation fails as it incorrectly assumes equality of power between the parties 
involved through the element of consent. MacKinnon writes: 
Consent often operates as a flag of freedom flown under the illusion that, if it is 
instituted as a legal standard, whatever sex women want will be allowed and whatever 
sex women do not want will be criminal. Legal consent standards do not conform to 
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this fantasy anywhere, wholly apart from the complexities that inequality introduces 
to what members of powerless groups can want or reject (2006:955). 
The argument is thus that defining rape in terms of consent only makes sense if, firstly, the 
woman is in a position where she has the freedom and power to refuse consent to unwanted 
sex, secondly, if her non-consent will be interpreted as such by her assailant as well as the 
legal system, and thirdly, if her non-consent will have the authority to ward off any unwanted 
sexual acts. In this regard MacKinnon explains that “[w]ithin its legal ambit, consent can 
include sex that is wanted, but it can also include sex that is not at all wanted and is forced by 
inequality” (MacKinnon 2005:245). Van Marle (2007:75) notes in this regard that “[c]onsent 
can only have meaning within a context where dissent and refusal are real possibilities”, and 
thus where forms of force and inequality that rule out the possibility of dissent are uncovered. 
Furthermore, MacKinnon argues that because rape, in terms of the consent approach, hinges 
on what transpired in the psychic space of the victim, and necessitates no exploration of the 
forms of force and inequality that might underlie the rape, consent is a highly inappropriate 
way of conceptualising the boundary between sex and rape, in so far as it isolates the event 
from the structures of inequality surrounding it (MacKinnon 2006:942). MacKinnon explains 
that, in other words, “when the law of rape finds consent to sex, it does not look to see if the 
parties were social equals in any sense, nor does it require mutuality or positive choice in sex, 
far less simultaneity of desire” (MacKinnon 2005:243).  On this basis MacKinnon argues in 
favour of rather defining rape in terms of coercive circumstances. If rape is defined in terms 
of coercion, proof of physical acts and the surrounding context is decisive (MacKinnon 
2006:942). The questions that are asked concern the material plane of concrete events: “who 
did what to whom and sometimes why” (MacKinnon 2006:942). Force and inequality are 
thus factors that can more readily be taken into account if rape is defined in terms of coercive 
circumstances. 
MacKinnon writes in this regard: 
Emphasis on coercion as definitive […] sees rape fundamentally as a crime of 
inequality, whether of physical or other force, status, or relation (2006:942). 
Furthermore, MacKinnon argues that even the criminal law’s treatment of force in the context 
of rape does not display an awareness of the hierarchy between the sexes that is at stake, in so 
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far as the dominant positions that men occupy in the power structures of society are not 
acknowledged as forms of force at all (MacKinnon 2005:244). MacKinnon lists the following 
as instances of such forms of force: the economic superiority and dominion of men as 
employers, dominance in the patriarchal family, the power and authority of teachers and 
religious leaders, the dominance of men in state office such as policemen and prison guards, 
and “the credibility any man has (some have much more than others based on race and class 
and age), not to mention the clout of male approval and the masculine ability to affirm and 
confirm feminine identity” (MacKinnon 2005:244). The insensitivity of South African courts 
to these forms of power comes strikingly to the fore in the Zuma case, where the effects of 
Zuma’s powerful political position, his positioning as patriarch in a big family, as well as the 
complainant’s financial dependence on him, were not considered by the court at all.  
MacKinnon then argues that rape legislation which correctly understands sexual violence as a 
practice and manifestation of inequality would frame rape, firstly, as a physical attack of a 
sexual nature, and secondly, as an attack under coercive conditions which include inequalities 
(MacKinnon 2005:247). Furthermore, MacKinnon argues that consent should be replaced 
with a “welcomeness standard” (MacKinnon 2005:247). An understanding and recognition of 
the power relations at stake should inform the court’s investigation into the wantedness of the 
sex. Accordingly: “[t]he idea here is not to prohibit sexual contact between hierarchical 
unequals per se but to legally interpret sex that a hierarchical subordinate says was unwanted 
in the context of the forms of force that animate the hierarchy between the parties” 
(MacKinnon 2005:247).  
Here it should be noted again that although consent is defined in the New Sexual Offences 
Act in terms of coercive circumstances (which constitutes an improvement on the previous 
definition, which referred only to consent with no reference to coercive circumstances), it is 
not sufficient. The retention of the concept of consent at the centre of the definition pushes 
the crime back into the ‘psychic space’ of the victim, even though an interpretation of what 
happened in that psychic space is now enhanced by taking note of coercive circumstances. 
There is no indication that the listing of coercive circumstances in the New Act has changed 
the approach to rape in courts. Accordingly, in order to transform the approach of the courts 
in terms of what they need to look at to determine whether a rape occurred or not, consent as 
an ideologically loaded concept must be removed completely from the definition.   
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In her analysis of Prosecutor v Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-96-4-T) decided by the International 
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) in 1998, MacKinnon extends her argument in an 
interesting way. In Akayesu the crime of rape was for the first time formulated in terms of 
coercive circumstances in the context of international law. The ICTR held that rape is “a 
physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are 
coercive” (par 688). The ICTR also held that coercive circumstances do not necessarily entail 
a show of physical force, but that “[t]hreats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress 
which prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in 
certain circumstances” (par 688). MacKinnon explores the possibility of extending this kind 
of definition of rape, which was formulated in the context of international law, to domestic 
rape law. She writes (2006:955): 
To make a transition to settings where no collective conflict is recognized to exist – 
for example, to global sex inequality with its attendant violence against women – 
requires bringing into focus the extent of force that exists as a background condition 
for specific rapes in these other settings. The Akayesu approach and the pattern of 
outcomes in cases since support the suggestion that rape laws fail because they do not 
recognize the context of inequality in which they operate, focusing as they so often do 
on isolated proof of nonconsent against a false background presumption of consent in 
the context of a presumed equality of power that is not socially real.  
MacKinnon thus argues that there is no clear reason why the Akayesu approach is not 
applicable to rape in domestic settings as well, in so far as rape legislation fails to address 
rape successfully because it does not take into account the context of inequality in which 
rapes happen. Accordingly, MacKinnon argues that if the force that exists as a background 
condition for rape in a place like South Africa (which she notes has the highest rape statistics 
in the world according to Interpol and the Guinness Book of World Records) is brought into 
focus, it would be seen that the Akayesu approach should also find application in our situation 
(MacKinnon 2006:955). In this regard it is shocking to note that fifty-thousand rapes of 
women are reported in South Africa each year (which is estimated to be nine times lower than 
the actual number of rapes that occur) (Seedat 2009:1011), while in the whole Bosnia-
Herzegovina conflict between twenty-thousand and fifty-thousand rapes were reported 
(Amnesty International Report 2009:5). Even though the number of rapes was much higher in 
the Rwandan genocide, it is no exaggeration to argue that rape in South Africa is happening 
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on the scale of a crime against humanity and that the consent approach is accordingly highly 
incompatible with the context in which rapes occur.  
Force which operates as a background condition for rapes in South Africa would include, for 
example, factors like the poverty and unemployment of so many women, and the “high levels 
of sexual coercion in heterosexual relations” (Mills 2010:251).  
These arguments by MacKinnon and Du Toit gain further importance in the South African 
constitutional context where gender-based violence is explicitly recognised as an equality 
issue through being listed as a prohibited instance of discrimination on the ground of gender 
in PEPUDA, and where the Constitutional Court has on several occasions highlighted the 
relationship between sexual violence and substantive inequality. The retention of the concept 
of consent in the definition of rape in the New Sexual Offences Act can thus be argued to be 
unconstitutional to the extent that it is unable to pick up on the trenchant role of inequality in 
rape and is therefore inconsistent with the guarantee of substantive equality contained in the 
Constitution. 
The problem with the concept of consent at the centre of the definition of rape in South 
Africa is thus that it introduces an hierarchical, masculine-dominant approach to sexual 
difference into the definition of rape. Through constructing feminine sexuality as naturally 
submissive, the line between sex and rape is blurred, which makes rape very difficult to prove 
in court. Furthermore, this hierarchical construction of sexuality results in a performative 
contradiction in so far as the crime of rape hinges on the response of the feminine victim who 
is understood as being naturally submissive and weak. The definition thus assumes equality 
while actively undercutting it. This is the result of the definition being rooted in a hierarchical 
construction of sexuality, which results in the naturalisation of this hierarchy. The inequality 
that flows from this hierarchy is thus not problematised at all, and is treated as equality. This 
problem is heightened by the gender neutrality of the definition which renders this power 
play invisible. Furthermore, the fact that the consent approach hinges mostly on an 
exploration of what happened in the psychic space of the victim blinds the court to the 
inequalities and forms of force that constitute the backdrop of rapes. The consent approach is 
therefore not at all concerned with the inequalities inherent to or underlying the crime of rape. 
On this basis it is submitted that the concept of consent in the definition of rape should be 
replaced with the notion of coercive circumstances.    
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Lastly, it is important to respond to the objection raised by Naylor, that even if consent is 
written out of the definition of rape, which may have symbolic importance, the problem of 
consent is likely to remain an issue in most rape cases (Naylor 2008:27), because the accused 
will still be able to evoke consent as a defence. The argument is thus that a definition of rape 
without the consent element will still in most cases lead to the scrutiny of the behaviour and 
mental state of the victim when the legitimacy of the defence of consent is considered. Naylor 
explains that this appears to be the case in jurisdictions where the consent approach has been 
replaced with a coercive circumstances approach (Naylor 2008:27). 
I want to respond to this objection with two points. Firstly, the removal of consent from the 
definition of rape has great symbolic value in the transformation of the understanding of rape 
in the social imaginary, in so far as it will resist the perception of the courts and society that 
rape is merely an extension of sex and will as a result contribute toward a dismantling of the 
naturalised sexual hierarchy in which the masculine is regarded to be naturally dominant and 
the feminine naturally submissive. It will also enable a broader and deeper understanding of 
the harms of rape, and will be able to pick up on the role of inequality in rape. Even though 
consent may thus come up as an issue in the trial, the basic legal and social understanding of 
the crime of rape will be able to develop independently of the oppressive and limiting 
masculine bias inherent in the concept of consent. Secondly, the practical advantage of 
having consent raised only as a defence is that the evidential burden then rests on the 
defendant and not the complainant. Accordingly, even though the issue of consent will not be 
completely removed from the court proceedings, its removal from the definition of rape can 
allow for rape to become a ‘provable’ offence, and can play a crucial role in the 
transformation of society’s attitude to rape on a symbolic level.  
VI   Conclusion 
In this chapter it was thus argued that, except for allowing for male victims and female 
perpetrators, the New Sexual Offences Act does not solve the problems of the common law 
definition of rape. The main point that was made in this chapter is that through the gender 
neutrality of the definition of rape on the one hand, and the retention of the concept of 
consent on the other, the New Sexual Offences Act deals with sexual difference in a doubly 
problematic way. Through the gender-neutral language of the definition, sexual difference is 
denied. However, this is done through ascribing to the notion of the universal human being, 
modelled on a covertly idealised notion of masculine subjectivity. Difference from the 
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masculine norm is thus construed as meaning ‘less than’. Femininity is therefore not 
understood as a position in its own right, but as inferior to the masculine. In our symbolic 
order, where sexual difference is not acknowledged and celebrated, the gender-neutral 
definition of rape is thus inevitably sexed. This is especially problematic in the context of the 
crime of rape where the legislation is supposed to seek justice for women as the 
overwhelming majority of victims. On the other hand, the concept of consent does introduce 
an acknowledgment of sexual difference into the Act. However, the way in which sexual 
difference features in the New Sexual Offences Act is damaging. It was argued with 
reference to thinkers like Du Toit that, through the concept of consent, masculine sexuality is 
construed as naturally active and dominant and feminine sexuality as passive and of only 
marginal significance in sexual encounters. Furthermore, any sexual activity by a woman 
beyond coyness and resistance is then often seen as provocation. By understanding normal 
sex as something in which the only role of the feminine is to submit, a sexual hierarchy is 
naturalised as sexual difference. This superficial construct of sexual difference thus serves to 
entrench a sexual hierarchy in society. This hierarchy is not understood as inequality, because 
it is construed as being natural and not something that the law has to address. Accordingly, 
the concept of consent renders the definition blind to the systemic sexual inequality that 
underlies and that is perpetuated by the phenomenon of rape. In addition, because the consent 
approach largely limits the court’s enquiry to what transpired in the mind of the victim, the 
systemic inequalities and force that constitute the backdrop for rape are not taken into 
account at all. The definition of rape thus remains unable to identify and deal with the 
problem of systemic sex inequality that lies at the heart of the problem of sexual violence 
against women. 
Furthermore, the combination of the gender neutrality of the definition and the concept of 
consent exacerbates the situation in so far as the gender neutrality masks the harmful 
construal of sexual difference that is incorporated in the definition through the concept of 
consent. Accordingly, judged from an Irigarayan perspective, the New Sexual Offences Act 
is guilty of all the mistakes in the book. In addition, the definition is just as problematic from 
a constitutional perspective, in so far as it ignores the constitutional insights that, firstly, 
sexual violence is a problem of sex inequality, and that secondly, the pursuit of the 
transformation of sex and gender relations is served, rather than undercut by a concern with 
particularities.  
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CONCLUSION 
In this thesis it was argued that the New Sexual Offences Act negates and undermines 
insights that have been reached on a constitutional level. It was shown in the second chapter 
that the way in which the ideal of equality is approached in the Constitution and interpreted 
by the Constitutional Court shows significant overlaps with Irigaray’s conceptualisation of 
equality as an ideal that is underpinned by a radical acknowledgment of and respect for 
difference (even though the notion of sexual difference has not yet been developed and 
activated in a fully Irigarayan sense by the Constitutional Court). In addition, the equality 
jurisprudence allows for the emergence of a concrete, embodied and sexually particular legal 
subject rather than the abstract, disembodied and universal subject of traditional legal 
discourse, and sexual particularity is introduced explicitly into the right to sex equality 
through PEPUDA’s listing of sex-specific instances of discrimination on the ground of 
gender. It was thus argued that the South African constitutional order has made a promising 
start in its approach towards the transformation of sex and gender relations, in so far as it 
opens up a space for the setting in motion of the kind of symbolic transformation advocated 
for by Irigaray, where the pursuit of justice and equality cannot be separated from a concern 
with the particularities of the embodied person. Moreover, the constitutional commitment to 
substantive equality is aimed at identifying systemic inequalities that traditionally fell outside 
the scope of equality, because in terms of a formal approach they were regarded as natural 
differences rather than legal issues of inequality. Albertyn’s description of the relationship 
between difference and hierarchy in a substantive approach to equality is relevant here: 
It is widely recognized that the problem of inequality is not difference per se, but 
rather the manner in which difference is tied to hierarchies, exclusion and 
disadvantage. The South African Constitutional Court has affirmed the importance of 
difference as a positive feature of society. An important indicator of the law’s 
capacity to dismantle systemic inequalities lies in its ability to deal with difference in 
a practical and normative manner. In a transformative approach, the law should be 
able to prohibit difference linked to discrimination at the same time as it affirms 
positive and future forms of difference and diversity. Fundamental to this is the ability 
to facilitate or establish new, and non-hierarchical, normative frameworks of 
participation and social inclusion (2007b: 260).  
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So whereas the Constitutional commitment to equality is aimed at dislodging difference from 
hierarchy and establishing new structures and frameworks in society that are able to deal with 
difference as a positive feature, the newly reformed sexual violence legislation reverts back to 
an approach where difference is either denied or inevitably tied to hierarchies that are 
naturalised, and accordingly not treated as inequalities. Furthermore, in PEPUDA, sexual 
violence is explicitly acknowledged as an issue of sex inequality. This is completely ignored 
by the New Act. The New Sexual Offences Act can thus be said to blatantly undermine the 
spirit of the Constitution. In this regard it can be argued that the definition of rape in the New 
Sexual Offences Act is inconsistent with the constitutional commitment to substantive 
equality of the sexes, as well as the constitutionally entrenched right to freedom from all 
forms of violence from either public or private sources. These problems are particularly 
disappointing when viewed in the light of the fact that the New Sexual Offences Act is the 
result of a legal reform process lasting more than a decade. It also points to a systemic 
blindness and insensitivity towards the oppression of the feminine that is still in place in the 
social and symbolic imaginary of our society. 
It is thus submitted that a gender-specific definition of rape, which still includes the 
possibility of male victims as well as female perpetrators, is crucial in order to more 
successfully address the crisis that we are facing in South Africa and to start the necessary 
transformation of society’s attitude toward rape. I want to argue that this is necessary even if 
it means that the criminal law must sacrifice some of its traditional and esteemed word 
economy and conceptual simplicity, in order to provide a more nuanced definition of the 
crime of rape perpetrated by a man against a woman, by a man against a man, or by a woman 
against another woman or man. It was argued that Cahill’s idea of rape as a violent sexual 
attack on a sexed body could be the universal element to anchor the meaning of rape. 
Defining rape in sex-specific language will reflect the constitutional recognition of the 
Irigarayan idea that “the neutral individual is nothing but a cultural fiction” (Irigaray 
1994:75), but that the particularities of the concrete individual are central to the pursuit of 
justice. In this way, rape will be rendered a more readily provable offence, and women and 
feminised men will be able to rely on the legal system to protect their bodies. Furthermore, it 
was argued that the concept of consent must be removed completely from the definition of 
rape and replaced with a reference to coercive circumstances.  
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt the development of a different definition of 
rape in accordance with the requirements and suggestions set out above. However, Du Toit 
provides some useful guidelines for the formulation of a definition of rape which would be 
better able to deal with the complexities of rape. She argues that the language of rape 
legislation should allow for an articulation of spirit injury, as well as sex-specific injury, and 
that the recognition of such injuries should not be dependent on the complainant’s ability to 
prove it (Du Toit 2012a:63). An articulation of the injury of rape should draw attention to the 
way in which rape destroys the subjectivity of the victim through sexual subjugation, and to 
the fact that all embodied persons are vulnerable to such violations (Du Toit 2012a:63). 
Furthermore, the definition of rape should alert the Court to the gender hierarchy that 
underlies and is perpetuated by rape (Du Toit 2012a:63). Closely related to this point, Du 
Toit notes that the definition of rape should not naturalise the violence of masculine sexuality 
and the submissiveness of feminine sexuality respectively (Du Toit 2012a:63).  
Admittedly, the development of a definition of rape which can do justice to the many facets 
of the crime, and which can respond appropriately to the complex network of ideological and 
political narratives that are supported and perpetuated thereby, is an unusual and highly 
challenging task for the legislature. However, as argued throughout this thesis, it is action that 
is demanded by our Constitution’s commitment to the protection and empowerment of 
women in South Africa. 
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